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The United States-Dakota War Trials:
A Study in Military Injustice
Carol Chomsky*
Between September 28 and November 3, 1862, in southwestern Minne-
sota, nearly four hundred Dakota' men were tried for murder, rape, and
robbery. All but seventy were convicted, and 303 of these were condemned
to die.2 After an official review of the trials, the sentences of thirty-eight
were confirmed and, on December 26, 1862, these thirty-eight were hanged
in Mankato, Minnesota, in the largest mass execution in American history.
On November 11, 1865, after three additional trials, two more Dakota fol-
lowed them to the gallows.
The death penalty was not unusual in 1862, 3 and other American Indi-
ans have been tried and convicted in American courts. But the Dakota trials
* © 1990 by Carol Chomsky. Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I
am grateful to numerous people who read earlier drafts of this article and offered many valuable
suggestions: Gary Anderson, Milner Ball, Roger Buffalohead, Laura Cooper, Daniel Farber, Mary
Louise Fellows, Philip Frickey, George Grossman, Robert Hudec, Robert Levy, Paul Murphy, Nell
Newton, Suzanna Sherry, Avi Soifer, David Weissbrodt, and fio wiger. I am especially grateful to
Chief Ernest Wabasha, Vemell Wabasha, Tribal Chair David Larsen, Dr. Chris Cavender, Reverend
Gary Cavender, and James Whipple, members of the Mdewakanton Dakota community, for reading
drafts and sharing their thoughts with me. Finally, Jaki Cottingham-Zierdt provided outstanding
research assistance; more than that, she helped me understand the meaning and importance of the
events I have described and led me to see them with new eyes. Steven Liss lived with this project
daily for more than two years; he read not just one but every draft and was my best and most
supportive critic.
Much of the source material for this article comes from primary documents contained in the
collections of the National Archives and the Minnesota Historical Society. For ease of reference, I
have used a standard set of abbreviations to refer to specific files on which I rely. These abbrevia-
tions appear in the Appendix beginning on page 96 infra.
I have, where possible, relied on events occurring before the trials and used sources and authori-
ties in existence in 1862 in order to determine the legitimacy of the trials at the time they were
conducted. However, when later events appear sufficiently part of a pattern to reflect attitudes in
1862 or where subsequent legal analysis seems particularly helpful-especially when little or no
authority existed in 1862-I have made use of later materials. I have nonetheless tried to avoid
anachronistic judgments.
1. The Dakota, along with the Lakota, comprise what is often called the Sioux Nation. In
1862, the Dakota occupied a small strip of land in southwestern Minnesota. See text accompanying
and following note 5 infra.
2. Approximately ten Winnebagos were also tried, but acquitted. See note 87 infra. Oral tradi-
tion among the Dakota and other Indian nations suggests that members of other tribes were also
tried and that some were executed. I have chosen, nonetheless, to refer to all the defendants as
Dakota, except when discussing particular trials of members of other Indian nations, because the
overwhelming majority of defendants were Dakota and the political ramifications of the trials and
executions were felt primarily by that community. I do not mean to ignore the participation of
members of other Indian nations in the events described here.
3. See generally HuGo ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3-9, 21-22 (1982).
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and executions were different. The Dakota were tried, not in a state or fed-
eral criminal court, but before a military commission. They were convicted,
not for the crime of murder, but for killings committed in warfare. The
official review was conducted, not by an appellate court, but by the President
of the United States. Many wars took place between Americans and mem-
bers of the Indian nations, but in no others did the United States apply crim-
inal sanctions to punish those defeated in war.
The unique nature of these trials raises many questions. Why did this
war, unlike others, result in trials? What meaning did the trials have for the
Dakota and American communities? Were the proceedings conducted fairly
and did they lead to just results? Was there historical precedent for con-
ducting trials of this kind or legal authority for the jurisdiction exercised by
the military court? What do these events suggest about the role of law in a
pluralistic society in which all members do not share the same assumptions
about justice and law?
The answers to these questions are of more than academic interest. Dif-
fering views about the war, the trials, and the executions-formative events
in Dakota and Minnesota history--continue to divide the Dakota and non-
Dakota communities in Minnesota. Upon recommendation of some mem-
bers of the Dakota community, the Governor of Minnesota declared 1987,
the 125th anniversary of the war, to be the "Year of Reconciliation" in an
effort to heal some of the remaining wounds.4 I hope that this detailed con-
sideration of the trials will deepen the understanding of these events and
contribute to the healing. By exploring the context of the trials and their
impact on the Dakota and American communities, I also hope that this arti-
cle will contribute to a greater understanding of the role and limits of law in
a pluralistic society.
Part I of the article describes the war itself, the trials and official review
of the proceedings, and the treatment of the accused and the rest of the
Dakota community. The remainder of the paper explores the legitimacy of
the trials and executions. Part II reviews the manner in which the trials
were conducted. Part III questions whether, under American law, a military
commission was the proper forum for trial of any offenses of which the Da-
kota might legitimately have been accused. Part IV examines the status of
the Dakota in the context of the then-existing norms of warfare in interna-
tional and American law to determine the standard by which the actions of
the Dakota should have been judged. Part V reviews the evidence presented
at the trials and considers whether it shows that any of the Dakota did, in
fact, commit punishable offenses. Part VI addresses why this war, and no
others, led to trials and executions.
The evidence demonstrates that the trials of the Dakota prisoners were
objectionable in a number of respects. The speed of the proceedings, the
nature of the evidence, and the identity of the judges all combined to pre-
4. Proclamation of Governor Rudy Perpich (Dec. 19, 1986) (on file with Stanford Law
Review).
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elude judicious decisionmaking and to guarantee an unjust outcome. The
commander who ordered the commission trials likely did not have the au-
thority under prevailing statutes to convene the tribunal, and it is questiona-
ble whether a military commission had any lawful authority to try the
Dakota.
More important, the commission tried the Dakota for the wrong crimes.
Based on the historical and legal views prevailing in 1862 and the years that
followed, the Dakota were a sovereign nation at war with the United States,
and the men who fought the war were entitled to be treated as legitimate
belligerents. The Dakota, therefore, should have been tried only on charges
that they violated the customary rules of warfare, not for the civilian crimes
of murder, rape, and robbery. Judged by those standards, few of the convic-
tions are supportable. President Lincoln's commutation of all but thirty-
eight death sentences may have been an effort to correct the trial verdicts to
reflect the proper standard of responsibility, but the flaws in the proceedings
make even his judgments questionable.
I. THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Dakota people are part of what, is often identified as the Sioux Na-
tion, a group comprised of seven politically distinct tribes-the Seven Coun-
cil Fires-that share family ties and a cultural value system, social
organization, and language. The four tribes principally involved in the
war-the Mdewakanton, Wahpekute, Sisseton, and Wahpeton-are among
those that refer to themselves as Dakota.5
The Dakota people had once inhabited and controlled large areas of land
in the upper Midwest. By 1862, however, the seven thousand Dakota occu-
pied only a narrow strip of land-about one hundred twenty miles long and
ten miles wide-along the Minnesota River in the southwestern part of Min-
nesota. The remainder of their land had been ceded to the United States in a
series of treaties between 1805 and 1858 in return for cash payments and for
money allocated to build facilities such as schools and mills. The Sisseton
and Wahpeton tribes lived on the northwestern side of the reservation, with
the Mdewakanton and Wahpekute tribes residing on the southeastern side.
The reservation also contained two administrative centers established by the
federal government, the Yellow Medicine or "Upper Sioux" Agency in the
northwest and the Redwood or "Lower Sioux" Agency in the southeast.
A. The War 6
Despite the pledges of eternal peace and friendship in the treaties, by the
5. ELIZABETH S. GROBSMITH, LAKOTA OF THE ROSEBUD 6-7 (1981). The other tribes among
the Seven Council Fires are the Yankton, Yanktonai, and Teton. Id.
6. Until recently, the events described here were widely known as the "Sioux Uprising of
1862." Because "Sioux" is not the name by which the Dakota people refer to themselves and because
"uprising" suggested an unjustified rebellion, the name more generally used now is the "Dakota
Conflict." I have chosen instead to speak of these events as the "United States-Dakota War" to
emphasize the international nature of the conflict. See Part IV infra. Since my purpose in this article
November 1990]
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summer of 1862 serious tension existed between the Dakota and American7
communities, fueled by a lengthening list of Dakota grievances against the
United States.8 The treaties of 1851 had promised the Dakota lump sum
payments in exchange for land,9 but eleven years later the Dakota people
still had not received the funds.10 After 1851, American settlers began to
move onto reservation land north of the Minnesota River; in the treaties of
1858, a largely unwilling Dakota community was forced to relinquish that
land.'1 Restricted as they were to a small area, the Dakota could no longer
support themselves in their traditional manner and so became increasingly
dependent on the goods, services, and annuity payments promised in the
treaties. When payments and delivery of goods were delayed, the Dakota
suffered hunger and hardship.'
2
In 1857, the Indian Agent withheld the annuities in order to force the
is to explore the legal issues surrounding the war, not the war itself, the factual account that follows
is brief. Additional background about the war is available from a variety of sources. Of primary
importance is the oral history as told by the present-day members of the Dakota community. Other
accounts by Dakota witnesses of the events are collected in THROUGH DAKOTA EYES: NARRATIVE
ACCOUNTS OF THE MINNESOTA INDIAN WAR OF 1862 (G. Anderson & A. Woolworth ed. 1988)
[hereinafter THROUGH DAKOTA EYES]. Several histories were published in the years immediately
following the war, including CHARLES S. BRYANT & ABEL B. MURCH, A HISTORY OF THE GREAT
MASSACRE BY THE SIOUX INDIANS IN MINNESOTA (2d ed. 1864 & photo. reprint 1977) and ISAAC
V.D. HEARD, HISTORY OF THE SIOUX WAR AND MASSACRES OF 1862 AND 1863 (1864 & photo.
reprint 1975). Other valuable sources include GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON, LITTLE CROW (1986); 1
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS UNDER THE ACT OF APRIL 16, 1889, LEGISLATURE OF MINNESOTA,
MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS, 1861-1865, at 300-28, 347-69, 386-400, 416-38, 455-
71, 543-51, 572-84, 594-601, 670-77, 727-53 (1890) [hereinafter MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND
INDIAN WARS]; KENNETH CARLEY, THE SIOUX UPRISING OF 1862 (2d ed. 1976); 2 Wn.LAM
WATrS FOLWELL, A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA 109-264 (1926); ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY OF THE
SANTEE SIOUX 109-32 (1967); MARION P. SATTERLEE, A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE MASSACRE
BY THE DAKOTA INDIANS OF MINNESOTA IN 1862 (1923).
7. Throughout this article, I most often refer to the men and women with whom the Dakota
fought as "Americans" rather than as "whites" or "Minnesotans." I have chosen this terminology to
emphasize the point, central to my thesis, that the Dakota fought as a sovereign nation against
another nation, the United States. Most writers, both contemporaneous and modern, refer instead,
to the "Indians" and "whites," emphasizing the racial division. Although the participants--espe-
cially the whites-may have viewed the conflict as a racial one, a full understanding of the war and
its aftermath requires a shift in perspective in order to acknowledge the status of the Dakota as
lawful belligerents. See Part IV infra.
8. See generally THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 19-33; C. BRYANT & A. MURCH,
supra note 6, at 33-38; K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 2-6; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 21241; L
HEARD, supra note 6, at 31-51; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 109-16; M. SATTERLEE, supra note 6, at
2-9.
9. The Dakota signed two treaties in 1851: the Treaty of Traverse des Sioux, 10 Stat. 949
(1855), between the United States and the Sisseton and Wahpeton tribes, and the Treaty of Mendota,
10 Stat. 954 (1855), between the United States and the Mdewakanton and Wahpekute tribes.
10. See C. BRYANT & A. MURCH, supra note 6, at 33-35. Most of the money was given directly
to creditors, contrary to the treaty terms and to federal law. See id. at 35-38; R. MEYER, supra note
6, at 80-81; note 15 infra and accompanying text.
11. See R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 103-08. Taoyateduta (Little Crow) lost much of his influ-
ence in the Dakota community because of his agreement to the Treaty of 1858. See Big Eagle's
Account, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 21, 23, 25; M. SATrERLEE, supra note 6, at
114-15; see also note 42 infra.
12. See THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 20; K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 5; L
HEARD, supra note 6, at 44; M. SATTERLEE, supra note 6, at 7.
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Dakota to pursue and capture an outlaw band of Dakota,13 thereby punish-
ing the whole group for the actions of a few individuals who were not part of
the community. Later, the Agent began to divide the payments unequally
among the Dakota to reward those who adopted American ways at the ex-
pense of those who maintained a traditional Dakota lifestyle. 14 When annui-
ties were distributed, the Agent often paid most or all of the money directly
to the traders for goods already sold to the Dakota on credit, based on un-
verified claims that were probably padded and were viewed with great-and
justified-suspicion by the Dakota.15
In the summer of 1862, the annuity payments were late once again. Ru-
mors spread that, because of the American government's preoccupation with
the Civil War, payments might be made in paper money rather than the
stipulated gold, or might not be made at all.' 6 The traders were reported to
have said that the payments, if ever made, would be the last.' 7 Because of
past abuses by the traders, the Dakota made plans to demand payment of the
annuities directly to the people rather than to the traders; when the traders
learned of this, they refused to sell any more provisions on credit, though
many of the Dakota were starving.18 When Indian Agent Thomas Galbraith
met with the traders to try to resolve the impasse, Andrew Myrick, the
spokesman for the traders, responded, "So far as I am concerned, if they are
hungry, let them eat grass."' 19
Thus, longstanding grievances over treaty violations and trader abuses,
combined with worsening economic conditions and pressures created by the
American drive to assimilate the Dakota, set the stage for war. An incident
on Sunday, August 17, 1862, finally precipitated the conflict. Four young
Dakota men returning from a hunting expedition killed five American set-
tlers on two homesteads in Acton, Minnesota. 20 The attack, apparently un-
13. G. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 82-87; C. BRYANT & A. MURCH, supra note 6, at 4042; K.
CARLEY, supra note 6, at 5; P. MEYER, supra note 6, at 100; M. SATTERIEE, supra note 6, at 6.
14. See THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 19-20; Big Eagle's Account, supra note 11,
at 21, 26; I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 43.
15. See l. HEARD, supra note 6, at 31, 33-34; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 110-11 & n.3. This
kind of trader theft was rampant throughout the country. See DAVID A. NICHOLS, LINCOLN AND
THE INDIANS: CIVIL WAR POLICY AND POLITICS 5-24 (1978); ROBERT H. UTLEY, THE INDIAN
FRONTIER OF THE AMERICAN WEST 1846-1890, at 45-46, 78 (1984).
16. Big Eagle's Account, supra note 11, at 27; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 112-13.
17. J.E. De C. Sweet, Mmn JE de Camp Sweet's Narrative of Her Captivity in the Sioux Out-
break of 1862, in 6 COLLECTIONS OF THE MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 354, 357 (1894).
18. Robert Hakewaste's Testimony, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 31-32; C.
BRYANT & A. MuRcH, supra note 6, at 53 (quoting Major Galbraith); K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at
6; I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 48-49; M. SATrERLEE, supra note 6, at 9.
19. L MEYER, supra note 6, at 116. Myrick was one of the first casualties of the war. When his
body was found, his mouth had been stuffed with grass. Id. at 117; see also Big Eagle's Account,
supra note 11, at 55-56; Joseph Coursolle's Story, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 57,
59; K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 11; M. SATrERLEE, supra note 6, at 9.
20. Most of the stories about the events at Acton come from the writings of non-Indian histori-
ans. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 7-9; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 415-17; 1. HEARD, supra note
6, at 52-56; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 114-15. David Larsen, current Tribal Chair of the Lower
Sioux Mdewakanton Community, suggests that all of these accounts are inaccurate, but that they
have been repeated so many times that even some members of the Dakota community report them as
though they were fact. Moreover, the focus on these reportedly unprovoked killings allows the spark
November 1990]
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provoked by any immediate act, was fueled by the increasing tensions
between the Dakota and the American settlers. If serious grievances against
the Americans had not built up over the previous several years, the Dakota
might have delivered the four men to the Americans for punishment, and
peace would have prevailed, at least temporarily.21 The incident then might
have remained an isolated occurrence, one of many so-called "Indian depre-
dations" on the frontier.
Instead, many of the young Dakota men urged their leaders to initiate
war against the American settlers to try to drive them from the Minnesota
Valley. Councils were held among the Dakota that night.22 Many of the
leaders expressed reluctance or even opposition to war. Some felt sympathy
with or had ties to the American community; others realized that a war
against the superior numbers and firepower of the Americans could not be
won, even though many of the Minnesota men had been sent east to fight the
Civil War.23 The young men, however, hoped to recapture their lost land,
drive the American settlers away, and return to their traditional way of
life.24 Many also believed that the Americans would stop payment of the
annuities and take vengeance upon the whole tribe in retaliation for the Ac-
ton killings, particularly because women were among the victims. They ar-
gued that the Dakota should strike first rather than wait for the inevitable.
2 5
The Council decided on war.
The fighting began the next morning when a group of Dakota attacked
the Redwood (Lower) Agency, a settlement populated by traders, the Indian
agent, various government personnel and their families, farmer-Indians, and
some other mixed and full bloods.26 Thirteen Americans were killed in the
attack on the Agency, seven more were killed while fleeing from the settle-
that ignited the war to overshadow the long list of grievances that were the true cause of the conflict.
Interview with David Larsen, Tribal Chair of the Lower Sioux Mdewakanton Community, in Mor-
ton, Minn. (July 23, 1989).
21. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 115; cf G. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 85 (surrender by
Sissetons of a tribal member who had stabbed American soldier). One observer reported that two of
the Dakota who killed at Acton were shot in punishment by their own people. Good Star Women's
Recollections, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 52-53.
22. As with other decisions, the decision to go to war would normally be made in Council. See
text accompanying notes 436-437 infra. As reported by Wambditanka (Big Eagle), everyone at
Shakopee's village heard of the killings at Acton, and the young men responsible for the killings were
then taken to see Taoyateduta. A Council was held at Taoyateduta's village, and war was declared.
Big Eagle's Account, supra note 11, at 35-36; see also K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 10-12; R. MEYER,
supra note 6, at 117.
23. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 10-11; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 117-18.
24. G. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 130-31.
25. See Big Eagle's Account, supra note 11, at 35-36; see also G. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at
130-31. There was reason for the Dakota to fear general retaliation against the tribe. In 1857, a
renegade band of Wahpekutes led by Inkpaduta had killed more than forty Americans in Iowa in
what became known as the Spirit Lake Massacre. These Wahpekutes were already outcasts of the
tribe, having fled west to the Missouri River Valley after killing the recognized chief of the
Wahpekutes in the 1840s. Nonetheless, the Americans insisted that the Dakota had responsibility for
capturing and punishing Inkpaduta and withheld annuity payments to force them to do so. See note
13 supra and accompanying text.
26. See K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 12-14; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 109-11; .
MEYER, supra note 6, at 117.
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ment, and ten were captured.27
Forty-seven settlers escaped from Redwood to Fort Ridgely, a federal
army outpost garrisoned by Minnesota volunteer regiments that the United
States government had mustered into federal service while the regular troops
fought in the Civil War.2 8 After hearing the news of the attack, Captain
John S. Marsh, the commander at Fort Ridgely, set out for the Redwood
Agency with forty-six enlisted men and an interpreter. Despite warnings
from fleeing settlers that he would be outnumbered, he continued toward the
Agency. The Dakota attacked him and his men at the Redwood Ferry, kill-
ing twenty-four. The remaining soldiers retreated with some difficulty to
Fort Ridgely.2 9
In the days that followed, the Dakota fought several different kinds of
engagements with Americans. The Dakota fought two battles at New Ulm,
a German settlement in a strategically significant location in the Minnesota
Valley.30 In both battles, the town was defended by men who had volun-
teered to serve in the fight against the Dakota;31 these "citizen-soldiers"
fought to protect themselves and more than a thousand women, children,
and unarmed men barricaded in the center of town.32 Other battles involved
only the military:33 attacks on Fort Ridgely, an attack on a party of soldiers
at Birch Coulee, skirmishes in Meeker County, and the final battle at Wood
Lake.34 The American forces were led by Colonel Henry H. Sibley, ap-
pointed on August 19 by Minnesota Governor Ramsey to be commander of
the volunteer forces and named on September 29 by President Lincoln to be
Brigadier General of United States Volunteers in charge of the U.S. Military
District of Minnesota. 35
27. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 14.
28. See L.F. Hubbard, Narrative of the Fifth Regiment, in MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND
INDIAN WARs, supra note 6, at 243-44.
29. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 15-16; 2 W. FOLWEL., supra note 6, at 112-14; R. MEYER,
supra note 6, at 118; Hubbard, supra note 28, at 248-50.
30. See K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 32-39; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 118-19.
31. See J.H. Baker, Narrative of the Tenth Regiment, in MNNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND IN-
DIAN WARs, supra note 6, at 455, 455-56; Chas. E. Flandrau, The Indian War of 1862-1864, and
Following Campaigns in Minnesota, in MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS, supra note 6,
at 727, 731-32. See generally 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 135-44.
32. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 80; see also K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 33-39; 2 W. FOLWELL,
supra note 6, at 134.
33. The American soldiers were members of Minnesota volunteer regiments that were mus-
tered into federal service as part of the Civil War effort. See C. C. Andrews, Narrative of the Third
Regiment, in MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS, supra note 6, at 147, 147; Hubbard,
supra note 28, at 243-44; Charles W. Johnson, Narrative of the Sixth Regiment, in MINNEsOTA IN
THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARs, supra note 6, at 300, 300-01; James T. Ramer, Narrative of the
Seventh Regiment, in MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARs, supra note 6, at 347, 347-51.
Most of Sibley's initial cavalry were volunteers from the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, organized as
Northrup's Mounted Volunteers. Although Sibley tried to keep them in his command, most re-
turned to their homes after the second battle of Fort Ridgely. M. SATrERLEE, supra note 6, at 121-
22.
34. Flandrau, supra note 31, at 733-34, 736-40, 743-46; K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 28-30, 41-
44, 62-63; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 131-32, 179-81; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 119.
35. General Officers, in MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS, supra note 6, at 701,
712; K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 30-31, 67; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 147-48. Sibley, elected
November 1990]
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From the outset the Dakota also attacked other American settlements
and settlers who had not yet taken shelter behind the fortifications being
constructed by the citizens of the towns.36 Many of the settlers were report-
edly unarmed and taken by surprise.37 In most cases, the Dakota killed the
men and took the women and children prisoners. 38 Wild stories of mutila-
tion by the Dakota in these encounters spread among the settlers, but his-
torians have concluded that these reports were probably exaggerations of
isolated instances of atrocities. 39
Meanwhile, the disagreements evident at the initial Council continued,
dividing those Dakota who supported the war from those who opposed it.
The Sisseton and Wahpeton located at the Yellow Medicine (Upper) Agency
at first declined to join the war, and some of them helped American settlers
and missionaries escape attacks on the Agency.4° Some Mdewakanton op-
posed continuing the war and urged return of the women and children hos-
tages. Colonel Sibley contacted Taoyateduta (Little Crow),4 ' the reluctant
leader of the war,42 to attempt negotiation, but Sibley demanded the return
of the hostages before beginning any discussions.43 The Dakota held Coun-
the first Governor of Minnesota in 1857 (by defeating Ramsey), had no previous military experience,
but he knew the Dakota well from years of hunting and trading with them. 2 W. FOLWELL, supra
note 6, at 3, 147-48.
36. See K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 45-50; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 110-11, 115-16,
157-62; I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 68-71.
37. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 21-22; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 123-24.
38. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 120.
39. Id Meyer concludes that the stories of Dakota atrocities "can no longer be accepted by
sober scholarship." Id Carley suggests that when bodies were later recovered, "[i]t seems probable
that the condition of the bodies, which had lain in the hot sun for nearly two weeks, gave rise to
some false charges of mutilation." K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 42. The doctor who accompanied
one of the burial expeditions denied the existence of mutilations. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 120.
Meyer also notes that not all the atrocities were committed by the Dakota. Id. On the other hand,
some "mutilation" would occur from the use of weapons like the hatchet, knife, and war club, all
standard parts of the Dakota arsenal. In addition, purposefl mutilation might have been directed at
special enemies, such as the traders, to humiliate those who had treated the Dakota with particular
disrespect. See Anthony McGinnis, Strike & Retreat: Intertribal Warfare and the Powder River War,
1865-1868, 30 MONT. MAG. W. HnsT. 30, 38 (1980); note 19 supra (treatment of Andrew Myrick).
Some of the reports, then, were probably accurate, but wild rumors far exceeded the reality.
40. SamuelJ. Brown's Recollections, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 169, 169-70,
Gabriel Renville's Memoir, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 186, 186-88; K CARLEY,
supra note 6, at 17-20; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 116-20; I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 74-77.
41. Wherever possible, I have used the English transliteration of Dakota names for individual
Dakota people. Originally, the Dakota language was exclusively oral, but early missionaries thought
that it should have a written form as well. Transliterations from different sources may vary in
spelling. When an individual has become generally known by an English translation, I have also
included the English name upon the first use of the Dakota name.
42. Initially reluctant to participate in the war, Taoyateduta took leadership of the soldiers
despite his belief that the war could not be won. Anderson suggests that Taoyateduta made the
decision as a matter of honor-to give his life and die with the soldiers-as well as, perhaps, to
regain some of the influence he had lost as a result of his support for the Treaties of 1858 and his
accommodation to American ways. G. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 133-34; see also Big Eagle's
Account, supra note 11, at 23, 25; Little Crow's Speech, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYS, supra note 6, at
39, 40-42.
43. Flandrau, supra note 31, at 741-42; see also K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 61; I. HEARD,
supra note 6, at 148, 150; Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Mrs. Henry Sibley (Sept. 8, 1862), in
Sibley Papers, roll 11, frame 666, MHS [microfilm].
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cils to decide whether to negotiate.44 Taoyateduta was loath to do so, believ-
ing that no mercy would be shown the Dakota, but two other leaders, Chiefs
Wabasha and Taopi,45 who had opposed the war from the outset, contacted
Sibley to discuss a surrender.46
On September 23, scarcely a month after the war had begun, the Dakota
fighting men returned to camp after the battle at Wood Lake to discover that
the Dakota who opposed continuation of the war had taken control of the
white captives. Support for the war was rapidly diminishing, and those who
wished to continue fighting or opposed surrender moved out of camp with
their families and belongings, leaving the others behind. Among those who
fled north were three of the leaders of the war effort, Taoyateduta, Shakopee
(Little Six), and Wakanozanzan (Medicine Bottle). The remaining Dakota
then sent word to Sibley that he and his soldiers could "come up," which he
proceeded to do. On September 26, Sibley set up Camp Release opposite the
Dakota camp.47 He entered the Dakota camp later that day and took some
1200 Dakota men, women, and children into custody. About 800 more sur-
rendered in small groups over the next several weeks.48
In thirty-seven days of fighting, 77 American soldiers, 29 citizen-soldiers,
approximately 358 settlers,49 and an estimated 29 Dakota soldiers50 had
44. See Gabriel Renville's Memoir, supra note 40, at 186-91; Paul Mazakutemani's Statement,
in THROUGH DAKOTA EYEs, supra note 6, at 194, 195-98; Samuel J. Brown's Recollections, supra
note 40, at 175; Thomas A. Robertson'sReminiscences, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYEs, supra note 6, at
177, 178-79, 181-82; Victor Renville's Account in THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 6, at 192,
192-94; I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 151-52; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 122; THROUGH DAKOTA
Ems, supra note 6, at 168. Heard quotes at length the speech of Hdainyanka, Wabasha's son-in-
law, in favor of continuing the war:
I am for continuing the war, and am opposed to the delivery of the prisoners. I have no
confidence that the whites will stand by any agreement they make if we give them up. Ever
since we treated with them their agents and traders have robbed and cheated us. Some of
our people have been shot, some hung; others placed upon floating ice and drowned; and
many have been starved in their prisons. It was not the intention of the nation to kill any of
the whites until after the four men returned from Acton and told what they had done.
When they did this, all the young men became excited, and commenced the massacre. The
older ones would have prevented it if they could, but since the treaties they have lost all
their influence. We may regret what has happened but the matter has gone too far to be
remedied. We have got to die. Let us, then, kill as many of the whites as possible, and let
the prisoners die with us.
I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 151-52.
45. Both men held important positions in the Mdewakanton community. Wabasha was the
principal chief of the Mdewakantons. Big Eagle's Account supra note 11, at 25; K. CARLEY, supra
note 6, at 12. Taopi was head of the farmer-Indians, appointed by Indian Agent Galbraith. Big
Eagle's Account, supra note 11, at 93; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 121.
46. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 121-22; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 172-73; see also
Thomas A. Robertson's Reminiscences% supra note 44, at 183.
47. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 64-65; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 182-85; see also Letter
from Col. Henry Sibley to Mrs. Henry Sibley (Sept. 27, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 11, frame 670,
MHS [microfilm].
48. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 67; see also I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 188; Letters from Col.
Henry Sibley to Mrs. Henry Sibley (Oct. 5, Oct. 10, and Oct. 19, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 11,
frames 672-74, MHS [microfilm].
49. Accounts vary regarding the number of settlers killed. Marion Satterlee, a journalist who
has been called the "most thorough student" of casualties in the war, K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 1
n.*, reported 413 settlers killed. M. SATr=RLEE, supra note 6, at 124. Twenty-nine of the individuals
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been killed.
B. The Trials
When deciding whether to surrender themselves and their captives, Da-
kota leaders had expressed concern about the treatment their people would
receive from the Americans,5' but Sibley had assured them that he sought
only to punish the individuals who had committed the "murder and outrages
upon the white settlers."'52 As soon as Sibley gained custody of the 1200
Dakota at the camp, he took steps to initiate such punishment. On Septem-
ber 27 he reported to his commanding officer, Major General John Pope,5 3
that he had appointed a three-member military commission to examine all
the Indian and mixed-blood men and to "sift the antecedents" of each man
"so that if there are guilty parties among them they can be arrested and
properly dealt with."54 At this point, Sibley perhaps saw the Commission as
what would formally be called a "court of inquiry," generally designed to
collect information for later use in prosecution or other proceedings, but
with no authority to enter judgments and sentences.55
Whatever Sibley's original intention, however, the order he issued on
included in Satterlee's total were citizen-soldiers killed in the battles at New Ulm and Birch Coulee.
Id at 65-66, 120. Twenty-six others died under circumstances not directly connected with the fight-
ing in 1862: fifteen of them were killed in 1863, two in 1864, and six in 1865, id. at 59-61; one died,
without having been wounded, six months after the war, id at 36, and two "left [their homes] for a
months [sic] trip to the Missouri river, on June 2nd, but were never heard from," iaL at 50. Kenneth
Carley, a historian of the War, variously lists 447 (based on Satterlee's account, including military
losses) and 500 (based on Governor Ramsey's estimate). K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 1 n.*.
50. M. SATTERLEE, supra note 6, at 107-08. But see K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 1 n.* (21
Dakota killed).
51. Those who did not surrender shared that concern. They made their decision to flee in part
based on their belief that the Americans would retaliate against all Dakota for the killing. See; eg.,
GabrielRenville's Memoir, supra note 40, at 189-90. Indeed, the war itself was fought partly because
many of the young men argued that the entire nation would suffer for the actions of the men who
killed the settlers in the incident that sparked the war. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
52. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Those of the Half-Breeds and Sioux Indians Who Have
Not Been Concerned in the Murder and Outrages upon the White Settlers (Sept. 13, 1862), reprinted
in 13 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF
THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, SERIES 1 632 (1885) [herein-
after WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I]; accord, Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Ma-za-ka-tame
[Mazakutemani], Toopee [Taopi], and Wa-ke-nan-nan-te (Sept. 24, 1862), reprinted in id. at 666-67;
Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Ta-tanka-nazin (Sept. 24, 1862), reprinted in id. at 667.
53. Major General John Pope was placed in command of the newly created Military Depart-
ment of the Northwest on September 6, 1862. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 60. Pope had suffered a
major defeat in the second Battle of Bull Run just a week earlier, resulting in his removal from
command. He was "a major-general without ajob" and was sent, in some disgrace, to direct the fight
against the Dakota, in response to repeated requests from Governor Ramsey for federal assistance.
RICHARD N. ELLIS, GENERAL POPE AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY 6-7 (1970).
54. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Sept. 27, 1862), reprinted in 13
WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 679, 680; see Order No. 54, issued at Camp
Release (Sept. 27, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 32, frame 109, MHS [microfilm]. The order named
Colonel Crooks, Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall, and Captain Grant to a commission "for the purpose
of examining into the participation of certain Indians and half breeds in the late murders and robber-
ies committed on this frontier." Id All three men served on the expanded commission appointed on
September 28. See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
55. See note 308 infra.
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September 28 went beyond his reported plans. The order appointed a five-
member military commission and authorized it to "try summarily the Mu-
latto, and Indians, or mixed bloods, now prisoners, or who may be brought
before them... and pass judgement upon them, if found guilty of murders
or other outrages upon the Whites, during the present State of hostilities of
the Indians.'" 56 The Commission was to conduct trials and pass judgment,
not simply to investigate. Sibley wrote to Pope again on the 28th, reporting
that he had seized sixteen men in the camp suspected of being participants in
the "late outrages" and appointed a commission to try them.57 The guilty,
he said, would be executed immediately, despite his expressed doubt whether
such action was within his authority.58 "An example is ... imperatively
necessary," Sibley wrote, "and I trust you will approve the act, should it
happen that some real criminals have been seized and promptly disposed
of."5
9
There seemed little question that Pope would approve Sibley's actions.
Sibley's letter of September 28 to Pope crossed with one from Pope to Sibley,
in which Pope disparaged the ability of the Dakota to live up to any agree-
ments, cautioned Sibley against making any treaties with them, and
concluded:
The horrible massacres of women and children and the outrageous abuse of
female prisoners, still alive, call for punishment beyond human power to
inflict. There will be no peace in this region by virtue of treaties and Indian
faith. It is my purpose utterly to exterminate the Sioux if I have the power
to do so and even if it requires a campaign lasting the whole of next year.
Destroy everything belonging to them and force them out to the plains, un-
less, as I suggest, you can capture them. They are to be treated as maniacs
or wild beasts, and by no means as people with whom treaties or com-
promises can be made.6"
56. Order No. 55, issued at Camp Release (Sept. 28, 1862), reprinted in Trial Transcripts (con-
tained in each transcript).
57. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Sept. 28, 1862), reprinted in 13
WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 686-87. The same statement appears in letters
sent by Sibley from Camp Release to both his wife and Charles Flandrau on September 28. Letter
from Col. Henry Sibley to Mrs. Henry Sibley (Sept. 28, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 11, frames 670-
71, MHS [microfilm]; Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Col. Charles Flandrau (Sept. 28, 1862), in id
at roll 11, frame 688. Sibley's letter to Flandrau was reprinted in part, with an incorrect date of
September 25, 1862, in Flandrau, supra note 31, at 746.
58. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Sept. 28, 1862), reprinted in 13
WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 687. Sibley expressed similar doubts in his letter
to Flandrau: "If found guilty, they will be forthwith executed, although perhaps it will be a stretch of
my authority. If so, necessity must be my justification." Letter from Cl. Henry Sibley to Col.
Charles Flandrau (Sept. 28, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 11, frames 670-71, MHS [microfilm].
59. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Sept. 28, 1862), reprinted in 13
WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 687.
60. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Col. Henry Sibley (Sept. 28, 1862), reprinted in 13
WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 685-86. Pope's sentiments were shared by others
on the scene. In his message to the state legislature on September 9, Governor Ramsey had called for
the extermination of the Dakota or their removal from the state. Message of Governor Ramsey to
the Legislature of Minnesota (Sept. 9, 1862) at 12, reprinted in MiNNESOTA LEGISLATURE, ExEcu-
TIVE DOCUMENTS OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA FOR THE YEAR 1862 (1863).
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The five members of the Commission Sibley appointed were Lieutenant-
Colonel William R. Marshall, Colonel William Crooks, Captain Hiram P.
Grant, Captain Hiram S. Bailey, and Lieutenant Rollin C. Olin, the last
designated as Judge Advocate. 61 Sibley appointed Adjutant Isaac Heard of
McPhail's Mounted Rangers as Recorder.62 All six men appointed to the
Commission had fought in the war with the Dakota.
The trials began immediately on September 28,63 the day Sibley issued
the Order. The charges were based on information collected by Reverend
Stephen Riggs, a missionary from the American Board of Commissioners for
Foreign Missions, who had worked with the Dakota since 1837. Riggs,
61. William Marshall was the most prominent member of the Commission. Before joining the
Army, he had been a member of both the Wisconsin and Minnesota legislatures and had helped to
organize the Republican Party in the Minnesota Territory. Daniel S.B. Johnston, Minnesota Journal-
ism from 1858-1865, in 12 COLLECTIONS OF THE MINNESOTA HISTORIcAL Socmry 183, 219
(1908). One prominent Minnesota historian noted that "Minnesota had no citizen who more ar-
dently loved justice and freedom." 1 WILLIAM WATTS FOLWELL, A HisrORY OF MniNESOTA 375
(1921). Marshall, a pioneer newspaperman, founded the St. Paul Press on January 1, 1861, and
remained its editor until his enlistment in the Army in 1862. Johnston, supra at 219. He led five
companies in the decisive battle at Wood Lake. Report from Col. Henry Sibley to Gov. Alexander
Ramsey (Sept. 23, 1862), reprinted in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 278-79.
He was later to play an important role in several Civil War battles, and left the service a Brigadier
General. JAMES H. BAKER, William Rainey Marshall in 13 COLLECIONS OF THE MINNESOTA
HisrOIucAL SociETY 150, 152-53 (1908); Johnston, supra, at 220. Returning home a hero, he was
elected Governor of Minnesota in the fall of 1865, and served until 1870. Id.
William Crooks, a graduate of West Point, commanded the 6th Minnesota Regiment at the
battles of Birch Coulee and Wood Lake. 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 150-55, 177-82. He later
served as both a Representative and a Senator in the Minnesota State Legislature. Memorials of
Deceased Members, 1905-1908, in 12 COLLECTIONS OF THE MINNESOTA HISrORICAL SocIETY 767,
794 (1908).
The other members of the hearing panel were less well known. Captain Grant acted under
Marshall's command at Wood Lake. Report from Col. Henry Sibley to Gov. Alexander Ramsey
(Sept. 23, 1862), reprinted in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 279. He com-
manded Company A of the 6th Minnesota Regiment in the Battle of Birch Coulee, selecting the
camp location that proved disastrous for the Army. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 41-44. Grant took
charge of the entire command after his superior officers were wounded. M. SATrERLEE, supra note
6, at 64. First Lieutenant Olin was second-in-command of the 3rd Minnesota Regiment at the battle
of Wood Lake. Andrews, supra note 33, at 158-61. He later was named Assistant Adjutant General
of the District of Minnesota.
Marshall sat as a member of the Commission for only 29 cases. 1. HEARD, supra note 6, at 251.
On October 15, Marshall was replaced by Major George Bradley of the 7th Minnesota Regiment,
id, which had relieved the men under siege at Birch Coulee and fought in the Battle of Wood Lake.
See Ramer, supra note 33, at 350-52. Isaac Heard reports Bradley to have been "rated among the
first lawyers of the state." I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 268. Marshall, meanwhile, was placed in
command of several companies of soldiers assigned to pursue a group of fleeing Dakota. Ramer,
supra note 33, at 352.
62. Isaac V.D. Heard was a lawyer from St. Paul who had been for many years the prosecuting
attorney of Ramsey County and was on Colonel Sibley's staff at the time of the trials. Flandrau,
supra note 31, at 747; 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 192 n.3. Heard later became the primary
contemporary historian of the United States-Dakota War, authoring in 1864 a book entitled History
of the Sioux War and Massacres of 1862 and 1863 (1. HEARD, supra note 6). Folwell states that the
duties of the office of Judge Advocate were mainly performed by Isaac Heard, "erroneously" men-
tioned as the Recorder of the Commission. 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 192 n.3. The trial
transcripts, however, do list Heard as Recorder, see Trial Transcripts (early cases), a position associ-
ated with a court of inquiry rather than with a military commission or court martial. See note 308
infra.
63. See Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 1-5, 7, 14-22, 27.
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whom Heard described as "the Grand Jury of the court," had assembled in a
tent the mixed-bloods and "others possessed of means of knowledge" of the
war and had interrogated them to determine who was implicated in the
fighting."
It appears that the Commission tried sixteen men on that first day.65
Ten were convicted and sentenced to be hanged; six were acquitted and ap-
parently released.66 Sibley continued to apprise General Pope of the pro-
gress of the trials and his plans for those convicted, 67 and Pope, in turn,
informed his own superior, General Halleck.68 On October 2, Pope re-
sponded to Sibley that he "altogether approve[d] of executing the Indians
who have been concerned in these outrages" and reiterated his distrust of all
the Indians, whether or not they professed to be friendly.69 Indeed, he later
warned Sibley that he would not sanction any treaty with the Indians7 ° and
that he had enough troops to "exterminate them all, if they furnish the least
occasion for it.'71
64. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 251. Heard said Riggs was eminently qualified for this role
because of his familiarity with the Dakota language and because of his long acquaintance with the
Dakota, their character, and their habits, which "enabl[ed] him to tell almost with certainty what
Indians would be implicated and what ones not, either from their disposition or their relatives being
engaged." Id.
65. The trial transcripts contain a separate written charge for each of the 392 trials. Fifteen of
the charges were dated September 28--cases numbered 1-5, 7, 14-18, 20-22, and 27-and one, case
number 19, was dated simply September. As the case numbers of those so dated were not continu-
ous, it is possible that not all of these trials were actually held on September 28, but that the date was
copied incorrectly from earlier charges used as models for later trials. That error is particularly
likely in case number 27, in which the charge contained the name of a different defendant, which was
crossed out by hand with another name substituted. For lack of better information, however, I have
relied upon the dates written on the transcripts to specify the dates of trials.
66. The six acquittals are reported as Case Nos. 7, 16, 17, 20, 21, and 27.
67. See Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Sept. 30, 1862), reprinted in 13
WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 694; Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen.
John Pope (Oct. 3, 1862), reprinted in id. at 707, 708; Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen.
John Pope (Oct. 4, 1862), reprinted in id at 710; Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John
Pope (Oct. 5, 1862), reprinted in id at 711, 712; Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen.
John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), reprinted in id. at 717.
68. See Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 2, 1862), re-
printed in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 705, 706; Letter from Maj. Gen.
John Pope to Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 7, 1862), reprinted in id at 716; Letter from Maj.
Gen. John Pope to Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 9, 1862), reprinted in idt at 722; Letter from
Maj. Gen. John Pope to Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 10, 1862), reprinted in idt at 724; Letter
from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 13, 1862), reprinted in id. at 733.
69. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Oct. 2, 1862), in Letters
Rec'd-Adj. Gen., NARG 94 (M619, roll 483).
70. Sibley, too, rejected any notion of settling the conflict by treaty. See Letter from Col.
Henry Sibley to Adj. Gen. Oscar Malmros (Sept. 4, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 11, frame 683, MHS
[microfilm]. Rumors were circulating that a treaty would be concluded, and both Sibley and Pope
apparently responded with assurances that they had no such intention. Id
71. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Oct. 6, 1862), in Letters
Rec'd-Adj. Gen., NARG 94 (M619, roll 483). Pope repeated similar sentiments on October 10 when
he wrote to Sibley that all who were guilty in any way in the outbreak should be hanged. Letter from
Maj. Gen. John Pope to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Oct. 10, 1862), in Letters Rec'd-Ad. Gen.,
NARG 94 (M619, roll 483). He went on to say:
We have now the means to make a final settlement with all these Indians. The opportunity
may not occur again .... Let me again say to you that I regard the destruction of every
thing that can sustain life between Fort Ridgely and Big Stone Lake as very important....
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Sibley expected another group of Dakota-those who had fled north
with Taoyateduta but later abandoned him-to surrender shortly, and he
decided not to order any executions of the convicted until after the surrender
so as not to deter the others from returning.7 2 If the "other Indians" surren-
dered, he planned to take the men prisoner and march them to Fort Ridgely
to be tried by the Commission. 73 While Sibley still talked of separating the
guilty from the innocent, he indicated that he thought most of the men were
"deeply implicated in the late outrages" and warned those returning that if
any more of the young men went off to war against the whites he would "fall
upon their camp and cut them to pieces, without regard to age or sex." 74
When several hundred more Dakota surrendered, Sibley informed Pope that
he expected to imprison all the men except the very old and that the Dakota
would "receive but small mercy" at his hands. Indeed, although he had not
yet reviewed the proceedings of the Commission, which had by October 7
already condemned twenty Dakota to death, Sibley informed Pope that he
probably would approve the results and "hang the villains" although the
proceedings might not be "exactly in form." 75
Between October 7 and 10, Pope wrote several times to General Halleck
informing him that trials were in progress and that many of the Dakota who
participated in the "late horrible outrages" would be executed. 76 On Octo-
ber 13, Pope expressed his first doubt that he and Sibley were proceeding
correctly, asking Halleck if they needed any further authority to execute
those condemned by the Commission. 77
In accordance with earlier instructions received from Pope, Sibley had
All annuity Indians must be notified that hereafter they will not be permitted on any pre-
text to leave their reservation, that all the soldiers have orders to shoot them wherever they
are found, and citizens are authorized to do the same.
Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Oct. 10, 1862), supra.
72. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Oct. 3, 1862), reprinted in 13 WAR
OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 708; see also Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to
Mrs. Henry Sibley (Oct. 5, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 11, frame 672, MHS [microfilm].
73. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Oct. 4, 1862), reprinted in 13 WAR
OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 710.
74. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Oct. 5, 1862), reprinted in 13 WAR
OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 711-12; see also Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to
Mrs. Henry Sibley (Oct. 10, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 11, frames 672-73, MHS [microfilm].
75. Letter from Col. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), reprinted in 13 WAR
OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 717.
76. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 7, 1862), reprinted
in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 716; Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to
Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 9, 1862), reprinted in id. at 722; Letter from Maj. Gen. John
Pope to Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 10, 1862), reprinted in id. at 724.
77. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck (Oct. 13, 1862), re-
printed in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 733. In fact, a federal statute
required the President's approval. Article of War 65 provided that, in time of peace, sentences in-
volving loss of life could not be executed until laid before the President for his approval. Act of Apr.
10, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, art. 65, 2 Stat. 359, 367. By Act of Dec. 24, 1861, Congress provided that, in
time of war, approval was necessary only from the general commanding the army in the field or
colonel commanding a separate department. Ch. 3, 12 Stat. 330. In July 1862, however, Congress
specified that no sentence of death should be carried out until approved by the president. Act of July
17, 1862, ch. 201, § 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598.
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planned to send the convicted Dakota and the other disarmed men to Fort
Snelling and to continue the trials there. On October 15, Sibley received new
orders from Pope, instructing him to proceed with the trials, to execute
those found guilty, and to send only the remainder to Fort Snelling.78
Meanwhile, on October 14, General Pope's report on the trials and
planned executions was read at President Lincoln's cabinet meeting in
Washington. Lincoln and his cabinet, apparently disturbed by the report
and the planned executions, moved to prevent any precipitous action.79 On
October 17, Pope wrote to Sibley that "[tihe President directs that no execu-
tions be made without his sanction." 80 By the time Sibley received that dis-
patch on October 21, he had reported to Pope that the Commission had tried
more than 120 cases, with nearly 300 remaining.81
By November 3, the last day of trials, the Commission had tried 392
Dakota, with as many as 42 tried in a single day.82 Most were charged with
murder, and a few were also charged with robbery or rape.83 Below each
charge, the transcript listed "specifications." These specifications sometimes
detailed particular murders, robberies, or rapes in which the prisoner was
alleged to have been involved. But almost uniformly the specifications in-
cluded the statement (or a close variation) that the prisoner "did, between
the 19th of August and the 28th day of September, join and participate in
various murders and outrages committed by the Sioux Indians on the Min-
nesota Frontier."' 84 Often, the general statement of participation in the fight-
ing was the only specification to the charge.
78. See Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Oct. 15, 1862), reprinted
in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 740-41 (confirming that Sibley received
Pope's two communications which modified his previous instructions).
79. D. NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 95-96.
80. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in Letters
Rec'd-Adj. Gen., NARG 94 (M619, roll 483).
81. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Oct. 21, 1862), reprinted in
13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 756, 757.
82. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 275-316 (42 defendants tried on Nov. 1, 1862).
83. The description of the trials, unless otherwise noted, is drawn from the written transcripts
made at the time of the trials. Isaac Heard, as Recorder, probably made most of the record. The
transcripts are handwritten notes of the charges, evidence, and decisions. The arraignment page of
the transcript in each case includes a list of the Commission members, case number, charges and
specifications, the defendant's name, and the trial date. In many transcripts, that page appears to
have been prepared in advance-identical in each case, with blank spaces for name and date to be
added at the trial. See, ag., Trial Transcripts, Case No. 13 (trial of O-Ton-Ka; the space for defend-
ant's name is followed by the phrase, "a Sioux Indian," which was crossed out since 0-Ton-Ka was
a Winnebago), Case No. 6 (trial of Hin-han-shoon-ko-yag-ma-ne; name was shorter than blank
space, so a long dash was placed to take up excess space); see also Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 14,
22, 27 (the name Te-he-hdo-ne-cha is crossed out in each and the correct defendant's name (Sna-ma-
ni, Do-wan-sa, and Tu-wan-u-tak respectively) is written in. Te-hdo-ne-cha was the defendant in
Case No. 2.). Trial dates were treated similarly. See note 65 supra. The transcripts contain more
than one handwriting, so probably not all notes were taken by the same individual. The transcript
appears to be a largely verbatim record, though one must expect that there are gaps because of the
manner of recording. However, since the Commission received much of the testimony, from both
prisoners and prosecution witnesses, through a translator, the testimony would have been given
relatively slowly. It is therefore likely that the record is more complete than one might otherwise
expect with hand transcription.
84. See Trial Transcripts.
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In each case, the members of the Commission were duly sworn, and the
written charges were then read to the prisoner through an interpreter. The
Commission gave the defendant an opportunity to speak and, if necessary,
called witnesses against him.85 Some of the testimony against the prisoners
was given by white women who had witnessed particular attacks or who had
been held captive and had observed the men leaving and returning to camp,
apparently after engaging in fighting. Most of the evidence that convicted
the defendants, however, was provided either by the defendants themselves
or by mixed-bloods who had been swept up in the war effort and who
claimed that they had been forced to participate in the fighting. 6
All defendants found to have participated in any fighting, whether
against soldiers or against settlers, whether in a pitched battle or in a raid,
were convicted and sentenced to be hanged. Those found to have partici-
pated only in plundering were found guilty and sentenced to terms of impris-
onment ranging from one to ten years. Of the 392 men tried, the
Commission convicted 323. Of those convicted, the Commission sentenced
303 to be hanged; only 20 were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The
Commission acquitted the remaining 69 prisoners. Eight of these were re-
leased during the early days of trial, but the rest remained imprisoned with
the other men at the ironically named Camp Release.8 7
85. Apparently the Commission formed a pool of witnesses from which it could draw when
evidence was needed. For example, Wakenyawashtay was listed as a witness in 92 trials, but testified
in only 32 of them; Thomas Robertson was listed as a witness in 66 trials, but testified in only 33 of
them; Alex Graham was listed as a witness in 61 trials, but testified in only 16 of them. See Trial
Transcripts. On several occasions the Commission called witnesses from the pool whose only testi-
mony was that they knew nothing about the defendant's participation or actions. See, ag., Trial
Transcripts, Case No. 49 (both David Faribault and Alex Graham knew nothing of defendant's
actions); Case No. 55 (Thomas Robertson had no information about the defendant); Case No. 76
(Alex Graham and David Faribault did not know anything about the defendant's actions).
86. See text accompanying notes 224-246 infra.
87. A week after the conclusion of the trials of the Dakota, the Military Commission tried
about a dozen Winnebagos who had participated in the fighting along with the Dakota. The
Mankato Record reported that a Winnebago, Hoonkhoonokaw (Little Chief or Little Priest) was
found to have been present "at the massacre at the Upper Agency" and to have stabbed Andrew
Myrick after Myrick was shot. Mankato Rec., Nov. 15, 1862, at 2, col. 1. The newspaper also noted
that a Dakota witness proved that Maznopinki was present at the battle at Wood Lake, riding on the
same horse as the witness. I. Another witness against the Winnebagos may have been Otanka, a
Winnebago who had married a Dakota woman and was living with his family at the time of the War.
The Commission tried and acquitted him on October 4 and held him as a witness after he testified
that he had heard that nine Winnebagos were at the battle of the Redwood Agency. See Trial Tran-
scripts, Case No. 13.
Despite this evidence, which would have been sufficient to convict Dakota defendants, the Com-
mission acquitted all or all but one of the Winnebagos, and there is no indication that any Win-
nebagos were imprisoned or executed. THOMAS HUGHES, INDIAN CHIEFS OF SOUTHERN
MINNESOTA 152-53, 181 (1969). I was unable to find transcripts of the Winnebago trials to compare
the results with the verdicts against the Dakota. The Mankato Record reported that "[ain unusual
effort was made by Indian officials and sympathisers to save [the Winnebago] necks," Mankato Rec.,
supra, suggesting one possible reason for the seemingly different treatment.
There were also reports that the Commission tried one Dakota woman, but acquitted her. Let-
ter from Rev. Stephen R. Riggs to Martha Riggs (Nov. 4, 1862), in Riggs Papers, MHS.
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C. Presidential Review of the Trials
Prevailing federal statutes required the President's approval before the
sentences of death could be carried out,8 8 although Sibley and his immediate
superiors had initially been unaware of that requirement.89 By November
10, Major General Pope had forwarded to Lincoln the names of the con-
demned men; Lincoln responded by requesting "the full and complete record
of their convictions" and "a careful statement" indicating "the more guilty
and influential of the culprits."' 9 Pope forwarded the transcripts on Novem-
ber 15, preceded by a letter in which he urged the President to execute all of
the condemned, claiming that "the only distinction between the culprits is as
to which of them murdered most people or violated most young girls." 91 He
warned that the people of Minnesota, perhaps combined with some of the
soldiers, would take matters into their own hands and kill "all the Indians-
old men, women, and children," if the President did not allow all the execu-
tions to go forward.92 If the President proved reluctant to decide, he sug-
gested, the condemned could be turned over to the state government. 93
Minnesota Governor Ramsey left no doubt what decision he would make if
given the opportunity, writing to Lincoln to urge execution of all the
condemned. 94
A great public outcry arose in Minnesota in response to reports that Lin-
coln might not carry out the full sentence of the military commission.95 The
Stillwater, Minnesota Messenger demanded extermination of the Dakota:
"DEATH TO THE BARBARIANS! is the sentiment of our people."'96
Minnesota's Senator Morton Wilkinson and Representatives Cyrus Aldrich
and William Windom wrote to Lincoln reciting stories of rapes and mutila-
tion "well known to our people" and protesting any decision to pardon or
reprieve the Dakota.97 If the President did not permit the executions, they
said, "the outraged people of Minnesota would dispose of these wretches
without law. These two peoples cannot live together. We do not wish to see
mob law inaugurated in Minnesota, as it certainly will be, if you force the
88. See Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598; note 77 supra.
89. See texts accompanying notes 57-59, & 77 supra.
90. Letter from Pres. Abraham Lincoln to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Nov. 10, 1862), reprinted in
13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 787.
91. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), reprinted in
13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 788.
92. Id.
93. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 12, 1862), in Abraham
Lincoln Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, quoted in D. NicHOLs, supra note 15, at 101.
94. Letter from Gov. Alexander Ramsey to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 10, 1862), reprinted
in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 787. In a proclamation to the people of
Minnesota, Ramsey had already promised revenge on the Dakota and threatened to convict them in
state court if Lincoln did not allow the executions. St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 7, 1862, at 1, col. 3.
95. See D. NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 101-11.
96. Stillwater Messenger, Nov. 11, 1862, at 1, col. 1.
97. Letter from Sen. Morton Wilkinson, Rep. Cyrus Aldrich, and Rep. William Windom to
Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 1862), reprinted in S. ExEc. Doc. No. 7, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 2, 3
(1862).
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people to it."98 An open letter to the President from "the citizens of St.
Paul" called the actions of the Dakota "wanton, unprovoked and fiendish
cruelty," predicting further violence by "these Indians" if an example were
not made by executing the convicted, and predicting vengeance by the set-
tlers if the government did not act.99
Others expressed doubt about the proper response. Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs William P. Dole, visiting in Minnesota, suggested that execution
of the sentence would partake "more of the character of revenge than of
punishment."'10 Reverend Riggs and Bishop Henry Whipple urged clem-
ency for men involved in battles or plundering rather than in murdering
women and children.101 Some in the East, more removed from the scene,
expressed sympathy for the imprisoned Dakota.' 0 2
Lincoln was apparently torn between the cries for vengeance and his con-
cerns about potential injustice to the accused.' 0 3 On December 1, he wrote
to Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt, asking his legal opinion whether "if
I should conclude to execute only a part of them, I must myself designate
which, or could I leave the designation to some officer on the ground?"'' 4
Holt replied that the decision to pardon could not be delegated.' 05 On De-
cember 5, hoping to force the President's hand and prevent sympathetic ap-
peals from "shak[ing] his purposes," Minnesota Senator Wilkinson
introduced a resolution requesting that the President give an account to the
Senate of the events in Minnesota and the evidence upon which the Commis-
sion ordered execution.106
Meanwhile, Colonel Stephen Miller, commanding officer of the regiment
holding the condemned prisoners, repeatedly reported unrest among the citi-
zens and soldiers, which he feared would lead to mob violence against the
Dakota. Indeed, as the wagon train of prisoners moved through New Ulm
on its way from Camp Release to Mankato, a crowd of men, women, and
children pelted the shackled Dakota with bricks and other missiles, seriously
injuring some prisoners and guards.'0 7 A mob attacked the rest of the Da-
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 4-6.
100. Report of the Comm'r of Indian Affairs, William Dole, to See'y of the Interior Caleb
Smith (Nov. 26, 1862), reprinted in H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 169, 177 (1862).
101. D. NIcHOLs, supra note 15, at 103-04.
102. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1862) (remarks of Sen. Wilkinson). In his
memoir of the life of Sibley, J. Fletcher Williams later charged that President Lincoln prevented
execution of the condemned "at the earnest solicitation of some pseudo humanitarians at the East."
J. Fletcher Williams, Henry Hastings Sibley: A Memoir, in 6 COLLECTIONS OF THE MINNESOTA
HISTORICAL SociETY 257, 291 (1894).
103. D. NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 99-100.
104. Letter from Pres. Abraham Lincoln to J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Dec. 1, 1862), reprinted
in 5 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 537-38 (R. Basler ed. 1954).
105. Letter from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 1, 1862), in Letters
Sent-JAG, NARG 153 (Entry 1).
106. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1862).
107. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Mrs. Henry Sibley (Nov. 12, 1862), in Sibley
Papers, roll 11, frame 679, MHS [microfilm]. The crowd was driven back by a bayonet charge, and
some 15 men were arrested, marched with the wagon train to camp, reprimanded, and released. Id.
Two of the prisoners reportedly died as a result of the attack, "the guard refusing or neglecting to
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kota-the "friendly" community-on their way to Fort Snelling; one baby
was snatched from its mother's arms and beaten to death. 10 8
After being moved from Camp Release, the prisoners were held in an
open field near Mankato, where they were easy objects of attack. On No-
vember 16, Miller reported the existence of an "extensive secret organization
including men of character in all this upper country, and many soldiers"
who would attempt to take charge of the prisoners unless they were executed
within a week. "I was informed only yesterday," Miller said, "that the Sher-
iff was very busy exciting the citizens upon this subject."10 9 On the 22nd,
23rd, and 26th, Miller warned again of possible mob violence, particularly if
word spread that the prisoners were to be moved from Mankato or
pardoned. "[I]t is daily hinted to me," he went on, "that too many of the
Soldiers participate in this feeling and determination."' 10 Miller was mak-
ing plans to build a log prison to hold the men more securely and thought
that he could "get the prisoners safely into town, but to get them out would
require a small army." '
At 11 P.M. on December 4, several hundred civilians, armed with clubs,
hatchets, and knives, attacked the new camp. Miller reported that the mob
had planned to meet with 2000 other people the next day and intended to
murder the prisoners. 112 The soldiers surrounded, arrested, and disarmed
the civilians, then permitted them to return to Mankato after receiving
promises of good behavior. The soldiers had acted rapidly to put down the
attack, with good results,113 but Miller continued to warn of a "general,
fearful and bloody demonstration" if the prisoners were moved or if a gen-
keep the mob off." Letter from Rev. Thomas Williamson to S.B. Treat (Dec. 1, 1862), in ABCFM
Papers, MHS.
108. DANIEL BucK, INDIAN OuTBREAKS 222-23 (1904) (published 1965).
109. Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Nov. 16, 1862), in Letters
Rec'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346).
110. Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Nov. 22, 1862), in Letters
Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346); Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Nov.
23, 1862), in id.
111. Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Nov. 26, 1862), in Letters
Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346).
112. Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Dec. 5, 1862), in Letters
Rec'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346).
113. Second letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Dec. 5, 1862), in
Letters Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346). Miller issued a proclamation commending the soldiers who
helped to defeat the attackers. The proclamation acknowledged the soldiers' own desire for "the
prompt and universal execution of the guilty savages," but cautioned agitators that the soldiers
would do their duty "so long as the avenues of government point to the final and certain vindication
of right and justice." Gen. Order No. 6 (Dec. 6, 1862), enclosed in Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to
Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Dec. 6, 1862), in Letters Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346). Not all
soldiers were so dutiful. There were several reports that members of the state militia were instrumen-
tal in urging the attack on the camp and that some had participated in it in civilian clothing, possibly
using arms belonging to the state. See Letter from 1st Lt. E. Kennedy to Col. Stephen Miller, en-
closed in Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Dec. 9, 1862), in Letters
Rec'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346); Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin
(Dec. 11, 1862), in id. Major Brant, of the militia, was reported to be one ofthe ringleaders; the night
before the attack he had been heard to say, "Tonight I hold in my left hand a glass of lager Beer but
tomorrow night will hold in my right hand an Indian scalp." Letter from 1st Lt. E. Kennedy to Col.
Stephen Miller, supra.
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eral pardon were issued. 114
In response to the attack on the camp, Governor Ramsey issued a proc-
lamation urging the people of Minnesota to act with restraint and to obey
the law. The proclamation was a double-edged sword, however; it suggested
that Lincoln ultimately would agree to execute the prisoners and warned
that the state courts and legislature would take action if the federal govern-
ment did not.115
On December 6, Lincoln finally issued his decision. In his message to the
Senate, he explained that he had been "[a]nxious to not act with so much
clemency as to encourage another outbreak, on the one hand, nor with so
much severity as to be real cruelty, on the other." 116 He had, accordingly,
ordered a review of the transcripts with the intention of ordering the execu-
tion of only those who had been "proved guilty of violating females."' "17
Lincoln indicated that, contrary to his expectations, only two men had been
convicted of rape, so he determined to draw the line by executing those who
had participated in "massacres," as distinguished from those who had par-
ticipated in "battles." 118 Of the forty men fitting this description, he said,
one had been recommended by the Commission for clemency, 119 leaving
114. Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Dec. 9, 1862), in Letters
Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346); see also Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin
Olin (Dec. 7, 1862), in id. (stating that although prominent citizens promised support, they thought
that "an attempt to remove the Indians below would be a proper excuse for respectable citizens to
interfere"); Letter from Col. J. Baker to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 7, 1862), in id (reporting "a
concerted movement for the forcible seizure of those prisoners" and a paper signed by 400 who
pledged to murder the prisoners if the President refused to order their execution); Telegram from
Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Brig. Gen. Elliott (Dec. 8, 1862), in Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG
393 (Entry 343) (requesting that the President, should he decide to pardon the condemned, keep the
decision secret so the military could prepare for the expected onslaught).
115. Proclamation of Gov. Alexander Ramsey (Dec. 6, 1862), in Lincoln Papers, roll 45, Li-
brary of Congress [microfilm], quoted in D. NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 111.
116. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 7, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1862).
117. Id at 1-2.
118. Id. The distinction between "massacres" and "battles" was suggested to Lincoln earlier in
communications from Reverend Riggs and Bishop Whipple. Riggs agreed that the execution of "the
great majority" of the condemned was necessary but suggested distinguishing "grades of guilt from
the man who butchered women and children to the man who simply followed with a party for the
purpose of taking away spoils from the homes of settlers who had fled." Letter from Rev. Stephen
Riggs to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 17, 1862), in Lincoln Papers, roll 44, Library of Congress
[microfilm], quoted in D. NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 103. Whipple offered a similar opinion:
[T]here is a broad distinction be[t]ween the guilt of men who went through the country
committing fiendish violence, massacreing [sic] women & babes with the spirit of demons
& the guilt of timid men who received a share of the plunder or who under threat of death
engaged in some one battle where hundreds were engaged.
Letter from Bishop Henry Whipple to the Editor of the Republican Pioneer (undated, probably Nov.
1862), in Whipple Papers, MHS.
119. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 7, supra note 116, at 2. The prisoner recommended for clemency was
Godfrey, also called Otakle, the first of the defendants to be tried. He was the "mulatto" mentioned
in Sibley's order organizing the Commission. He had lived near the Redwood (Lower) Agency for
five years and was married to a woman from Wabasha's band of Mdewakanton Dakota. I. HEARD,
supra note 6, at 189, 191. According to Heard, the members of the court were prejudiced against
Godfrey at the outset but were impressed by his presentation and inclined to believe his testimony
might be accurate. Id at 254. Ultimately the court found him not guilty of the original charges of
murdering seven white men, women, and children, but convicted him of participating in the fighting
and sentenced him to be hanged. The court's "sympathy" was reflected in a recommendation that
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thirty-nine to be executed on December 19. He ordered that the remaining
prisoners be held "subject to further orders, taking care that they neither
escape, nor are subjected to any unlawful violence." 120
D. The Executions
Officials in Minnesota worried that a violent reaction would follow the
President's decision to execute only thirty-nine prisoners. Sibley immedi-
ately requested that Lincoln postpone the execution for one week,' 21 writing
to Miller that he needed "time for due preparation and for the concentration
of the troops necessary to protect the other Indians and ... to prevent a
fearful collision between the U.S. forces and the citizens."' 122
As of December 17, the prisoners had apparently not been told of the
President's decision. On that date, Reverend Augustin Ravoux wrote to Sib-
ley requesting that he separate the condemned men from the others and in-
form them of their fate at least one day before the planned execution to let
them prepare themselves "for the awful judgement of God."'123 The con-
demned men were finally moved on December 22. Later reports suggest
that, because of the similarity of several of the Dakota names, some errors
were made in identifying the thirty-nine condemned individuals from the
larger group of those convicted, 124 but Sibley denied this claim.125
the sentence be commuted to 10 years imprisonment because he had testified against many other
prisoners. See Trial Transcripts, Case No. I (memorandum by the Commission to Brig. Gen. Henry
Sibley, Nov. 5, 1862); text accompanying notes 224-229 infra.
120. Letter from Pres. Abraham Lincoln to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 6, 1862), reprinted
in 5 COLLECTED WoRKs OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 104, at 542-43.
Sibley believed that the President would probably order further executions. In a letter to Miller,
Sibley suggested that the order to retain the remaining prisoners should satisfy the people that the
President did not intend to release any of them. "It is probable there will be an order issued for
further executions," he wrote, "but of course that is but conjectural." Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry
Sibley to Col. Stephen Miller (Dec. 15, 1862), in Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry
343). Sibley received some support for this notion from Assistant Secretary of the Interior John
Usher, who wrote to Sibley on December 10 that "I do not understand from [the President] that he
has determined not to approve of the finding of the Court in more of the cases, but he finds some
difficulty in doing so, because of the meagre manner in which the evidence has been reported to
him." Letter from Ass't See'y of the Interior John Usher to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 10, 1862),
in Letters Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346). Olin expressed a similar sentiment in a letter to Miller
three days later:
[B]e particular to represent the sentiments of the President so far as can be judged of his
order, which is specific as to the safe custody, intimating thereby, that the punishment of
the thirty-nine may be followed by a like disposition of all or a portion of the remainder, or
the infliction of such other penalty as he deem it necessary to prescribe.
Letter from Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin to Col. Stephen Miller (Dec. 18, 1862), in Letters and
Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343).
121. Telegram from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 15, 1862), in
Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343).
122. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Cl. Stephen Miller (Dec. 15, 1862), in Letters
and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343).
123. Letter from Rev. Augustin Ravoux to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 17, 1862), in Letters
Ree'd-Adj. Gen., NARG 94 (M619, roll 483); see also Bruce David Forbes, Evangelization and
Acculturation Among the Santee Dakota Indians, 1834-1864, at 292 (1977) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary).
124. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 130; M. SATrERLEE, supra note 6, at 17. One such error may
have been the hanging of Chaska, who had done much to save the life of Sarah Wakefield, one of the
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After the division was made, Reverend Riggs addressed the condemned
prisoners, translating to them the President's order and a statement appar-
ently prepared by Miller:
Their Great Father at Washington, after carefully reading what the wit-
nesses testified to in their several trials, has come to the conclusion that they
have each been guilty of wantonly and wickedly murdering his white chil-
dren. And for this reason he has directed that they each be hanged by the
neck until they are dead, on next Friday; and that order will be carried into
effect on that day, at ten o'clock in the forenoon:
That good ministers are here, both Catholic and Protestant, from amongst
whom each one can select a spiritual adviser, who will be permitted to com-
mune with them constantly during the few days that they are yet to live:
Say to them now that they have so sinned against their fellow men, that
there is no hope for clemency except in the mercy of God, through the mer-
its of the blessed Redeemer and that I earnestly exhort them to apply to
that, as their only remaining source of comfort and consolation. 126
The prisoners received the news of their impending execution with equanim-
ity, according to Dakota tradition:
Several Indians smoked their pipes composedly during the reading, and we
observed one in particular who, when the time of execution was designated,
quietly knocked the ashes from his pipe and filled it afresh with his favorite
kinnekinnick; while another was slowly rubbing a pipefull of the same arti-
cle in his hand, preparatory to a good smoke.127
On December 23, the President suspended the execution of one of the
condemned men, Tatimima, after Sibley telegraphed that new information
led him to doubt the prisoner's guilt.128 Preparations proceeded to hang the
remaining thirty-eight. The settlers in the region took great interest in the
hanging, and Colonel Miller feared violence from many of those arriving,
uninvited, to view the execution. To help keep the peace, Miller declared
martial law would be in effect from the morning of December 25, the day
white captives. The military officials claimed he was mistakenly hanged instead of Chaskadon
(number 121), who was convicted of killing a pregnant woman. Wakefield believed that no mistake
had been made: Chaska's protection of her led to stories that she had become his wife during the
captivity, and she believed he was hanged to punish him for engaging in such a relationship with a
white woman. Nick Coleman & John Camp, The Great Dakota Conflict, Part III, St Paul Pioneer
Press Dispatch, Oct. 11, 1987, at 5G, col. 3 (citing SARAH F. WAKEFIELD, Six WEEKS IN THE
SIOUX TEEPEES (1864)). Thomas Robertson reported that one 18-year-old without full mental facul-
ties was mistakenly hanged instead of another man with the same name. Reminiscences of Thomas A.
Robertson 32, in Sioux Uprising Collection, MHS.
125. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Bishop Henry Whipple (Mar. 11, 1863), in Whip-
ple Papers, MHS.
126. Letter from Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Dec. 22, 1862), in Letters
Rec'd-Adj. Gen., NARG 94 (M619, roll 483); St. Paul Daily Press, Dec. 28, 1862, at 1, cols. 3-4.
127. St. Paul Daily Press, Dec. 28, 1862, at 1, col. 4.
128. Telegram from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 22, 1862), in
Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343); Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Col.
Stephen Miller (Dec. 23, 1862), in Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343).
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before the scheduled execution.' 29 Meanwhile, the troops constructed a
scaffold large enough to hang all thirty-eight at one time.
Having apparently accepted their fate, the condemned prepared them-
selves for the execution. On the evening of December 23, the prisoners
danced and sang together, probably to demonstrate their calmness and to
honor each other and their relatives.130 On the 24th, they were permitted to
meet with male relatives and friends also confined at the camp in order to
say goodbye and send messages and words of comfort to their families.
These meetings were reported to be "sad and affecting," with many of the
prisoners moved to tears. 13' Tatimima, not yet informed that his execution
had been stayed, sent word to his relatives not to mourn him, that he died
innocent of any white man's blood, and hoped his friends would thus con-
sider his death as simply a removal to a better world.' 32 Reflecting a belief
that more of the prisoners would later be executed, Tazoo said:
rell our friends that we are being removed from this world over the same
path they must shortly travel. We go first, but many of our friends may
follow us in a very short time. I expect to go direct to the abode of the
Great Spirit, and to be happy when I get there; but we are told that the road
is long and the distance great; therefore, as I am slow in all my movements,
it will probably take me a long time to reach the end of the journey, and I
should not be surprised if some of the young, active men we will leave be-
hind us will pass me on the road before I reach the place of my
destination. 133
On the 25th, Christmas Day, the condemned met with female relatives
who had been working as cooks for the prisoners. These interviews were
reported to be less sad. The prisoners sent messages to their relatives and
friends, advising them to "bear themselves with fortitude and refrain from
great mourning"; they also distributed personal items and locks of hair for
the women to give to those outside. 34
Shortly before the time for execution, Hdainyanka (Rattling Runner) 135
dictated a letter to Wabasha, his father-in-law, one of the leaders who had
counseled against the fighting and had helped negotiate the surrender to
Sibley:
WABASHAf,--You have deceived me. You told me that if we followed
the advice of General Sibley, and gave ourselves up to the whites, all would
be well; no innocent man would be injured. I have not killed, wounded, or
129. Gen. Order No. 21, Dec. 24, 1862, reprinted in I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 277.
130. Apparently the authorities feared the celebration was the prelude to an escape attempt
and thereafter fastened the prisoners' chains to the floor. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 284. A reporter
present thought the condemned were probably singing death songs. Id. (quoting "written account"
of Mr. Riggs).
131. Id at 284, 286.
132. Id at 285.
133. Id at 285-86.
134. Id at 286-87.
135. "Rdainyanka" is the spelling usually appearing in written accounts, but "Hdainyanka" is
a more correct spelling. Interview with Dr. Chris Cavender, Coordinator of the Dakota Studies
Committee, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Sept. 29, 1989).
November 1990]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
injured a white man, or any white persons. I have not participated in the
plunder of their property; and yet to-day I am set apart for execution, and
must die in a few days, while men who are guilty will remain in prison. My
wife is your daughter, my children are your grandchildren. I leave them all
in your care and under your protection. Do not let them suffer; and when
my children are grown up, let them know that their father died because he
followed the advice of his chief, and without having the blood of a white
man to answer for to the Great Spirit.
My wife and children are dear to me. Let them not grieve for me. Let
them remember that the brave should be prepared to meet death; and I will
do as becomes a Dakota.13
6
Several of the Christian missionaries stayed with the condemned through
that night. They reported that the prisoners were "cheerful and contented"
and had asked the missionaries to tell their wives and children how "cheerful
and happy they all had died, exhibiting no fear of this dread event. ' 137
At 7:30 A.M. on December 26, the iron manacles were removed and
cords were used to secure the prisoner's arms. The men continued their
songs and conversation, and each shook hands with the soldiers and report-
ers present to wish them goodbye. 138 Father Ravoux led them in prayer,
after which white hoods, rolled up to reveal their face paint, were placed on
the prisoners in preparation for the execution. The head coverings were a
source of shame-the Dakota would have wanted to show that they faced
death without flinching139 -and after being hooded, the men became more
subdued. 14° At exactly 10:00 A.M., soldiers led the men out of the prison
and to the scaffold. The condemned maintained their composure to the end,
walking "eagerly and cheerfully, even crowding and jostling each other to be
ahead.' 14' As they ascended the scaffold, watched by a throng of spectators,
they began to sing loudly what was variously reported as a death song or a
hymn.' 42 One of the men sang of his deeds in battle, mocking the crowd
136. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 284. Hdainyanka's sense that he had been misled into surren-
dering was no doubt shared by Chief Wabasha III and the other chiefs. Before the cessation of
fighting, Sibley had assured the chiefs that he sought to punish only those who had been involved in
the "murder and outrages upon the white settlers," see text accompanying notes 51-52 supra, but the
Commission tried and convicted many, like Hdainyanka, who had fought only in battles, see text
accompanying notes 205-246 infra.
Despite his sense of betrayal, Hdainyanka committed his family to Chief Wabasha's protection.
The family ties between Hdainyanka and Wabasha only partially explain this action. Chief Wabasha
had traditionally provided for and taken under his protection widows, orphans, and others in his
band who required such support. His father and grandfather before him played the same role. Inter-
view with Ernest Wabasha, hereditary Chief Wabasha VII, Lower Sioux Mdewakanton Community,
in Morton, Minn. (July 23, 1989).
137. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 287, 288.
138. Id at 288-89.
139. See, eg., ViNE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED 177-81 (1973).
140. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 289-90.
141. Id. at 290.
142. A St Paul Press reporter viewing the execution stated that the men were singing a death
song. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 284, 290. A death song is a special song sung by a person facing
certain death. It acts "as a benedictory statement by the individual to summarize and conclude his
time of existence." V. DELORIA, supra note 139, at 180. For the Dakota, "it was the final affirmation
of the meaning of individual existence, for it glorified the personal integrity of the person. It individ-
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with reference to a mutilated body at New UIm.143
Three drum beats signaled the moment of execution. Many of the men
clasped the hands of their neighbors. As the rope was cut, and the bodies
fell, a single prolonged cheer arose from the soldiers and citizens watching
the spectacle. Then the soldiers cut down the bodies and the crowd dis-
persed. The crowd was orderly, probably due in large part to the prepara-
tions of Colonel Miller and the declaration of martial law. The bodies were
buried in a single grave four feet deep on the edge of town.144
E. The Survivors
The Dakota convicted by the Commission but not executed continued to
be held as prisoners, since no general pardon was issued. The rest of the
Dakota community also remained under restraint, most of them in an in-
ternment camp at Fort Snelling.145 Beginning shortly after the trials con-
cluded and extending well into 1863, Sibley and others continued to collect
evidence to determine if they should bring any other Dakota to trial or have
any more of the sentences carried out,146 but no further executions or trials
ualized his tribal membership in a manner bringing credit and meaning to his life as a tribal mem-
ber." Id.
At least one oral tradition suggests the song was a Christian hymn sung in the Dakota language.
Rev. Sidney Byrd, Comments at the Year of Reconciliation: Symposium Commemorating the
United States-Dakota Conflict of 1862, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, Univ. of Minn. (Nov.
13-14, 1987).
143. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 291. A song taunting the enemies who were about to kill the
singer is one traditional form of death song. V. DELORIA, supra note 139, at 180.
144. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 291-95. On December 28, Miller reported that each night some
of the bodies were being removed and left exposed, and that he daily reinterred them. Letter from
Col. Stephen Miller to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Dec. 28, 1862), in Letters Ree'd, NARG 393
(Entry 346). In reply, Sibley ordered that "every possible measure be taken to prevent the removal,
or exposure" of the bodies. Letter from Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin to Col. Stephen Miller (Dec. 31,
1862), in Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343). Apparently these efforts were not
entirely successful. Later reports indicate that many of the bodies had been exhumed by local doc-
tors, who used them as cadavers for research. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 75; R. MEYER, supra note
6, at 130.
145. The winter had been hard on the prisoners at Mankato. Three of them died even before
the executions. See Report of Major Joseph Brown (Dec. 31, 1862), in Letter from Col. Stephen
Miller to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Jan. 5, 1863), in Letters Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 343). At least
six more died of consumption, pleurisy, and other ailments during the next six weeks. See Certifica-
tion by Surgeon H. Seigneuret, in Indian Prisoners, NARG 94 (Entry 173). Meyer reports a total of
13 deaths. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 136. Meanwhile, conditions were no better at Fort Snelling,
where about 130 of 1,600 Dakota died. Id. at 136.
146. See Letter from Maj. Joseph Brown to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Nov. 16, 1862), in Indian
Prisoners, NARG 94 (Entry 173) (reporting new evidence from Mazasha (Red Iron) that Wateanna
participated in the second battle of New Ulm and the battle at the Big Woods); Letter from Col.
William Crooks to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 27, 1862), in id. (reporting new evidence from
Michael Renville that Waundan had killed Dickinson at the battle of Birch Coolie and from
Kanvisapa that Pijivota had killed nine persons near Beaver Creek); Letter from Col. Stephen Miller
to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Dec. 30, 1862), in id. (reporting new evidence from Mr. Covell that
Toonkontoecheyayda had murdered a white woman in his presence); "Charges Against We-yu-ha-
ma-ne" (Mar. 25, 1863), in id. (recorded statement of Hapan reporting that Weyuhamane had told
her he killed four women and two children at Beaver Creek and that witnesses saw him kill another
woman in her presence); see also D. NICHOLS, supra note 15, at 112 & n.43 (in January and February
1863, Sibley sent more evidence to Lincoln and sought the execution of 50 more prisoners).
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occurred. In February 1863, John Nicolay, President Lincoln's Secretary,
wrote to Sibley- requesting his opinion about what to do with the remaining
condemned men.147 Sibley apparently still hoped for further executions but
suggested that the government send those not hanged to military prison in
Illinois or in some other way remove them from Minnesota, where public
sentiment still ran strongly against them. 148 Finally, in late March, the deci-
sion was made to send the convicted men to Camp McClellan in Davenport,
Iowa. 149
Meanwhile, Congress had enacted a statute providing for the removal of
all members of the four bands of Dakota from Minnesota, leaving the Presi-
dent to select an appropriate place for a new reservation. 150 In April 1863,
the men who had been acquitted and the fifteen or twenty women who had
served at the prison in Mankato were reunited with the sixteen hundred Da-
kota still held at Fort Snelling. The convicted prisoners were transported to
a new prison camp in Iowa,15 1 while the rest of the community was moved
to a reservation at Crow Creek in South Dakota.1 52
147. Letter from John Nicolay to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Feb. 7, 1863), in Letters Ree'd,
NARG 393 (Entry 346).
148. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Ass't Adj. Gen R. Selfridge (Feb. 9, 1863), in
Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343); Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Ass't
Adj. Gen. R. Selfridge (Mar. 9, 1863), in id.; Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Ass't See'y of
the Interior John Usher (Mar. 14, 1863), in id
149. Letter from Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin to Col. Stephen Miller (Mar. 25, 1863), in Letters
and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343); Letter from Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin to Col. Ste-
phen Miller (Apr. 12, 1863), in id Sibley was apparently concerned that the prisoners would attempt
to escape when they were moved. He cautioned those transporting the Indians to "exercise the most
rigid surveillance over the Indians by day as well as by night. The manacles of the Indians should be
examined three or four times during the day, and as often during the night. They must never be left
in the dark for a single moment." Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Capt. William Burt (Apr.
11, 1863), in id. The military was also concerned, once again, about violence from local mobs, so the
plans to move the prisoners were kept secret until the last possible moment. K. MEYER, supra note 6,
at 143.
150. An Act for the Removal of the Sisseton, Wahpaton, Medawakanton, and Wahpakoota
[Wahpekute] Bands of Sioux or Dakota Indians, and for the Disposition of their Lands in Minnesota
and Dakota, 12 Stat. 819 (1863). As Meyer notes, this was the first time the United States had
chosen to remove Indians unilaterally by statute, without even the semblance of agreement by treaty.
R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 141.
151. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 142-44. A few women from the community accompanied the
men to serve at the new prison camp. Id. at 143-44.
152. The land chosen for the Crow Creek Reservation was completely unsuitable. In the three
years the Dakota spent there, many people starved because of scarce game, unsuitable soil, extended
drought, and alkaline water. See I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 295. Others, weakened by near starva-
tion, succumbed to disease. Some died from exposure because the government failed to supply ade-
quate clothing, blankets, and shelter. See R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 146-53. In the spring of 1866,
because of continued desperate conditions, the government moved the residents of Crow Creek to a
new reservation in Nebraska Territory near the Niobrara River. There they were reunited with
newly pardoned family members who had survived imprisonment at Camp McClellan in Davenport.
See id. at 155-57. In 1863 when the prisoners were moved to Iowa and the rest of the community
was sent to Crow Creek, a few Dakota were allowed to stay in Minnesota. Those remaining included
mixed-blood scouts and their families, individuals who had testified against their fellow countrymen
in the trials, and people who had never moved onto the reservations and were not involved in the
war. See id. at 258-59. Over a period of several years many of the exiled Dakota gradually returned
to their Minnesota homeland. Id. at 273. Some fled the horrors of Crow Creek almost immediately.
Id. at 148. Travel was difficult. By the summer of 1863, Minnesota had a $200 bounty on Dakota
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Between the time of the executions in December 1862 and his death,
President Lincoln received and granted requests to pardon a number of the
remaining prisoners. Sibley himself submitted the first request in January
1863. He asked for the pardon of David Faribault, Jr., a mixed-blood who
claimed to have participated in the fighting under duress, an assertion made
by many of those convicted. Lincoln pardoned Faribault on May 11, 1863,
"on evidence that he acted with the Indians under duress, and that he was
not engaged in the massacre of women and children."'15 3 At the same time,
Lincoln pardoned Toonwanwakinyachatka, on the recommendation of the
Judge Advocate General, because the record "was altogether too imperfect
to justify the government in carrying the sentence into execution."' 15 4
On April 7, 1864, Reverend Riggs requested pardons for four prisoners
who he believed had not participated in the fighting.' 5 5 Sibley concurred,
noting that there was "reasonable doubt of the guilt of the prisoners named
from circumstances that have transpired since their trial by the Military
Commission, and.., they are entitled to the benefit of that doubt."'15 6 Lin-
coln granted the pardon on April 19, 1864.157 On April 30, 1864, at the
urging of Reverend Thomas Williamson, the President issued an order par-
scalps which, combined with revenge motives, made Dakota travel in Minnesota extremely danger-
ous. Dakota people who wished to return home to one of a few remaining safe havens had to travel
by night and hide in ditches under cover during the day. Interview with Mrs. Vernell Wabasha,
Lower Sioux Mdewakanton Community, in Morton, Minn. (July 23, 1989).
153. Gen. Order No. 120, May 11, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG 94; Letter from Brig.
Gen. Henry Sibley to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Jan. 26, 1863), accompanied by endorsements of J.
Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Feb. 16, 1863) and pardon by Pres. Abraham Lincoln (May 11, 1863), in
Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343) (also available in Court Martial Cases, NARG
153, File NN3132).
154. Gen. Order No. 120, May 11, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG 94; see Trial Transcripts,
Case No. 105; Annotation of Recommendation of J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt, in Court Martial Cases,
NARG 153, File NN3132. The evidence at trial consisted solely of the defendant's statement that he
had fired one shot at the battle of Fort Ridgely and two shots at the battle of New Ulm. Yet nothing
distinguishes this case from many others that resulted in convictions and death sentences. See ag.,
Trial Transcripts, Case No. 106 (only evidence was defendant's testimony that he fired one shot at
the first battle of Fort Ridgely and two shots at Birch Coulee); Case No. 111 (only evidence was
defendant's testimony that he took a few turnips at the Big Woods); Case No. 190 (only evidence
was defendant's testimony that he fired two shots at the second battle of Fort Ridgely); Case No. 191
(only evidence was defendant's testimony that he fired one shot at the battle of New Ulm). There is
no indication why Toonwanwakinyachatka was singled out for a pardon at this early date.
155. Letter from Rev. Stephen Riggs to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Apr. 7, 1864), in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132. Riggs requested pardons for Eyojanjan (No. 237),
Tahohpewakan (No. 238), Tapeytatanka (No. 95), and Weeyacha (No. 102). Eyojanjan and
Tahohpewakan had been with Narcisse Freniere (No. 236)-who was acquitted-in a group "not
shown to have been near to where any white man was killed, or to have participated at all in the
massacres." Id Tapeytatanka had testified at his trial that he had saved some escaping missionaries
by preventing a group of Dakota from following their trail. The Commission had not believed him
and had sentenced him to hang. Riggs confirmed that Tapeytatanka had told the truth. Id.
Weeyooha had been acquitted by the Commission and released but had afterwards been condemned
on evidence which Riggs said appeared "to have been vindictive in its character." Id
156. Notation by Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Apr. 8, 1864), in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153,
File NN3132.
157. Notation by Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Apr. 19, 1864), in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153,
File NN3132.
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doning twenty-six more prisoners, 158 and on August 27, 1864, the com-
mander of the Camp in Davenport received an order pardoning Tatememah,
apparently the same prisoner saved from the gallows just days before the
execution.1 59 The pardon of one prisoner, Wambditanka (Big Eagle), was
delayed by official skepticism of the pardon document, a penciled note from
Lincoln on the back of a letter.160 Apparently the confusion was resolved
because Wambditanka was later released. 161
Beginning as early as July 1865, after two years of imprisonment at
Camp McClellan, there was discussion about releasing the remaining prison-
ers, in part "because of the expense of feeding them and guarding them." 162
General Pope expressed some reluctance about releasing the men and al-
lowing them the freedom to join with what he termed other "hostile Indi-
ans" near the Crow Creek Reservation. 163 Nevertheless, orders arrived in
late September to transport the men as soon as spring navigation opened.
Finally, on March 22, 1866, President Johnson ordered remission of the
sentences of death and release of the 177 remaining prisoners.164 They,
along with the community from Crow Creek, were transported to the Nio-
brara Reservation, newly appropriated for them in the northeast corner of
the Nebraska Territory.165
F. Later Trials
The Army convened additional military commissions in 1863 and 1864
to try three more Dakota captured well after the fighting ended in September
158. Order for Pardon of Sioux Indians, Apr. 30, 1864, reprinted in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 104, at 325-26. Despite the official pardons, these and other
pardoned Dakota had difficulty returning to their families. Once released, the men apparently were
not eligible to receive further supplies from the Army and had no way to support themselves locally
or to travel to reunite with their families. If they could somehow provision themselves for that
journey, they were then in danger of being killed on the trip. Three prisoners were held as long as
eight months after being pardoned because no provision was made for them once released. Letter
from Rev. Thomas Williamson to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 15, 1864), in Indian Prisoners,
NARG 94 (Entry 173); Letter from Capt. George Judd to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Aug. 27, 1864),
in id.
159. See text accompanying note 128 supra. The spellings of the names differed, but the release
order probably referred to the same individual.
160. On October 26, 1864, President Lincoln met with one George Dow, who must have in-
quired about Wambditanka. Lincoln wrote, in pencil, on the back of Dow's letter of introduction,
"Let the Indian 'Big Eagle' now confined at Davenport, Iowa be discharged at once." When Dow
presented this pardon to the commander of the camp in Davenport, he and the order were treated
"with much rudeness and contempt." Letter from George Dow to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Oct. 31,
1864), in Indian Prisoners, NARG 94 (Entry 173).
161. See Letter from Rev. Thomas Williamson to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 15, 1864), in
Indian Prisoners, NARG 94 (Entry 173).
162. Letter from Congressman H. Price to See'y of War Edwin Stanton (July 8, 1865), in
Letters Ree'd-Adj. Gen., NARG 94 (M619, roll 483).
163. Letter from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to See'y of War Edwin Stanton (Sept. 22, 1865), in
Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132 (also available in Letters Ree'd-Adj. Gen., NARG
94 (M619)).
164. Gen. Ct. Martial Order No. 86, Mar. 22, 1866, in Military Orders, NARG 94.
165. See note 152 supra.
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1862. These later trials and their review differed significantly from the trials
conducted in 1862.
The first to be tried was Wowinape, the sixteen-year-old son of Taoyat-
eduta. After the end of the fighting in September 1862, Taoyateduta and a
small group of followers had fled north, but he, his son, and several others
later returned to the vicinity of Mankato. 166 On July 3, 1863, Taoyateduta
and Wowinape were surprised by two settlers while picking berries. The
settlers shot and killed Taoyateduta;167 Wowinape temporarily escaped, but
was captured several weeks later. x68 On August 22, 1863, Sibley ordered the
formation of a military commission at Fort Abercrombie to try
Wowinape. 169
Wowinape was tried on the general charge of participating in the
murders and massacres between August 18 and September 23, 1862, and for
attempted murder and horse stealing at frontier settlements near Devil's
Lake in May, June, or July 1863.170 Mixed-blood witnesses testified that
Wowinape had been present at the second battle of New Uln, as well as at
fighting in the Big Woods and Hutchinson. 17 1 Others described Wowinape's
capture and his statement that he and his father had come to steal horses. 172
The trial concluded on September 28, 1863, with a guilty verdict and a sen-
tence of death by hanging. 173 Sibley, as the officer convening the Commis-
166. See generally G. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 164-77. Taoyateduta and 16 of his followers
returned to Minnesota in June 1863. K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 83-84; M. SATrERLEE, supra note
6, at 81. Taoyateduta told several people he was returning to kill more Americans but told his son
that he was returning to steal horses that they needed to maintain their existence on the plains. G.
ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 176-77.
167. The desire for revenge and a bounty on Dakota scalps motivated violence against the
Dakota. See note 152 supra.
168. Transcript of the Commission Proceedings in Trial of Wo-we-na-pa, in Court Martial
Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132 (also available in Sioux War Trials, MHS P1423).
169. Spec. Order No. 300, Aug. 22, 1863, in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
The order specified trial of three prisoners in addition to Wowinape, but I have found a record only
of Wowinape's trial.
170. Transcript of the Commission Proceedings in Trial of Wo-we-na-pa, in Court Martial
Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
171. Among the witnesses was David Faribault, Jr., who had been convicted in the first trials
and had only recently been pardoned by the President. See text accompanying note 153 supra. Dur-
ing Wowinape's trial, Faribault was asked by a member of the Commission where he had been
during the battle of Wood Lake; had Faribault answered, he might have incriminated himself. The
transcript reflects that the Commission then went into private session and determined that the ques-
tion should not be answered. See Transcript of the Commission Proceedings in the Trial of Wo-we-
na-pa, in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
172. Transcript of the Commission Proceedings in the Trial of Wo-we-na-pa, in Court Martial
Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
173. The Commission recessed from August 25, 1863 to September 23, 1863 to move its pro-
ceedings from Fort Abercrombie to Fort Snelling in order to hear from witnesses more readily avail-
able there. Spec. Order No. 303, Aug. 25, 1863, in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
Nathan Lamson, one of the settlers who had discovered Wowinape and Taoyateduta, served as a
witness against Wowinape. Lieutenant Colonel Jennison had previously written to Sibley suggesting
that the Commission hear Lamson's testimony because, according to Jennison, Lamson claimed that
Wowinape had shot at him just as he shot at Taoyateduta. Jennison suggested that this proved "the
'boy' to be no such innocent lad as might otherwise be believed." Letter from Lt. Col. Samuel Jenni-
son to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Sept. 8, 1863), in Letters Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346). Lamson
ultimately testified only that he thought that all the shots fired at him could not have been fired by
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sion, approved the sentence. 174
To this point, Wowinape's trial closely resembled the earlier trials, but
the subsequent review took an unusual turn. After Sibley indicated his ap-
proval of the finding and sentence, Major General Pope forwarded the pro-
ceedings to the Secretary of War and then to Judge Advocate General Holt.
Instead of reviewing the trial, however, these officials returned the transcript
to Pope with a reference to army regulations and to a statute effective De-
cember 24, 1861, that required the General Commanding the Army in the
Field (Pope, in this case) to confirm or disapprove the proceedings. Pope's
neutral "referral" was not enough. 175 The same statute and regulations had
been in effect in November 1862, but no one sought Pope's official approval
at that time.
Given Pope's vociferously expressed intention to exterminate the Dakota
or drive them out entirely,176 one would have expected him to confirm the
proceedings without hesitation. Instead, with a sudden display of concern
for legal nicety, Pope found a "technical difficulty" that prevented him from
confirming the proceedings. 177 Article 65 of the Articles of War, as
amended in 1830, specified that an officer otherwise authorized to convene a
court-martial could not do so if he were also the "accuser or prosecutor."' 178
An officer was the "accuser" if he either originated the charge or adopted
and became responsible for it, unless he acted solely in an official capacity to
order an investigation after facts warranting such an investigation were
brought to his attention.1 79 The amendment to article 65 was designed to
avoid the impropriety or the appearance of impropriety that exists when the
individual passing on a court-martial proceeding might be biased because he
also brought the charges.180 Although article 65 referred by its terms only
to courts-martial, and not to military commissions, Pope suggested that it
one man, although Wowinape, in his statement, had claimed that his father was the only one who
had fired. The adjournment also permitted testimony from mixed-bloods who were serving as smuts
for Sibley's 1863 expedition against the Dakota who had fled north after the war. See Letter from Ist
Lt. and J. Adv. Frank Pratt to Lt. Col. Samuel Jennison, Pres. of the Military Comm'n (Aug. 25,
1863), in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
174. See Endorsements to Wowinape Trial Transcript (Oct. 1, 1863) (Sibley's approval), in
Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
175. See id. at Oct. 8, 1863 (Pope's referral to the President); id. at Oct. 11, 1863 (forwarded by
General-in-Chief Halleck to Secretary of War Stanton); id. at Oct. 12, 1863 (referred to Judge Advo-
cate General Holt by Secretary of War); id. at Oct. 13, 1863 (returned to Secretary of War with
Holt's remarks on requiring confirmation); id. at Oct. 16, 1863 (returned to General Pope by the
Secretary of War with remarks of Judge Advocate General).
176. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
177. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Oct. 29, 1863), in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132. Pope developed greater sympathy for the Indians as he
became more familiar with their condition and treatment, and he advocated substantial reforms in
federal policy towards them. R. ELLIS, supra note 53, at 39-44. Perhaps this new-found perspective
sensitized him to the plight of the Dakota by the time he was asked to review the trial of Wowinape,
though it did not prevent him from approving the later trials of Wakanozanzan and Shakopee. See
text accompanying notes 198-200 infra.
178. Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 179, § 1, 4 Stat. 417.
179. 1 W. WINTHROP, MILrrARY LAW 68-69 (1886).
180. Id. at 67 & n.4.
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might apply here, too, by analogy. Believing that the proceedings against
Wowinape were "in violation of the spirit of the 65th Article of War, but
[that] there... [was] a possible doubt," he submitted the matter for decision
to Judge Advocate General Holt.181 Holt agreed that article 65 had been
violated in spirit,18 2 and Pope thereafter disapproved the proceedings. 183
Upon hearing of Pope's disapproval of Wowinape's trial, Sibley wrote to
Holt to justify his own actions. He noted, quite accurately, that "a precisely
similar condition of things existed in 1862, when nearly four hundred Indian
warriors, taken prisoners by the forces under my command, were tried and
the greater number condemned to death by a Military Commission ordered
by me upon charges and specifications preferred by myself."' 1 4 If
Wowinape's trial was irregular and subject to disapproval, so, too, were the
earlier trials. Sibley argued that the provision was designed only to protect
inferior officers from the prejudice their superiors might feel toward them,
and such hostility could not be "pre-supposed to exist" where the defendants
were enlisted men or prisoners of war. 8 5 Sibley's superiors disagreed. De-
spite the disapproval of the proceedings, however, Wowinape was not re-
leased but was sent to Camp McClellan to be confined with the other
prisoners "until the President shall act upon the case."' 8 6
The other two Dakota tried by military commission in 1864 were less
fortunate. Wakanozanzan and Shakopee, both chiefs who had fled north
with Taoyateduta, were kidnapped from Canadian soil in January 1864 by
British soldiers. 87 In May the two prisoners were taken to Fort Snelling,
where, on November 14, Sibley convened a military commission.18  On No-
vember 25, the Commission formally charged Wakanozanzan with murder-
ing Philander Prescott and "sundry white men[,] women and children whose
names are unknown," and with participating in the "murders[,] massacres
181. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Oct. 29, 1863), in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
182. J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Nov. 3, 1863), inscribed on back of
Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Oct. 29, 1863), supra note 177. Holt
agreed that the Articles of War did not, by their own terms, apply to the trial of Wowinape but that
"the reasons for the law" would nonetheless support its applicability. He concluded that "sufficient
ground is established to justify a disapproval of the proceedings." Id
183. Letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope to J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Oct. 29, 1863), supra note
177.
184. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Dec. 7, 1863), in Sioux
War Trials, MHS P1423.
185. Id
186. See Endorsements to Wowinape Trial Transcript (Nov. 13, 1863), in Court Martial Cases,
NARG 153, File NN3132 (also available in Sioux War Trials, MHS P1423).
187. See 2 W. FOLWELL, supra note 6, at 293, 443-44. The British soldiers acted at the behest
of Major Edwin Hatch, who had been authorized, over the objections of both Pope and Sibley, to
raise an independent battalion to fight the remaining Dakota who had fled north and had engaged in
skirmishes with American settlers. Hatch had no authority to cross onto Canadian soil to capture
the two Dakota, so he resorted to soliciting the unofficial aid of the British soldiers. Id 290, 293,
443-44.
188. Folwell suggests that the delay in convening the Commission was due to the absence of
many of Sibley's troops and the consequent difficulty in finding sufficient numbers of commissioned
officers to serve on the panel. Id at 445.
November 1990]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
and other outrages committed by the Sioux Indians upon the white settlers
of the State of Minnesota." 189 In a departure from the earlier trials, each
specification recited that Wakanozanzan was "a Sioux Indian of a band
under the protection ... of the United States," perhaps reflecting an awak-
ened sensibility to the sovereignty questions raised by the trials.' 90 At the
outset, Wakanozanzan asked for permission to introduce counsel. The re-
quest was granted, but only after a day's adjournment to seek guidance from
headquarters. The proceedings were then continued for two days at the de-
fendant's request. When the court reconvened, Wakanozanzan still did not
have counsel present but said that he was ready to proceed.19'
Five witnesses testified against Wakanozanzan-one American woman
and four Dakota-none of whom actually had seen the defendant kill any-
one. Witnesses testified that Wakanozanzan had favored killing whites, that
he willingly had gone out with war parties and had led some of them, that he
had boasted of killing whites, that he had threatened "civilized" and
"friendly" Indians if they didn't join the fight, and that he was a member of
the group that had killed Philander Prescott.192
The defendant offered no evidence but requested time to prepare a final
defense. The Commission adjourned for two days, at which time Waka-
nozanzan submitted a written statement prepared by two attorneys, ex-Gov-
ernor Willis A. Gorman and future Senator and Governor Cushman K.
Davis.' 93 The statement challenged the jurisdiction of the court because
Wakanozanzan had been seized from a foreign state, and it denied that he
189. Transcript of the Commission Proceeding in the Trial of Tahtaechashnahmanne, in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132. The transcript refers to the defendant as 'Tahta-e-chash-
nah-manne alias Medicine Bottle." It is unclear why the Dakota name used in the transcript differs
from the one by which the defendant was generally known (Wakanozanzan).
190. See generally Part IV infra.
191. Transcript of the Commission Proceeding in the Trial of Tahtaechashnahmanne, in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132; Letter from J. Adv. Morrison to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin
Olin (Nov. 25, 1864), in Indian Prisoners, NARG 94 (Entry 173).
192. Transcript of the Commission Proceeding in the Trial of Tahtaechashnahmanne, in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132. A member of the Commission demonstrated a special
concern for the status of the Dakota by asking one Dakota witness if Wakanozanzan and his band
were under the protection of the United States. The witness acknowledged that they were "annuity
Indians" and under such protection. "Annuity Indian" referred to those Dakota who received an-
nual payments pursuant to the Treaties of 1851 and 1858, in which the Sisseton, Wahpeton,
Wahpekute, and Mdewankanton sold large tracts of land in exchange for lump sum and annual
payments to the bands, to be distributed to individual tribe members. See text following note 5 supra.
193. Transcript of the Commission Proceeding in the Trial of Tahtaechashnahmanne, in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132. Gorman was better known than Davis, having served as
territorial governor of Minnesota from 1853 to 1857 and as a delegate to the state constitutional
convention. He had dealt with the Dakota earlier when they were removed to the Redwood and
Yellow Medicine Reservations after the treaty of 1851. Baker, supra note 61, at 51-53; Life and
Public Services of Hon. Willis A. Gonnan, in 3 COLLECTIONS OF THE MINNESOTA HISTORICAL
SOcIETY 314, 318-21 (1880). Gorman's prior experiences suggest some of his motivations in assisting
both Wakanozanzan and Shakopee, an act probably unpopular in the Minnesota community. While
serving as commander of a military division in Arkansas during the Civil War, Gorman established
"a sort of court of civil jurisdiction, which was ordered to proceed according to... the common
law," apparently in an effort to subordinate the military to the civil law. Baker, supra note 61, at 57.
At the time of Gorman's death, Davis noted in his eulogy that Gorman had always favored civilian
law over military power. Life and Public Services of Hon. Willis A. Gorman, supra, at 329. In repre-
[Vol. 43:13
U.S.-DAKOTA WAR TRIALS
had participated in the events charged or that he told anyone that he had
been connected with Prescott's death. The Commission returned guilty ver-
dicts on both charges-murder and participation in the fighting-but found
Wakanozanzan not guilty of the specification of killing United States
soldiers.1 94
The proceedings against Shakopee began immediately after Wakan-
ozanzan's trial concluded. 195 Shakopee, too, asked for time to introduce
counsel, and the Commission granted a one-day adjournment. When the
proceedings resumed, Shakopee stated that Mr. Gorman had agreed to de-
fend him, but would not be available until December 9, six days later.
Shakopee asked for another adjournment until that date, but the Commis-
sion denied the request. Shakopee was then tried on charges of murder and
"general participation in the murders[,] massacres and other outrages." The
specifications charged various acts of killing, with an "unknown murderous
weapon," various unidentified white men, women, and children. As with
Wakanozanzan, the specifications recited that Shakopee acted "with other
Indians of the same tribe under the protection of the United States." At the
outset of their testimony, each of the six witnesses, all Dakota, stated that
Shakopee was an "annuity Indian" and under the protection of the United
States, an issue previously raised only in the trial of Wakanozanzan. As in
the trial of Wakanozanzan, none of the witnesses had actually seen Shakopee
do anything, but each repeated what Shakopee had told others about various
killings. Shakopee submitted a written statement denying that he had fought
against the whites or had claimed to have killed any of them. The Commis-
sion then issued its verdict, finding him guilty of both charges-murder and
general participation in the fighting-but, as with Wakanozanzan, not guilty
of the two specifications charging him with shooting at and killing
soldiers.196
The Commission sentenced both Wakanozanzan and Shakopee to be
hanged. Sibley confirmed the sentences on December 14, 1864, and set exe-
cution for January 20, 1865. He forwarded the proceedings to Judge Advo-
cate General Holt with a notation that the two were "chiefs of two of the
bands most deeply implicated" in the war, that it was a matter of notoriety
that these men "not only [led] in instigating their people to attack the whites,
but in personal participation in the indiscriminate butchery of men, women
and children." He noted that British subjects, not American soldiers or citi-
senting Wakanozanzan and Shakopee, Gorman apparently was continuing his efforts to subordinate
military authority to civil law.
194. Transcript of the Commission Proceeding in the Trial of Tahtaechashnahmanne, in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
195. Transcript of the Commission Proceeding in the Trial of Shakopee, in Court Martial
Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
196. Ia The verdict also struck from the charges and specifications the allegation that
Shakopee had acted "in company with other Indians of the same tribe," the indication of the coun-
ties in which certain acts had occurred, the statement that one family Shakopee killed had "three or
more" women and children, and the description that Shakopee's participation in the "murders, mas-
sacres and other outrages" had been "general." Ia No explanation was given for the changes.
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zens, had kidnapped the defendants and that the escape of these two from
punishment "would have a very bad effect upon the Indians generally. ' 197
Two weeks later, on December 27, 1864, Holt returned the proceedings
to General Pope for his confirmation in order to comply with the require-
ment, first noted after the trial of Wowinape, that the general commanding
the army in the field confirm or disapprove the proceedings. 198 Pope con-
firmed the judgments on January 20, 1865,199 ignoring the defect that had
caused him to disapprove Wowinape's trial, though these trials suffered from
the same infirmity.200 In March, Holt reviewed the transcripts and the chal-
lenge to jurisdiction, and he strongly recommended to President Lincoln
that the executions be carried out.201
On August 29, 1865, President Johnson, who had taken office after Lin-
coln's assassination, approved the sentences. The executions were scheduled
for October 11, but Johnson postponed them the day before on the recom-
mendation of the Secretary of the Interior, who had received a plea from
Bishop Grace of St. Paul.20 2 Holt again recommended execution, pointing to
the major part these individuals had played in the fighting as described in
Sibley's earlier letter.203 The two Dakota were hanged at Fort Snelling on
November 11, 1865.204
II. FAIRNESS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A. Procedural and Evidentiary Defects
1. Rapidity of the trials.
It has become a commonplace observation that the United States-Dakota
war trials were unfair.205 The Commission conducted the trials very rapidly,
197. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Dec. 14, 1864), in
Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132 (also available in Sioux War Trials, MHS P1423).
198. Letter from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Dec. 27, 1864), in Court
Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132; see text accompanying note 175 supra.
199. Endorsement to Transcript of the Commission Proceeding in the Trial of Shakopee, in
Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
200. See text accompanying notes 176-183 supra. The record contains no explanation of the
different results and no indication that Pope or his superiors even detected the parallel. Perhaps
sympathy for the position of the 16-year-old Wowinape, who had done no more than fight in battles,
may have been a factor leading to Pope's disapproval on technical grounds; no such sympathy would
have attached to those seen as leaders of the war.
201. Letter from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 25, 1865), in
Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132. With respect to Shakopee, Holt noted particularly
that "the prisoner is shown to have been one of a tribe of Indians receiving an annuity from the
government of the United States," 1d., again obliquely raising the issue of sovereignty status.
202. Letter from See'y of the Interior James Harlan to Sec'y of War Edwin Stanton (Oct. 10,
1865), in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132; Letter from Pres. Andrew Johnson to
Sec'y of War Edwin Stanton (Oct. 10, 1865), in id.
203. Letter from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Sec'y of War Edwin Stanton (Nov. 7, 1865), in
Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132 (quoting Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to J.
Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Dec. 14, 1864), supra note 197).
204. Letter from Ass't Adj. Gen. H. Clay Wood to Sec'y of War Edwin Stanton (Nov. 20,
1865), in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132.
205. See eg., G. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 164-65; K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 69; 1VL
SATrERLEE, supra note 6, at 17, 79.
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with as many as thirty or forty trials in a single day. After hearing the evi-
dence, the Commission would clear the room, deliberate for a few minutes,
and announce the verdict. With the exception of the first case, it appears that
the Commission had little trouble reaching its verdicts. Isaac Heard, the Re-
corder for the Commission, attempted to justify the speed: "The trials," he
said, "were elaborately conducted until the commission became acquainted
with the details of the different outrages and battles, and then, the only point
being the connection of the prisoner with them, five minutes would dispose
of a case." 2"6
Even Reverend Riggs, who assisted the Commission by securing infor-
mation from the Dakota, was appalled at the speed of the trials. In a letter to
the St. Paul Daily Press, he wrote, "Many of those that are tried and con-
demned, are doubtless guilty of participation in the murders and outrages
committed on the Minnesota frontiers-some of them as guilty as Satan
himself, and richly deserving the punishment of death.... [Nonetheless, a]
military commission, where the cases of forty men are passed upon in six or
seven hours, is not the place for the... clear bringing out of evidence and
securing a fair trial to every one."'207 Bishop Whipple wrote to the Secretary
of the Interior that "[o]fficers of the highest character who were present at
the trial have assured me that... [the Commission] could not and did not
make a careful examination. '20 8 Reverend J.P. Williamson noted that "400
have been tried in less time than is general[ly] taken in our courts with the
trial of a single murderer. '20 9
2. Cultural misunderstanding and deficiencies of the evidence.
To say, as many have, that the trials were unfair because they were con-
ducted too quickly only skims the surface of the imperfections. A detailed
look at the trial transcripts produces a more precise understanding of the
nature of the unfairness. In most of the first few cases, the defendants were
charged with attacking individual wagons of settlers and murdering one or
more of the men in the wagons. Among the witnesses called were women
who had been in those wagons, had witnessed the attacks, and had been held
captive in the Dakota camp until released with all the American prisoners at
the end of September.210 This evidence was the best sort presented--eyewit-
ness testimony to particular acts of killing.
As the trials progressed, however, there was less and less of such evi-
206. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 254-55. Although the first few cases appeared to take longer
than many of those that followed, one could hardly call them "elaborate." The length of the trial
seemed to depend more upon the length of the statement made by the defendant than on the nature
of the other evidence presented.
207. St. Paul Daily Press, Nov. 29, 1862, at 1, col. 4.
208. Letter from Bishop Henry Whipple to Ass't Sec'y of the Interior John Usher (Apr. 21,
1863), in Whipple Papers, MHS.
209. Letter from Rev. John Williamson to S.B. Treat (Nov. 5, 1862), in ABCFM Papers,
MHS.
210. See, eg., Trial Transcripts, Case No. 2 (Tehehdonecha), Case No. 3
(Wechankwashtodopee).
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dence. Many defendants admitted to being at a battle, and that evidence
alone was enough to bring a conviction. Others admitted that they were with
a group when another individual killed a settler, and that, too, brought con-
viction. Testimony from other witnesses tended to be short, serving merely
to identify the prisoner as having been present at particular battles or when
particular individuals were attacked, but the witnesses often had no direct
knowledge of who struck the fatal blows. In many cases, the only evidence
against the defendant was testimony from the white women captives or
mixed-bloods that the defendant had appeared to go willingly into battle,
"whooping around" with the rest, and had boasted afterward' about the
number of people he had killed in the fighting.211
Although evidence of the prisoners' boastful statements was admissible
as a confession, 212 the reliability of such remarks is highly suspect in ways
that were never suggested at the trials. Boasting about exploits, exaggerated
as well as real, would have been an expected part of the aftermath of any
battle. Such exaggeration was particularly likely to occur in this war, be-
cause the Dakota disagreed about whether to go to war and many men
might have desired to prove their loyalty by describing and embellishing
their exploits.213 Special acts of bravery, such as touching an armed soldier
during battle or sneaking into an enemy camp to steal or release horses, were
considered "counting coup," 214 and might have been boasted of in a manner
suggesting that killings had occurred. 215 Moreover, according to Dakota
custom, the man who struck the mortal blow was not the only one entitled
to claim a kill in battle. "It was considered most honorable to be the first to
211. See, eg., Trial Transcripts, Case No. 1 (Godfrey).
212. Hearsay was generally excluded from use in courts-martial, but voluntary confessions
were admissible. 1 W. WINTHROP, supra note 179, at 459, 463.
213. See, eg., St. Paul Pioneer, Oct. 14, 1865, at 2, col. I (suggesting that Shakopee had a
"motive ... for... telling an untruth" in saying that he had killed white settlers in response to
Taoyateduta's question "[W]here have you been all day?"); Trial Transcripts, Case No. 1 (Godfrey)
(defendant testified that he was told that those who did not go out on raids would be killed), Case
No. 3 (Wechankwashtodopee) (defendant said he had "snapped gun" at victim because another
asked if he was afraid), Case No. 6 (Hinhanshoonkoyagmane) (defendant testified that he was told
that he would be killed if he didn't go to battle), Case No. 8 (Charles Crawford) (defendant testified
that Taoyateduta said that every mixed-blood and Indian must go to battle or be killed). One
example of the pressure to embellish exploits was recounted by Thomas A. Robertson (Case No.
135), a mixed-blood who was tried and acquitted on the charge of killing a man at Fort Ridgely.
Robertson reported later that he was instructed by a member of the soldiers' lodge to shoot a burn-
ing arrow in order to start a fire and felt he must comply. A friend, apparently seeking to protect
him, "nudged me and pointing out of the window said, 'There goes a man&.] shoot and I will say you
killed him."' Robertson fired, and the friend declared "'He shot him down. He shot him down."'
Reminiscences of Thomas A. Robertson, supra note 124, at 25.
214. 2 GEORGE BIRD GRINNELL, THE CHEYENNE INDIANS 29-38 (1923); M. SATrERLEE,
supra note 6, at 118-19; ROBERT F. SPENCER, JESSE D. JENNINGS, CHARLES E. DIBBLE, ELDEN
JOHNSON, ARDEN R. KING, THEODORE STERN, KENNETH STEwART & WILLIAM J. WALLIS, THE
NATrIVE AMERICANs 346 (2d ed. 1977).
215. See, eg., Trial Transcripts, Case No. 383 (Wakinyanna) (witness testified that defendant
said he killed two boys with his war lance in house near Traveller's Home; defendant testified only
that he might have "done it"-he touched one with his "flute" but did not use his lance), Case No.
333 (Hataninkoo) (witness testified that the defendant said he killed someone with an axe; defendant
testified that others shot the man and he struck the victim only after he was dead).
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touch an enemy, but the three next following were accounted as having
helped kill him, though he might be dead before they reached him. '2 16 The
man who first touched an enemy was also credited with having killed him,
even if the actual killing was done by another, and the one who first entered
a house where people were later killed by any of the group was given credit
for all the killings.217
Thus, when individuals boasted of killings, they might have been exag-
gerating or they might have meant no more than that they were present at
the time of a killing and had performed acts of valor.2 18 In many of the
cases, moreover, the testimony about the defendants' "confessions" came
from Americans captured in the early days of the war, witnesses who may
not have understood these distinctions, even assuming they understood the
Dakota language well enough to interpret the defendants' remarks correctly.
At trial, then, a defendant might truthfully have denied-as many did-
actually killing anyone, but the court would likely have considered the re-
spouse untruthful in view of the testimony about the defendant's own "con-
fession." Because no one suggested the potential for such cultural
misunderstanding at the time of the trials, however, the Commission made
no effort to explore the possible meanings of the defendants' statements.
Nonetheless, many of the defendants admitted at least that they were
present when individuals were killed by other Dakota. If the Commission
regarded those particular killings as murders, it might conclude that all
members of the group present were equally liable, analogizing to the com-
mon law doctrine of felony murder.2 19 Evidence might then be sufficient to
convict even though it failed to distinguish between the one who struck the
blow and others who were present. But it is not clear how, if at all, the
felony-murder doctrine should apply to acts committed during a time of
war: If a group could, under the laws of war, legitimately set out with weap-
ons to kill soldiers and to run settlers off strategic land,220 particular killings
by members of the group would not have been done in the commission or
attempted commission of a felony, a requirement of the felony-murder doc-
trine.221 Again, however, these questions were not raised at the trials.
216. SAMUEL W. POND, THE DAKOTA OR SIOUX IN MINNESOTA As THEY WERE IN 1834, at
128 (1986); see also 2 G. GRINNELL, supra note 214, at 30 (when an enemy was killed, many would
try to be the first to touch him, and those following would also strike the body).
217. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 189. Godfrey, whose Dakota name, Otakle, was reported to
mean "he who kills many," testified that he had been given that name because many people were
killed in a house that he entered first, but he had only struck one man on his shoulder with the back
of a hatchet. See Trial Transcripts, Case No. 1.
218. Reverend Stephen Riggs reported that most of the condemned prisoners denied commit-
ting acts warranting a death sentence. "But their ideas of this are very strange," he said. "One man,
who acknowledges he helped kill a number says if he had killed one all himself he would think it
right that he should die." Letter from Rev. Stephen R. Riggs to Mary Ann Riggs (Dec. 23, 1862), in
Riggs Letters, WPA-Chippewa County Project, MHS. One wonders if those "strange ideas" re-
flected the distinction between counting coup and actual killing.
219. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 622-41
(1986).
220. See Part IV infra.
221. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 219, at 632-37.
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If the Commission had considered whether the evidence it heard could
point to different levels of involvement and guilt, it might at least have con-
cluded that different forms of participation warranted different punishments.
Instead, Sibley expressly instructed the Commission to consider solely
whether the individual voluntarily participated in the fighting. "The degree
of guilt was not one of the objects to be attained. ' 222 The Commission like-
wise ignored mitigating evidence that particular defendants had acted to
protect the victims of attack from being raped or killed.223
3. Self-interest of the witnesses.
Much of the evidence in the trials came from individuals who were them-
selves on trial for their lives, mostly mixed-bloods and others who had
adopted American ways. The most often mentioned of these' defendants-
turned-witnesses was Godfrey, also called Otakle, the "Mulatto" specifically
described in the order forming the Commission.224 In his own trial, Godfrey
claimed that he had been forced into battle by threats against his family and
had not actually killed anyone. Although Godfrey was the first to be tried,
the Commission held his case open for some time, asked for his testimony in
subsequent cases, and suspended imposition of his sentence until it com-
pleted the trials.
Godfrey gave evidence in fifty-five of the cases; of the thirty-eight Dakota
who were ultimately hanged, he testified in the trials of eleven. 225 Reverend
Riggs noted that Godfrey "was convicted among the first batch. But he was
everywhere in all the battles and . . . [later wanted] to convict everyone
else."'226 The Commission also questioned subsequent prisoners and wit-
nesses about Godfrey, but found "no person who saw him kill anyone. ' 227
Ultimately, the court found him not guilty of the charge of murdering seven
unknown whites, but convicted him of participating in the fighting and sen-
tenced him to be hanged. The court's gratitude for Godfrey's cooperation
222. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Ass't Sec'y of the Interior John P. Usher (Dec. 19,
1862), in Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343). Sibley went on to note that "it would
have been impossible to devote" sufficient time to ascertain the degree of guilt in each of so many
cases. Id.
223. See, eg., Trial Transcripts, Case No. 24 (defendant testified that he saved Miss Williams'
life; corroborated by witness), Case No. 356 (defendant testified that he saved the lives of many
women because they had treated him well; witness testified that defendant saved a woman, two
children, and oxen), Case No. 359 (defendant testified that he saved a woman's life; corroborated by
witness). All three of these defendants were sentenced to hang, and defendants numbered 24 and 359
were among the 38 executed on December 26, 1862.
224. See text accompanying note 56 supra. Godfrey was the son of a French Canadian and a
black woman who had been a servant in the family of Alex Bailly, a fur trader. He was raised in the
Bailly family. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 191; THROUGH DAXOTA EYEs, supra note 6, at 85.
225. See Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 10, 22, 35, 115, 210, 254, 327, 359, 377, 382, 383.
226. Letter from Rev. Stephen Riggs to Mary Ann Riggs (Oct. 20, 1862), in Riggs Letters,
WPA-Chippewa County Project, MHS.
227. I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 254 (emphasis in original). The absence of eyewitness ac-
counts of killing did not prevent the court from convicting and ordering the execution of many other
prisoners based solely on testimony that witnesses had overheard the defendants boast of killings or
participation in battles. See text accompanying note 211 supra.
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was reflected in a recommendation to the President that the sentence be
commuted to ten years' imprisonment because he had given evidence against
many other prisoners. Without his testimony, the Commission wrote, "a
large number of men of the very worst character would have gone unpun-
ished."' 28 The President agreed and spared Godfrey's life. 229
Godfrey was the most noted witness, but others played similar roles.
Thomas Robertson testified in fifty-five of the trials, including those of five of
the thirty-eight executed, 230 and was found not guilty in his own trial.231
Charles Crawford testified in eight trials232 and was himself tried twice and
found not guilty each time.233 Wakanhdehota testified in seven trials, includ-
ing one for a defendant who was hanged;234 his own first trial resulted in a
sentence of death by hanging but that was later reduced to imprisonment for
three years.235 Wechahpenompa testified in six trials,236 Louis LaBelle in
four,237 Louis Frenier238 and Tazoo 239 in three, and Henry Millard and Bap-
tiste Campbell in one each.240 The Commission found all of these men guilty
in their own trials,241 and the last three were hanged. David Faribault, Jr.,
described by one of the missionaries as a mixed-blood "of bad character,
strongly suspected of instigating the Indians to these murders," 242 testified in
many of the trials-the precise number is impossible to determine' 43 -and
was later pardoned.
The self-interest of these witnesses, and their anger and distress at being
drawn into the war and forced to choose sides in the long-standing conflict
between the "farmer Indians" and the traditional Dakota, suggest reasons to
doubt their credibility. Their testimony was not always crucial to the out-
come, as the defendants often had already admitted to acts of war that
would have led to guilty verdicts. Still, the witnesses often were responsible
228. Trial Transcripts, Case No. 1, Memorandum by the Court to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley
(Nov. 5, 1862).
229. See S. EXEC. Doc. No. 7, supra note 116, at 2.
230. See, eg., Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 178, 279, 333, 342.
231. Trial Transcripts, Case No. 135.
232. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 50, 84, 102, 103, 157, 158, 169, 220.
233. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 8, 136.
234. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 278, 298, 309, 310, 313, 377, 378.
235. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 181, 277. Both of Wakanhdehota's trials appear to have
occurred before he began to testify, but five of the trials in which he testified were held on the same
day as his second trial, in which the Commission imposed a lesser sentence.
236. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 168, 173, 194, 195, 246, 334. Only one of these defendants
was found guilty.
237. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 176, 236, 237, 238.
238. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 159, 160, 174.
239. Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 9, 24, 115.
240. Trial Transcripts, Case No. 13 (Henry Millard), Case No. 115 (Baptiste Campbell).
241. Trial Transcripts, Case No. 282 (Wechahpenompa), Case No. 139 (Louis LaBelle), Case
No. 131 (Louis Freniere), Case No. 4 (Tazoo), Case No. 115 (Henry Millard), Case No. 138 (Bap-
tiste Campbell).
242. Letter from Rev. Thomas Williamson to S.B. Treat (Nov. 21, 1862), in ABCFM Papers,
MHS.
243. Both David Faribault, Sr. and David Faribault, Jr. testified at the trials. The transcripts
frequently do not specify which man testified, but "David Faribault" is listed as a witness in 84 of
the trials. See Trial Transcripts passim.
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for evidence of the defendants' participation in attacks on individual settlers,
which apparently led to their inclusion on Lincoln's execution list for having
engaged in "massacres." 244
The testimony of these witnesses may, of course, have been truthful, but
their own self-interest in avoiding punishment and their positions in the dis-
putes within the Dakota community must lead to questions about their ve-
racity-questions that the Commission itself never asked. Indeed, the
Commission may have found these witnesses trustworthy precisely because
they did cooperate and were therefore "good Indians" or "friendlies," 245
although the Commission nonetheless convicted some of them for their own
participation in the fighting. Moreover, most of the regular witnesses were
mixed-bloods, more likely to be believed than the full-blood defendants. In a
letter to the SL Paul Pioneer, Reverend Riggs complained that the Commis-
sion might believe a mixed-blood who claimed he was forced to go into bat-
tle and, therefore, reduce his sentence; the Commission would not accept
such a defense from a full-blood. 246
4. Defendants' misunderstanding and absence of counseL
It seems likely that the prisoners understood little about the nature and
purpose of the trials. David Faribault, Jr., a mixed-blood, was a United
States citizen, had been raised and educated among the whites, and was flu-
ent in both English and French as well as Dakota. Nonetheless, in his re-
quest for pardon he stated that he had not understood the nature of the
proceedings. He believed, he said, that the object of the Commission was
1"merely to ascertain what parties should be held for a regular trial to be had
at some future time in the Courts of the country," and he did not know that
he was on trial for his life. 247 The rest of the Dakota prisoners, even more
unfamiliar with American customs, almost surely did not know more.248
The exchange of communications between Father Ravoux and Sibley, and
the message to the condemned delivered on December 22,249 four days
before the executions, suggest that not until that late date did the Dakota
know the nature of the Commission's deliberations. Nor would the Dakota
244. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
245. See K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 61, 64, 81; M. SATIERLEF, supra note 6, at 75, 77.
246. St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 14, 1862, at 4, col. 3. Racism alone could probably account for the
distrust of the full-bloods. In addition, the Commission members would have had more natural
affinity for the mixed-bloods, who had usually been raised and educated in the white community.
247. Affidavit of David Faribault, Sr., in Court Martial Cases, NARG 153, File NN3132 (writ-
ing of his son's statements to him); see also Affidavit of Lt. Col. L.H. Fowler, ia (supporting Fari-
bault's request for pardon). Faribault's belief is consistent with what Sibley may have first set out to
do when he convened the Commission. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
248. If the defendants did not know they were on trial, they might also have been unaware of
just how much they were at the mercy of the Commission. Such a conclusion may lessen the strength
of my suggestion that the testimony of those defendants who cooperated was suspect. See text ac-
companying notes 224-243 supra. On the other hand, the defendants probably knew that they were
likely to be punished for their actions, especially as the trials progressed; they simply did not know
the extent of the penalty being considered or that punishment was being determined by this
Commission.
249. See text accompanying notes 123-126 supra.
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have been familiar with American trial procedures. Reverend John William-
son reported: "[The defendants know] nothing of the manner of conducting
trials[,] if a mistake occurs they are unable to correct it. And often not un-
derstanding the English language in which the trial is conducted, they very
imperfectly understand the evidence upon which they are convicted. '250
The prisoners' lack of understanding might have been alleviated if coun-
sel had been present to represent or advise them. Although the military con-
sidered the presence of defense counsel a privilege, not a right,251 courts-
martial generally admitted counsel as a matter of course.252 The Commis-
sion did not follow that rule here. St. Andr6 Durand Balcombe, government
agent to the Winnebagos, apparently attempted to intervene and introduce
counsel on behalf of ten or twelve Winnebagos tried in November 1862 for
participating in the fighting with the Dakota;25 3 the Mankato Record re-
ported that General Sibley "very respectfully but firmly replied that these
were 'military trials,'" intimating that he would not comply with the
request.254
Of the Dakota, only Wakanozanzan and Shakopee, tried in late 1864,
requested permission to introduce counsel at their trials. The Commission
granted the requests, but only after consulting with Sibley,255 who appar-
ently had a change of heart since the Winnebago trials. The bulk of the
Dakota prisoners, unfamiliar with American proceedings, probably did not
think of seeking counsel; they likely would have been unable to find counsel
even if Sibley would have permitted it. In the absence of counsel, the Judge
Advocate was responsible both for prosecuting the case and assisting the
accused in preparing his case. Even in a normal court-martial this assistance
was recognized as inadequate.256 Relying on the prosecutor to act as counsel
for the accused is yet more problematic where, as here, the Judge Advocate
fought in the battles that led to the charges. Certainly the transcripts do not
reflect that the Judge Advocate provided any protection or assistance to the
defendants in these cases.
5. Contemporaneous recognition of trial defects.
Local missionaries and officials who reviewed the trial transcripts for
President Lincoln voiced some of these criticisms at the time of the trials.
Assistant Secretary of the Interior John P. Usher wrote to Sibley as early as
December 10, 1862, complaining about the "meagre manner in which the
250. Letter from Rev. John Williamson to S.B. Treat (Nov. 5, 1862), in ABCFM Papers,
MHS.
251. See I W. WINTHROP, supra note 179, at 220; WLiAM C. DE HART, OBSERVATIONS ON
MILITARY LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION AND PRACTICE OF CouRTS MARTIAL 132 (1846 &
photo. reprint 1973 of 1859 printing).
252. 1 W. WNTHROP, supra note 179, at 220; W. DE HART, supra note 251, at 132.
253. See note 87 supra.
254. Mankato Rec., Nov. 15, 1862, at 2, col. 1.
255. See Letter from J. Adv. J. Morrison to Ass't Adj. Gen. Rollin Olin (Nov. 25, 1864), in
Indian Prisoners, NARG 94 (Entry 173).
256. 1 W. WINrHROP, supra note 179, at 266-70.
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evidence... [had] been reported" to Lincoln.257 Reverend Thomas William-
son wrote that he had:
only read the testimony in four cases... but am satisfied in my own mind
from the slight evidence on which these are condemned that there are many
others in that prison house who ought not to be there; and that the honor of
our Gov[ernment] and the welfare of the people of Minnesota as well as that
of the Indians requires a new trial before unprejudiced judges.258
Sibley vehemently defended the Commission, although in so doing he
admitted to many of the weaknesses of the proceedings:
[I]t should be borne in mind that the Military Commission appointed by me
were instructed only to satisfy themselves of the voluntary participation of
the individual on trial, in the murders or massacres committed, either by his
voluntary concession or by other evidence and then to proceed no further.
The degree of guilt was not one of the objects to be attained, and indeed it
would have been impossible to devote as much time in eliciting the details in
each of so many hundred cases, as would have been required while the expe-
dition was in the field. Every man who was condemned was sufficiently
proven to be a voluntary participant, and no doubt exists in my mind that at
least seven-eighths of those sentenced to be hung have been guilty of the
most flagrant outrages, and many of them concerned in the violation of
white women and the murder of children.259
In a letter to Bishop Whipple, Sibley likened the proceedings to a drum-head
court-martial, a court-martial held in the field under the pressures of war,
which is "not expected to enter into details of a technical character." 26" But
drum-head courts-martial-officially termed "garrison" or "regimental"
courts-martial-are not authorized to try capital cases, or even to order im-
prisonment for more than one month,261 no doubt for the very reason that
they are not able to grant full and fair trials under exigent circumstances.
B. Commission Prejudice
The potential for unfairness described above was compounded by the
257. Letter from Ass't See'y of the Interior John Usher to Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 10,
1862), in Letters Ree'd, NARG 393 (Entry 346).
258. Letter from Rev. Thomas Williamson to Rev. Stephen Riggs (Nov. 24, 1862), in Riggs
Papers, MHS; see also Letter from Rev. Thomas Williamson to Rev. Stephen Riggs (Nov. 17, 1862),
in Riggs Papers, MHS (asking Riggs to "look over" some of the testimony with General Pope "and
point out to him its utter inconclusiveness"); Letter from Rev. Thomas Williamson to S.B. Treat
(Nov. 21, 1862), in ABCFM Papers, MHS:
I doubt whether the whole state of Minnesota can furnish 12 men competent to sit as jurors
in their trial.... From our Governor down to the lowest rabble there is a general belief
that all the prisoners are guilty, and demand that whether guilty or not they be put to
death as a sacrifice to the souls of our murdered fellow citizens.
259. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Ass't See'y of the Interior John Usher (Dec. 19,
1862), in Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343). As I describe below, see Part V infra,
the evidence did not establish the charge that many were "concerned in the violation of white wo-
men and the murder of children." Perhaps Sibley referred not to the charges proved, but more
generally to what he was sure the convicted had done during the war.
260. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Bishop Henry Whipple (Dec. 7, 1862), in Whipple
Papers, MHS.
261. Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, arts. 66, 67, 2 Stat. 359, 367.
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composition of the Commission itself. All members of the Commission were
local residents, likely to react as vehemently as any other Minnesotan to the
events of the war. The military commanders noted the strength of the
soldiers' sympathy with the citizenry regarding the desire to punish the Da-
kota; the officers feared that the soldiers would support an attempt by mob
violence to accomplish what Lincoln might not be prepared to do.262 Rever-
end Thomas Williamson suggested: "[I]f the members of the court who try
them think and feel as do a majority of those whom I hear speak of the
Dakotas and the editorial corps of Minnesota[,] universally so far as I
know[,] innocence will be no guaranty of safety." 263
The trials began immediately after hostilities ceased; they were held near
the scene of the fighting while passions were most inflamed and fears re-
mained of renewed fighting by the Dakota who had fled. The Commission
members had themselves fought in the battles and thus had been under at-
tack by the very individuals on whom they now passed judgment.264 It is
inconceivable that they came to their task with open minds. William Mar-
shall, who served on the Commission through the early trials, admitted as
much, saying that "his mind was not in a condition to give the[ ] men a fair
trial."265 Reverend John Williamson described the trial proceedings by stat-
ing that each defendant was "first prejudged guilty of any charge ... the
court... [chose] to prefer against him and then if he denies he is cross
examined with all the ingenuity of a modem lawyer to see if he cannot be
detected in some error of statement. '266 Reverend Riggs, who was present at
many of the trials, wrote to the St Paul Pioneer about the attitudes of the
members of the Commission:
I have a very high regard for all the gentlemen who composed the military
commission. I count them individually among my personal friends. But they
were trying Indians, and my sense of right would lead me to give Indians as
fair and full a trial as white men. This was the difference between US. 2 6 7
262. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
263. Letter from Rev. Thomas Williamson to Rev. Stephen Riggs (Oct. 25, 1862), in Riggs
Papers, MHS.
264. All five Commission members had been at the most recent Battle of Wood Lake, and
three of them were at the attack at Birch Coulee, where loss of life on the American side had been
particularly heavy. Approximately 200 Dakota soldiers surrounded the American encampment at
Birch Coulee and kept it under siege for 31 hours until Colonel Sibley arrived with his troops. The
Americans had used their bayonets to dig shallow trenches for protection and were without food and
water during most of the siege. When Sibley arrived "he found a 'sickening sight.' Thirteen men and
no less than ninety horses lay dead, forty-seven men were severely wounded, and many more were
less seriously hurt.... The stench of decaying bodies was overwhelming. The survivors were weak
and exhausted .. " K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 44. Although military commissions were often
composed of individuals who had more of a stake in the outcome of the trial than typical civilian
jurors, the members were rarely as personally involved in the events leading to the charges being
tried as were the Commission members here. See notes 297-303, 311-319, & 324-334 infra and ac-
companying texts.
265. Letter from Bishop Henry Whipple to Ass't Sec'y of the Interior John Usher (Apr. 21,
1863), in Whipple Papers, MHS (quoting Marshall's statement).
266. Letter from Rev. John Williamson to S.B. Treat (Nov. 5, 1862), in ABCFM Papers,
MMS.
267. St. Paul Pioneer, supra note 246.
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Isaac Heard, attempting to defend the Commission, admitted that he be-
lieved there was "[n]early universal complicity" in the war; in the absence of
evidence of innocence, "the inference was very logical and natural, that the
defendant being an Indian, with the sentiments, inclinations, attachment and
revengeful impulses of an Indian, did not fall within the exception, but acted
as the vast majority of the other Indians did."'268
C. Authority to Convene the Commission
The composition of the Commission was thus problematic, but probably
lawful. More serious difficulties are presented by Colonel Sibley's role in the
proceedings. The statutes governing courts-martial-applicable by army or-
der to military commissions as wel1269-suggest that Colonel Sibley did not,
in fact, have authority to convene the Dakota trials.
I have already identified one difficulty in discussing the review of
Wowinape's trial.27o Because the officer who convenes a court-martial is the
first to review the proceedings for error, it is important that he be free from
bias or the appearance of bias. Article of War 65 therefore expressly pro-
vided that an officer who was the "accuser" of an inferior officer could not
himself convene the court-martial to try the junior officer. 271 Both General
Pope and Judge Advocate General Holt concluded that Sibley was the ac-
cuser in the Dakota trials, 272 and Sibley did not disagree. Sibley himself
noted that the Dakota were tried based on "charges and specifications pre-
ferred by" him.273 Article of War 65 therefore suggests that he should not
also have acted to convene and subsequently review the proceedings. 274
Sibley argued that article 65 should not be applied to military commis-
sion trials because it was designed solely to protect inferior officers from the
prejudice their superiors might feel towards them.275 In a formalistic sense,
Sibley was correct: By its express terms, article 65 only limited the authority
of an officer to convene courts-martial to try his inferior officers. A literal
268. St. Paul Pioneer, Dec. 11, 1862, at 1, col. 4 (letter from "H."--presumably Isaac Heard.
The writer identified himself as having been present at the trials and gave details similar to those
published in I. HEARD, supra note 6).
269. Although the Articles of War in 1862 nowhere mentioned military commissions or the
procedures to be followed in establishing them, the Army had determined, at least by January 1,
1862, that military commissions were to be "ordered by the same authority, be constituted in a
similar manner, and their proceedings be conducted according to the same general rules as courts-
martial, in order to prevent abuses which might otherwise arise." See eg., Gen. Order No. 1, HQ,
Dept. of the Missouri, Jan. 1, 1862, reprinted in 8 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at
476. Similar orders were issued in other Departments. See 2 W. WINTHROP, supra note 179, at 74.
270. See text accompanying notes 175-183 supra.
271. 1 W. WINTHROP, supra note 179, at 68-69. As described earlier, the officer is an "accuser"
if he either originates the charge or adopts and becomes responsible for it, unless he is acting solely
in an official capacity by ordering an investigation after facts warranting such an investigation are
brought to his attention.
272. See text accompanying notes 181-183 supra.
273. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt (Dec. 7, 1863), in Sioux
War Trials, MHS P1423.
274. 1 W. WINTHROP, supra note 179, at 69.
275. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
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reading of the statute would not prevent an officer from ordering and then
reviewing courts-martial of enlisted men or military commission trials of en-
listed men or civilians. In the absence of any statutes establishing procedures
for military commissions, however, the military had already determined that
a commission trial should be conducted in the same manner as a court-mar-
tial.276 As both General Pope and Judge Advocate General Holt agreed, the
same potential for actual or perceived bias and prejudgment exists whenever
an individual both prefers charges and reviews the outcome of a trial on
those charges, whatever the tribunal may be called.277
The trials of the Dakota are a prime example of such bias and prejudg-
ment. Sibley's correspondence, both before and after the trials, clearly shows
that he had precisely the kind of bias that inspired the rule preventing him
from playing both roles. On August 24, 1862, while still pursuing the Da-
kota, Sibley called them "the fiends, the devils in human shape!... [M]y
heart is hardened against them beyond any touch of mercy. '278 His commu-
nications with General Pope, quoted earlier, display his assumption that
most of the Dakota men were implicated. 279 Before reviewing any of the
trials, Sibley had already told Pope that he would probably approve the re-
sults. 280 As he wrote to Bishop Whipple in December 1862:
I approved the proceedings; because I had no reason to doubt the criminal-
ity of every man that has been condemned. On the contrary, I sent back
many cases where men had been acquitted for lack of evidence for revision,
and in several of these, additional testimony was adduced, and the Indians
sentenced to be hung.2 8
1
While Sibley might have permitted an acquittal where there was truly no
evidence of participation, and he noted one instance in which he remitted a
sentence because the evidence was inconclusive,282 a pattern of prejudice is
276. See note 269 supra.
277. In at least one other instance, in 1866, the Army agreed that article 65 should apply to
trial by military commission. I W. WImRop, supra note 179, at 67 n.3. Congress, too, thought that
the same protection against bias or the appearance of bias should extend beyond inferior officers
accused by their superiors. In 1884, Congress amended article 65 to forbid an officer from ordering a
commission to try "any officer under his command." Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 224, 23 Stat. 121. In
1913, it was amended once again to forbid an officer to be both accuser and convener of a trial of any
person. Act of Mar. 2, 1913, ch. 93, 37 Stat. 722.
278. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Mrs. Henry Sibley (Aug. 24, 1862), in Sibley
Papers, roll 11, frame 664, MHS [microfilm].
279. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra; see also Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to
Mrs. Henry Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in Sibley Papers, roll 11, frame 674, MHS [microfilm] (describing
the surrender of thirteen lodges and noting that there were "twenty two men, most of them desperate
rascals who... [would] be hung").
280. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), reprinted in
13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 717.
281. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Bishop Henry Whipple (Dec. 7, 1862), in Whipple
Papers, MHS.
Sending the proceedings back for further testimony violated military procedures, see I W. WIN-
THRoP, supra note 179, at 645, as well as the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy,
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
282. See Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Bishop Henry Whipple (Dec. 7, 1862), in
Whipple Papers, MHS. The case is that of the brother of Other Day. Sibley also displayed some
sensitivity towards fairness and due process when he informed Lincoln that Tatimima had been
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clear. Although he claimed that "no one could have acted with a more con-
scientious regard to truth and justice... in deciding the cases which were
brought before me,"' 283 it is unlikely that his judgments could have remained
unaffected by his own involvement in the war and in bringing the charges.
Practically, of course, the effect of any prejudgment by Sibley or the
Commission members may have been attenuated by the subsequent review of
the trials by individuals who were not accusers themselves. As the military
itself determined in the case of Wowinape and in at least one other, unre-
lated trial, however, 284 the appearance of impropriety alone was sufficient to
warrant disapproval.
A second reason exists why Sibley may not have had proper authority to
convene these commission trials. Under the Articles of War, only a general
officer commanding an army or a colonel commanding a separate depart-
ment could convene a general court-martial, which alone had the power to
conduct trials for capital offenses.285 Sibley was not in charge of either an
army or a separate department, but a district. At the end of 1861, Congress
enacted a provision that permitted the commander of a division or a separate
brigade to appoint a general court-martial in time of war,286 but Sibley's
command was neither.287 Not until 1913 did Congress give the commander
of a district the power to appoint general courts-martial, and then only
"when empowered by the President. '288
By the Army's own rulings, only those officers who were permitted by
statute to convene a general court-martial had the authority to order a mili-
tary commission that could issue death sentences.289 Indeed, in December
1861, General-in-Chief Halleck-in a letter to Brigadier General Pope, then
in command of volunteers in the Mississippi Valley-declared null and void
the proceedings of a military commission ordered by a colonel commanding
a regiment on the express ground that only the General-in-Chief of the army
or a general commanding a department had authority to order a military
convicted on incorrect testimony, see text accompanying note 128 supra, and when he supported
pardons for a few of the convicted in the years following the executions, see text accompanying note
153 supra. Nonetheless, Sibley's correspondence and public statements leave the firm impression that
he had largely prejudged the defendants.
283. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Bishop Henry Whipple (Mar. 11, 1863), in Whip-
ple Papers, MHS.
284. See I W. WINTHROP, supra note 179, at 67 n.3.
285. Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, art. 65, 2 Stat. 359, 367. Inferior officers commanding a
regiment, corps, garrison, fort, or barracks could appoint a court-martial for non-capital offenses,
but could impose at most a fine of one month's pay or imprisonment for one month. Id. arts. 66-67.
286. Act of Dec. 24, 1861, ch. 3, 12 Stat. 330. The Act provided that the general commanding
the army in the field would have to confirm any death sentence. It further provided that if the
division or brigade commander was the accuser or prosecutor, the next higher commander would
convene the court-martial. Id
287. See 1 W. WINTHROP, supra note 179, at 77-78 (officers sometimes erroneously convened
courts-martial when their commands were not properly divisions or separate brigades; that "was
peculiarly the case with the commands known as 'districts' ").
288. Act of Mar. 2, 1913, ch. 93, 37 Stat. 722.
289. See, eg., Gen. Order No. 1, HQ, Dept. of the Missouri, Jan. 1, 1862, reprinted in 8 WAR
OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 476.
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commission.29° Sibley himself expressed some doubts about whether he had
authority to order the commissions, but nonetheless expected Pope to ap-
prove his acts afterwards. 291
In August 1864, recognizing that district commanders like Sibley lacked
authority to convene general courts-martial, the War Department granted
permission to commanding officers of departments or armies to designate a
district as a "separate brigade"; 292 since a brigade commander could order a
general court-martial under the 1861 statute,2 93 such a designation would
empower the district commander to do likewise. Two months later, just
before Sibley convened the Commission to try Wakanozanzan and
Shakopee, General Pope issued such an order, declaring the district of Min-
nesota, under Sibley's command, to be a separate brigade.294 As a brigade
commander in 1864, Sibley could convene a commission under the 1861
amendment. As a district commander in 1862, he could not.
Again, these requirements serve only as technical objections to the trials.
In reality, this limitation probably would not have changed the result since
Pope-who wrote repeatedly to Sibley encouraging him to execute the guilty
if not exterminate the whole tribe29 5-had the authority to order the trials
anyway. If the reviewing authorities had disapproved the Dakota trials based
on the failure to convene them properly, however, the resulting delay in pun-
ishment might have allowed some lessening of the anger and fear caused by
the war. Renewed proceedings might then have been conducted more fairly
and judiciously.
Moreover, the army's own record establishes precedent for sustaining
such technical objections. The history of military commission trials of Con-
federate soldiers and Northern sympathizers during the same period sug-
gests that the Dakota were not the only victims of the military's "rough
justice." Throughout the Civil War, military commanders made many ar-
rests, some for serious offenses, others for more frivolous acts or for simply
speaking out against the war effort. Prisoners were often held without trial, a
practice legitimized by President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus in September 1862.296
When military trials were held, the proceedings were marred by irregu-
larities in trial procedure and overzealousness in prosecuting and sentencing.
As with the Dakota trials, many of the Civil War military commissions
290. Letter from Gen.-in-Chief Henry Halleck to Brig. Gen. John Pope (Dec. 31, 1861), re-
printed in 8 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 822; accord Gen. Order No. 1, HQ
Dept. of the Missouri, Jan. 1, 1862, reprinted in id. at 476.
291. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Maj. Gen. John Pope (Sept. 28, 1862), reprinted in
13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 687.
292. 1 W. WNTrHRoP, supra note 179, at 78.
293. See note 286 supra; and accompanying text.
294. Gen. Order No. 38, HQ, Dept. of the Northwest, Oct. 25, 1864, in Court Martial Cases,
NARG 153, File NN3132.
295. See note 71 supra text accompanying note 60 supra.
296. See J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 157-63 (1951).
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failed to follow mandated procedures, 297 convicted on inadequate evi-
dence,298 and ordered executions for acts not warranting such extreme pun-
ishment.299 Military justice during the war was criticized for its "looseness
and inconsistency. '"30° Contemporaneous military communications related
to courts-martial and other military trials suggest that much of the irregular-
ity can be attributed to ignorance of the system of military justice and to
pressing responsibilities that distracted officers from remembering and ap-
plying the instructions issued from headquarters. No doubt the exigencies
and passions of war also contributed.
Like the Dakota, then, many other individuals were ordered imprisoned
or executed after deficient military trials. But when the defendant was a
Confederate soldier or northern Confederate sympathizer, the President and
the War Department often acted as a check on precipitous action by the
commanders in the field, particularly as the war progressed and the proper
procedures became better defined. Many proceedings-including death
sentences-were disapproved for irregularities as minor as failing to admin-
ister the oath to the members of the commission or court-martial or failing
to ask the defendant if he wished to challenge any members of the tribu-
nal.301 Indeed, one such order of disapproval noted that "[iun a proceeding
involving life, such irregularities [as failing to read the convening order to
the prisoner or present the charges to him in writing] are wholly inexcusable,
and make the execution of the death sentence legally impossible. '' 302 In
297. See, eg., Opinion of J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Pres. Abraham Lincoln (Sept. 26, 1862),
in Letters Sent-JAG, NARG 153 (Entry 1) (sentence disapproved because judge advocate not
sworn); Opinion of J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler (Nov. 4, 1862), in id.
(sentence disapproved because records forwarded to Judge Advocate General were copies only, not
originals as required); Opinion of J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler (Dec. 16,
1862), in id. (sentence disapproved because record did not show that prisoners were permitted to
object to panel members or were read charges against them, or that witnesses were sworn, and
because record did not contain cross-examination of witnesses); Gen. Order No. 255, Aug. 1, 1863,
in I (death sentence disapproved because record did not show that order convening Commission
was read in presence of prisoner or that privilege of challenge was offered or that commission mem-
bers were sworn); Gen. Order No. 151, May 26, 1863, in id (death sentence disapproved because
Commission and judge advocate not sworn on the record); Opinion of J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to
Brig. Gen. Arboth (Nov. 7, 1863), in id (proceedings disapproved because phrase endorsed, "Re-
spectfully forwarded," was not in conformity with regulation).
298. See, eg., Gen. Order No. 346, Oct. 22, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG 94 (death sen-
tence for alleged spy disapproved).
299. See, e.g., Gen. Order No. 135, May 18, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG 94 (execution
ordered for aiding others to plunder and harboring stolen U.S. wagon, commuted to one year impris-
onment; execution ordered for stealing horse from boy, commuted to six months imprisonment;
execution ordered for aiding rebels to rob citizens, commuted to hard labor for duration of war;
execution ordered for passing the lines dressed as a civilian and lurking near a fort, commuted to
imprisonment for duration of war); Gen. Order No. 157, May 28, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG
94 (death sentence for associating with party in arms against U.S. government and violation of oath
of allegiance; sentence commuted to one year imprisonment).
300. Military Courts, 5 U.S. SERV. MAG. 214, 214-17 (1866).
301. See note 297 supra.
302. Gen. Order No. 257, Aug. 1, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG 94; accord Opinion of J.
Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler (Dec. 16, 1862), in Letters Sent-JAG, NARG
153 (Entry 1) ("The record of all trials, especially when the punishment is death, should be full,
complete and perfect.").
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many other cases the President reduced death penalties to terms of imprison-
ment ranging from six months to the duration of the war.30 3
The political situation facing Lincoln prevented him from responding in
like fashion to the Dakota trials. Public outcry in Minnesota resulted in
enormous pressure on the President to punish the Dakota for the war. No
matter how the President might otherwise have reacted to the record laid
before him, he apparently felt compelled to compromise by permitting a lim-
ited number of executions despite the unsatisfactory nature of the proceed-
ings.304 In calmer times, would the reviewing authorities have recognized
the procedural and substantive deficiencies and disapproved the results as
they did in Civil War commission trials? The treatment of Wowinape sup-
ports this possibility. Pope's discovery of a "technical difficulty" barring
confirmation of Wowinape's trial, a flaw that undermined all 326 convic-
tions, suggests that the reviewing authorities recognized the weakness of the
Commission proceedings and might have disapproved all of the Dakota tri-
als, had that result seemed politically possible in December 1862.
III. MmITARY COMMISSION AUTHORY AND JURISDICTION
In Part II, I described a number of deficiencies in the Dakota trial pro-
ceedings. The form of the trials-the use of a military commission to try
American Indians for apparent acts of war-raises another, more fundamen-
tal question: Was a military commission a legitimate forum for the trials? In
this Part, I trace the history of military commissions and their source of
legal authority in an effort to answer that question.
A. Statutory Provisions
In 1862, as today, there were three types of military tribunals. Courts-
martial were established by federal statute primarily to try soldiers, and ci-
vilians serving with the armed forces in the field, for offenses enumerated in
the Articles of War, including striking an officer, failing to obey an order,
and missing duty.30 5 In addition, the Articles authorized a court-martial of
any person, whether soldier or civilian, charged with giving intelligence to,
assisting, or harboring the enemy,3°'6 and of any person charged with spying
in time of war or rebellion. 30 7 Courts of inquiry, also creatures of statutory
303. See note 299 supra.
304. See text accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
305. The statutory provisions were contained in the Articles of War enacted in 1806. Act of
Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, 2 Stat. 359. Between 1806 and December 1862, there were only 12 amend-
ments to the Articles. See FREDERICK C. BRIGHTLY, ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1857, at 83 (1858); FREDERICK C. BRIGHTLY, ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF THE UNrED STATES, 1857-1863, at 1101-03 (1863). I discuss in the text all the amend-
ments relevant to the questions raised here.
306. Article 56 made it an offense to "relieve the enemy with money, victuals, or ammunition,
or [to] knowingly harbor or protect an enemy." Art. 56, 2 Stat. 359, 366 (1862). Article 57 estab-
lished the offense of "holding correspondence with or giving intelligence to the enemy either directly
or indirectly." Iad art. 57.
307. Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 25, § 4, 12 Stat. 339, 340. The original Articles of War prohib-
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law, could be convened to collect information that might later be used in a
court-martial proceeding or to explore allegations such as cowardice in
battle.30 8
Determining the source of authority for the military commission, the
type of military tribunal used in the Dakota trials, is more problematic. Un-
til July 1862, the United States Congress had not recognized any form of
military tribunal other than the court-martial and the court of inquiry. In
the fall of 1862, when most of the Dakota were tried, the only statutory
reference to military commissions appeared in an off-hand reference about
recordkeeping in a provision establishing the position of Judge Advocate
General of the Army.3°9 In contrast to the very specific enumeration of of-
fenses triable by court-martial, the statutory law provided no guidance re-
garding the validity and proper use of military commissions. As the Civil
War progressed, Congress specifically authorized trial by military commis-
sion for various offenses,310 but in 1862 there was virtually no congressional
recognition of that form of tribunal. Thus, although the military commission
later evolved to become a statutorily authorized "war court," at the time of
the Dakota trials it was simply an exercise of executive or military authority.
ited only spying "in time of war." § 2, 2 Stat. 359, 371 (1862). The prohibition on spying during
time of rebellion was added in February 1862, presumably to permit the military to try Confederates
found spying within any part of the United States declared by the President to be in a state of
insurrection. See 12 Stat. 339, 340.
308. See arts. 91-92, 2 Stat. 359, 370. Courts of inquiry could be used to "examine into the
nature of any transaction, accusation or imputation against any officer or soldier." Id. art. 91, at 370.
The statute provided that only the president or an accused could order a court of inquiry, as courts
of inquiry could be "perverted to dishonourable purposes, and may be considered as engines of
destruction to military merit, in the hands of weak and envious commandants." Id. art. 92, at 370.
Since a court of inquiry did not sit in judgment of an accused, it required only a recorder "to reduce
the proceedings and evidence to writing" rather than a judge advocate to act as prosecutor. See id.
art. 91, at 370.
309. See Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 36, § 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598 ("the President shall appoint.., a
judge advocate general... to whose office shall be returned, for revision, the records and proceed-
ings of all courts-martial and military commissions, and where a record shall be kept of all proceed-
ings had thereupon").
310. See, eg., Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736 (murder, manslaughter,
robbery, larceny, and certain other crimes, when committed by military persons in time of war or
rebellion, punishable by court-martial or military commission); id § 38, 12 Stat. 737 (spies to be
triable by military commission or court-martial); Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 253, § 6, 13 Stat. 394, 397
(civil officials of quartermaster department amenable to trial by military commission or court-mar-
tial for neglect of duty and fraud). In each of these statutes, Congress simply stated that cases triable
by court-martial under statutory authority could also be tried by a military commission. Since mili-
tary commissions and courts-martial were conducted in the same manner, see note 269 supra, there
seems no basis for distinguishing the two forms of trial. In 1864, Congress enacted the first statute
that specified trial by military commission for offenses not triable by court-martial. Act of July 2,
1864, ch. 215, § 1, 13 Stat. 356 (commanders of departments and armies authorized to execute
sentences imposed by military commissions upon guerrillas for violation of the laws and customs of
war). In the debate in the Senate preceding passage of the Act, however, Senator Lyman Trumbull,
committee member and floor manager of the bill, repeatedly stated that the bill would not confer any
new authority on military tribunals but would simply permit sentences of such tribunals to be car-
ried out without the delay caused by having to seek presidential approval. CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3030, 3416-17 (1864).
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B. Military Commissions in the Mexican War
Despite the absence of congressional authorization, the army began to
use military commissions during the Mexican War as a way of conducting
what the commanding officers viewed as necessary trials involving individu-
als and offenses not specified by statute as being subject to court-martial. In
1847, after invading central Mexico, General Winfield Scott declared martial
law and issued General Order 20, announcing that certain crimes against
soldiers committed by Mexican civilians-including murder, malicious stab-
bing, maiming, malicious assault and battery, robbery, and theft-would be
subject to trial by military commission.3 11 General Scott also had some diffi-
culty controlling his own troops but had authority under the Articles of War
to try the soldiers only for enumerated offenses, most of them involving
breaches of army discipline.3 12 General Order 20 therefore announced that
the same crimes, if committed by his own soldiers against other soldiers or
against civilians, would also be subject to trial by military commission. 313
Pursuant to this declaration, Generals Scott, Wool, and Taylor convened
military commissions to try soldiers and followers of the army for offenses
such as theft, receiving stolen property, 314 assault with a deadly weapon,3 15
and murder of a soldier.31 6 Military commissions were also ordered to try
311. Gen. Order No. 20, HQ Army at Tampico, Feb. 19, 1847, in Military Orders-Mexican
War, NARG 94 (Entry 134). The complete list of offenses in the General Order was "[a]ssassination,
murder, malicious stabbing, or maiming, rape, malicious assault and battery, robbery, theft, the
wanton desecration of churches, cemeteries or other religious edifices and fixtures and the destruc-
tion except by order of a superior officer of public or private property." Id Some of these offenses
referred to acts committed not by civilians but by soldiers, who were also included in the order
establishing military commissions. See text accompanying notes 313-316 in ra.
312. On its face, Article of War 99 appears to provide ample authority to try soldiers for many
acts not expressly made unlawful by the statute:
All crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be
guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not mentioned in
the foregoing articles of war, are to be taken cognizance of by a general or regimental
court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offence, and be punished at their
discretion.
Act of Apr. 20, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, art. 99, 2 Stat. 359, 371. In practice, however, the army had not
viewed this provision as a grant of authority to try soldiers for acts such as rape, murder, robbery,
arson, and assault with intent to kill. See Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 381-83 (1920). Congress
later remedied this problem by providing for military trial for such offenses by soldiers. Act of Mar.
3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736.
313. Gen. Order No. 20, HQ Army at Tampico, Feb. 19, 1847, in Military Orders-Mexican
War, NARG 94 (Entry 134). In fact, individuals brought before these commissions were sometimes
tried for offenses not expressly included in the list enumerated in General Order 20. For example, the
orders convening military commissions listed such offenses as burglary, picking pockets, carrying a
concealed weapon, riotous conduct, and attempting to pass counterfeit money, none of which were
contained in General Order 20. 1 W. WINTHRoP, supra note 179, at 59-60.
314. Order No. 5, Mar. 13, 1848, in Military Orders-Mexican War (Puebla), NARG 94 (Entry
134); Order No. 36, May 21, 1848, in hl; Order No. 176, June 14, 1847, in Military Orders-Mexican
War (Gen. Scott), NARG 94 (Entry 134).
315. Order No. 5, Mar. 13, 1848, in Military Orders-Mexican War (Puebla), NARG 94 (Entry
134).
316. Gen. Order No. 97, Apr. 7, 1847, in Military Orders-Mexican War (Gen. Scott), NARG
94 (Entry 134).
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Mexican citizens for offenses such as theft317 and selling liquor to soldiers.318
These instances were the first in which the army convened tribunals actually
called "military commissions." Military commissions were used in a similar
manner during the Civil War to provide a system of justice following the
capture of rebel territory.319
In essence, these military commissions replaced the civilian criminal
courts in occupied, hostile territory after the declaration of martial law.320
The Supreme Court in 1857 confirmed that the President had the authority
to establish such tribunals, 321 but lower courts held that trial by these mili-
tary commissions could continue only while military necessity demanded it
and only during actual hostilities.322 At the time of the United States-Da-
kota War, martial law was declared only for the day on which the executions
took place. Although tensions still ran high in September when the trials
began, and both the settlers and the military feared renewed hostilities if the
fleeing Dakota returned, actual fighting had ceased. Those Dakota who had
not surrendered had fled. Moreover, although the settlements in Minnesota
317. Order No. 30, HQ Dept. of Puebla, May 17, 1848, in Military Orders-Mexican War (Pue-
bla), NARG 94 (Entry 134); Order No. 33, HQ Dept. of Puebla, May 19, 1848, in ka
318. Order No. 17, HQ Dept. of Puebla, May 3, 1848, in Military Orders-Mexican War (Pue-
bla), NARG 94 (Entry 134).
319. See, eg., J. RANDALL, supra note 296, at 91 (martial law declared in New Orleans; Wil-
liam Mumford convicted and hanged for treason for tearing down United States flag after liberation
of city).
320. See H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 782 (1861); see also S. BENtr, A TREATISE
ON MILITARY LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL 10-16 (4th ed. 1864). Halleck notes
that in California, also the scene of fighting in the Mexican War, such offenses were generally tried in
the civil courts; the occupying army set up special tribunals in only a few cases. H. HALLECK, supra,
at 783.
321. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177-78 (1857); accord Mechanics' & Trad-
ers' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 295-97 (1874); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
129, 132-33 (1869); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 189-90 (1853). But see Jecker v.
Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1851) ("neither the President nor any military officer can
establish a court in a conquered country, and authorize it to decide upon the rights of the United
States, or of individuals in prize cases, nor to administer the laws of nations"; the courts established
in Mexico by the military commanders were "nothing more than agents of the military power, to
assist it in preserving order in the conquered territory").
322. Several lower federal courts rejected the use of martial law in the period following the end
of hostilities in the Civil War, granting writs of habeas corpus to release prisoners held under mili-
tary authority. See, e-g., In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 4303) (civilian tried for
murder in South Carolina seven months after the rebel army surrendered); United States v. Com-
mandant of Ft. Delaware, 25 F. Cas. 590 (C.C.D. Del. 1866) (No. 14,842) (four civilians tried for
murder of military guard after hostilities had ceased). The Egan court suggested that martial law is
really no law at all but simply the commanding officer's will, which takes the place of law that
cannot be enforced under the conditions of war. The court found that martial law could be indulged
only as a matter of necessity; when order is restored, that necessity ceases and the exercise of martial
law is inappropriate.
Whether the military could continue to try civilians once order was restored was the subject of
challenges to the use of military government under the Reconstruction Acts, but was never defini-
tively decided. Congress first sought to block the Supreme Court's consideration of the question by
removing the Court's appellate jurisdiction over habeas petitions. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1868). When the Court decided that it nonetheless had jurisdiction, Exparte Yerger, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868), the prisoner was released before the merits of the question were reached.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 154-57 (1989) (discussing factual backgrounds
of McCardle and Yerger).
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were in turbulence as a result of the fighting, the civil authority in the state
was never interrupted. Nothing prevented access to the state courts, where
trials for murder and other ordinary criminal charges would usually be held.
Indeed, Governor Ramsey threatened to try the Dakota in the Minnesota
courts if the army did not carry out what he saw as its responsibility to
punish the offenders. 323 The situation does not seem to have demanded sum-
mary military action, so the claim of military necessity could not have pro-
vided the army with the authority to try the Dakota by military commission
for civilian crimes.
Another type of tribunal used by General Scott during the Mexican War
provides a more apt historical model for the military commissions convened
by Colonel Sibley to try the Dakota. These tribunals, called "councils of
war," were court-martial-like bodies constituted to try individuals, not for
criminal offenses committed in time of war, but for violations of the "laws of
war"-emerging standards regarding proper conduct of warfare.324 Some
commissions tried Mexican citizens or soldiers for encouraging desertion by
United States soldiers;325 others tried individuals for being "guerilleros." 326
To the extent that any of the Dakota committed acts that could be consid-
ered violations of the laws of war, the tribunals established by General Scott
might be historical precedent for trying the Dakota by military
commission. 327
323. Of course, the Dakota might have fared even worse in the state courts. Sibley may have
been motivated to convene a commission in order to ensure fairer trials than would have occurred in
the state courts. See text accompanying notes 490-494 infra. Similar motives may have led to the
trial of the Lincoln murder conspirators before a military commission rather than before a civil jury.
See Thomas R. Turner, What Type of Trial? A Civil Versus a Military Trial for the Lincoln Assassina-
tion Conspirators, in 4 PAPERS Op THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASSOCIATION 29, 38 (1982). Nonethe-
less, as explained in the text, jurisdiction for such a commission trial was lacking and no tribunal,
state or federal, could legitimately try the Dakota for anything other than violating the laws of war.
324. See Gen. Order No. 181, HQ Army at Puebla, June 19, 1847, in Military Orders-Mexican
War (Gen. Scott), NARG 94 (Entry 134). In his treatise, Winthrop lists eight orders, 2 W. WIN-
THROP, supra note 179, at 60 n.1, but some of these are simply orders creating a council, rather than
records of judgments by the councils. See, eg., Gen. Order No. 181, June 19, 1847, in Military
Orders-Mexican War (Gen. Scott), NARG 94 (Entry 134); Gen. Order No. 184, June 24, 1847, in ia
325. See Gen. Order No. 187, HQ Army at Puebla, June 24, 1847, in Military Orders-Mexican
War (Gen. Scott), NARG 94 (Entry 134).
326. See Gen. Order No. 372, HQ of the Army, Dec. 12, 1847, in Military Orders-Mexican
War (Volunteer Div.), NARG 94 (Entry 134). The Order referred to "atrocious bands called Gueril-
leros and Rancheros who under instructions from the late Mexican Government or authorities, con-
tinue to violate every rule of warfare observed by civilized nations." It provided that no quarter
should be given to such individuals and that a Council of War should be convened to try any such
offenders "falling into the hands of American troops." The Council could condemn a prisoner to
death for "flagrant" violations of the laws of war "on satisfactory proof that such a prisoner, at the
time of capture actually belonged to any party or group of known robbers or murderers or had
actually committed murder or robbery upon any American officer or soldier or follower of the
American Army." Unfortunately, the army records remaining from the Mexican War are not com-
plete, and there were no further orders describing individual trials for the described offenses. It is
thus not possible to learn what the army considered to be "murder" or a "flagrant" violation of the
laws of war.
327. Several commentators have pointed to other earlier trials-the 1780 trials of Major John
Andr6 and Joshua Hett Smith for conspiring with Benedict Arnold and the 1815 trial of Louis
Louaillier for assisting the enemy-as predecessors to the military commission trial. See 2 W. WIN-
THROP, supra note 179, at 59; A. Wigfall Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832,
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C. Military Commissions in the Civil War
During the Civil War, the use of military commissions greatly expanded.
In addition to their use as part of military government in occupied rebel
territory, they were employed, much like General Scott's "councils of war,"
to try Confederate soldiers accused of violating the laws of war.328 Soldiers
were tried for offenses such as robbing civilians, 329 passing Union lines in
civilian dress,330 and boarding a United States ship in neutral territory with
intent to seize it on the high seas.33 1
Military commissions were also widely used in northern states and occu-
pied rebel territory to try individuals accused of "disloyal practices," 332 in-
cluding fighting as guerrillas, often by attacking civilians. 333 General Order
100, which was issued in April 1863 to instruct the military about proper
conduct in warfare, formalized the role of military commissions for trying
violations of the laws of war, declaring that "cases which do not come within
the Rules and Articles of War, or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on
courts-martial, are tried by military commissions" under the common law of
war.
334
Whether any of these military commission trials was lawfully conducted
is less than clear, however. Statutory authority remained meager, 335 and
questions were repeatedly raised regarding the military's authority to con-
duct trials not affirmatively authorized by Congress. Indeed, shortly before
the United States-Dakota War, the highest ranking judicial officer in the
Army, Judge Advocate John F. Lee, suggested to the Secretary of War that
832-33 (1948). In each of these cases, however, the defendants were tried for offenses defined by
statute as triable by court-martial. Thus the trials do not truly represent the use of military
commissions.
328. Interestingly, Confederate soldiers were treated as legitimate belligerents despite the
United States government's refusal to recognize the Confederacy as an independent sovereign.
Although the United States maintained that it could try the rebels for treason, it chose to grant the
Confederate forces the privilege of being treated as belligerents, both for humanitarian reasons and
to avoid retaliation against Union troops. See J. RANDALL, supra note 296, at 65-69.
329. Gen. Order No. 135, May 18, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG 94; Gen. Order No. 151,
May 26, 1863, in id.
330. Gen. Order No. 135, May 18, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG 94.
331. 8 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFcIIA RECORDs OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, SERIES 11, 674-81 (1899) [herein-
after WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. II].
332. J. RANDALL, supra note 296, at 175-76.
333. See Gen. Order No. 135, May 18, 1863, in Military Orders, NARG 94; Gen. Order No.
267, Aug. 3, 1863, in 1d; Gen. Order No. 151, May 26, 1863, in id Most, if not all, of the trials for
conducting guerrilla warfare occurred in occupied rebel territory, where many individuals not in the
Confederate army nevertheless engaged in obstructive tactics and acts of violence. J. RANDALL,
supra note 296, at 174-75.
334. Gen. Order No. 100, 1 13, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in RIcHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN,
LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAw OF WAR 45 (1983) [hereinafter Gen. Order No. 100]; accord Letter
from Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck to Brig. Gen. John Pope (Dec. 31, 1861), reprinted in 8 WAR OF THE
REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 52, at 822-23 (prisoners of war who violate the laws of war are to be
tried by military commission, not court-martial; source of law is "general code of war," not Articles
of War, and charge should be "violation of the laws of war").
335. See notes 309-310 supra.
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military commissions had no legitimacy,336 although Lee later acquiesced to
the practice despite his continuing doubts.337
Lee's successor, former Secretary of War Joseph Holt,338 was less ambiv-
alent. As of September 8, 1862, the issue was still under advisement by the
President, but Holt expressed his own view that "[t]hese 'commissions'...
have existed too long in the service, and [are] too essential to its wants and
emergencies, to be now ignored. Long and uninterrupted usage has made
them as it were part and parcel of the common military law. '339 Despite the
lack of formal authority, President Lincoln concurred. On September 24,
1862, he declared that rebels, insurgents, and all persons "guilty of any dis-
loyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels" would be subject to mar-
tial law and liable to trial by court-martial or military commission.3 4
D. Military Commissions After the Civil War
The legitimacy of wartime commissions was settled only temporarily, as
shown by the numerous challenges to the practice that arose once wartime
tension abated. In 1865, for example, controversy arose concerning the va-
lidity of the military commission appointed to try the defendants charged
with the assassination of President Lincoln.341 Both defense counsel and the
Judge Advocate presented lengthy arguments to the Commission concerning
the legality of that body.342 During the trial, the Attorney General advised
336. Letter from J. Adv. John Lee to See'y of War (Mar. 1862), in Letters Sent-JAG, NARG
153 (Entry 1), at 289 ("[Uinder our municipal laws, State or Federal, these proceedings [a military
commission trial of a civilian] are of no validity. Military commissions are not a tribunal known to
our laws; and military commanders have no power to inflict death except by sentence of court-
martial.").
337. Letter from J. Adv. John Lee to See'y of War (June 8, 1862), in Letters Sent-JAG,
NARG 153 (Entry 1), at 312 ("I have been compelled to submit my opinion that these 'military
commissions' within the territory and jurisdiction of the U.S. are tribunals unknown to our laws, and
there is no warrant of law for executing the sentences of death they adjudge. Still it is done.").
338. Holt's title was Judge Advocate General, a post newly created by Congress in the Act of
July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598, but his role was identical to Lee's.
339. Letter from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Sec'y of War Edwin Stanton (Sept. 8, 1862), in
Letters Sent-JAG, NARG 153 (Entry 1). As discussed above, see notes 311-319, 324-327 supra and
accompanying texts, this "long usage" dated back only to the Mexican War in 1846-1847, and was
used mostly in occupied territory to allow trial for normal criminal offenses that otherwise would
have gone unpunished.
340. Proclamation by the President, Sept. 24, 1862, reprinted in 6 JAMEs D. RiCHARDsON,
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENrs 1789-1897, at 98-99 (1897).
341. See generally Turner, supra note 323.
342. Reverdy Johnson, attorney for Mary Surratt, argued that the Bill of Rights protected the
defendant, a citizen of the United States, and assured her trial by jury and presentment to a grand
jury, unless she was serving in the armed forces. He denied that the President had authority under
his "war power" to order such trials, because the war power belonged to Congress and Congress had
not made statutory provision for military commissions. REvERDY JOHNSON, AN ARGUMENT TO
ESTAHLISH THE ILLEGALTY OF MILrrARY COMMISSIONS m THE UNrrED STATES 7-10, 14-16
(1865) (available at University of Minnesota Law Library). In response, Special Judge Advocate
John Bingham made an argument notable less for clarity than for his repeated harangues about the
evils of the enemies of the Union and the arrogance of those who would challenge the authority of
the President and his Commission. See, ag., JOHN BINGHAM, TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS FOR
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LiNco 4-6, 12-13, 14-15 (1865) (available at University of
Minnesota Law Library). He suggested that the Commission could have no authority to rule on the
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President Johnson that the military tribunal was validly conducted under
the law of nations as an incident of war; the Constitution, he said, made the
law of nations part of the laws of the land by granting Congress the power to
"define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offences against the laws of nations. '343 Even if Congress did not define
such offenses by statute, the Attorney General suggested, the military could
act directly under the laws and usages of war, because the law of nations
exists independently of any "definition" by Congress. 344 The Commission
apparently agreed; it convicted the defendants and sentenced them to death.
No court was asked to review that conclusion.
The next prominent discussion about the validity of military commis-
sions arose in the trial of Confederate soldier Henry Wirz in August 1865.
Wirz was charged and ultimately convicted of abusive treatment and murder
of Union soldiers at the Andersonville prisoner of war camp in Georgia.345
He objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal as one "unauthorized by either
statute, military law, martial law, or well-established usage."' 346 As in the
Lincoln assassination trial, the Judge Advocate argued that the power to
conduct this military trial arose from the necessity for and right of any sov-
ereign to protect itself in times of war and rebellion.347 The Commission
implicitly concurred and overruled the challenge to its jurisdiction. 348
Again, no court decision followed. Indeed, despite the large number of mili-
tary commission trials of Confederate soldiers, none of these cases reached
the federal courts for any definitive ruling on the validity of the trials, per-
haps in large part because the President had suspended the writ of habeas
corpus for the insurgents. 349
The writ of habeas corpus was also suspended for citizens of Union states
convicted by military commissions, 350 but a case challenging such a trial
question of its own validity, because if it ruled the Commission invalid it would be in the absurd
position of deciding a question it found it had no authority to decide. Id at 7-11. On the substantive
question of the source of authority for the tribunal, he supported the use of the military tribunal to
try the alleged Lincoln assassins as an exercise of martial law and a necessary power of any govern-
ment to defend itself. Id at 13-14, 21-50.
343. 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 299 (1865) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).
344. Id at 300, 310. The Attorney General responded to Reverdy Johnson's arguments that
the fifth and sixth amendments required that the defendants be indicted by grand jury and tried by
petit jury by distinguishing between "crimes," which fell under the protection of those amendments,
and "offences," which did not. Id. at 312-13.
345. Trial ofHenry Wirz, reprinted in H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 23,40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1868).
346. Id at 10.
347. Id at 726-28.
348. Id at 805, 809.
349. See Proclamation by the President, supra note 340. At least one state court had previ-
ously addressed questions about the validity of military trials of civilians in time of war. Smith v.
Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. 1815). Shaw brought an action for assault and battery and false imprison-
ment based on his arrest and detention by the military. Shaw had been charged with, among other
things, exciting insurrection and being a spy. Chief Judge Thompson, speaking for the New York
Supreme Court, readily found that, because he was an American citizen, Shaw could not be charged
as a spy. Therefore, he could not be brought before a court-martial for trial. Id. at 265.
350. See Proclamation by the President, supra note 340. Despite the suspension of the writ,
many federal district courts entertained petitions for writs of habeas corpus and demanded responses
from the military. If they responded at all, the military commanders simply relied upon the Presi-
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finally reached the United States Supreme Court in 1866.351 In Ex parte
Milligan,352 the Court rejected the notion that, because of the existence of
martial law, the "laws and usages of war" permitted the military to try the
civilian defendant; the Court concluded that no jurisdiction existed for the
trial 353 The Court emphasized, however, that Milligan was a citizen of a
loyal state in which the civil courts were still in operation and concluded
that, whatever authority the military might have under other circumstances,
it could not try civilians in this manner.354 The Court did not reach-indeed
it expressly declined to discuss-the question of "what rule a military com-
mander... can impose on states-in rebellion to... quell the insurrec-
tion, 355 or how the result would change if the defendant had been a
prisoner of war "engaged in legal acts of hostility against the
government. 3 5 6
E. The Modern View
As discussed in the previous section, there was no indication how the
courts at the time of the Dakota trials would have ruled on the validity of
military commissions used to try prisoners-of-war. In 1942, the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Quiin 357 finally held that the Army could conduct mili-
tary commission trials of foreign nationals accused of sabotage, espionage,
and other acts in violation of the laws of war, but by that time Congress had
specifically authorized commission trials for violations of the laws of war.3 53
dent's suspension of the privilege. See . RANDALL, supra note 296, at 157-63. A few courts upheld
the authority of the military to make the arrests. See, ag., Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874,
924 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816), cert denied, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863); Exparte Field, 9
F. Cas. 1, 8 (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4761). Other courts determined the arrests to be unlawful and
issued writs of habeas corpus, but the commanders were under orders not to obey the writs and the
courts had no ability to enforce their judgments. See . RANDALL, supra note 296, at 157-63. Some
judges issued opinions denouncing the failure to obey the court. See, ag., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). At least one judge simply acknowledged the difficult posi-
tion of the marshal who held the prisoner, caught between two masters, and declined to hold him in
contempt. Ex parte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 173-74 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1292).
351. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). The Court was earlier presented with the
opportunity to rule on the validity of military commission trials of citizens of the Union in Ex parte
Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). Perhaps uncomfortable with the possibility of under-
mining the President's war effort, the Court declined to decide the question whether the military
commission had jurisdiction over Vallandigham. The Court ruled instead that neither the United
States Constitution nor federal statutes granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review
military trials by writ of certiorari. Id. at 251-52. Although Vallandigham had sought a writ of
habeas corpus from the United States Circuit Court, which was denied, he apparently petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the military proceedings rather than to review the
denial of habeas corpus relief. See J. RANDALL, supra note 296, at 178-79. In Ex parte Milligan, the
defendant instead sought review of the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, and the Court agreed that
there was jurisdiction to hear the claim. See text accompanying notes 352-356 infra.
352. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
353. Id. at 121, 130.
354. Id at 121-27.
355. Id at 126.
356. Id at 131.
357. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
358. Id at 28-29. The primary statutory authorization was contained in the 1920 revision of
the Articles of War. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759. Article 12 specified that general
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The Court expressly declined to answer whether the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief could, without congressional approval, constitutionally cre-
ate military commissions and authorize them to try foreign nationals for war
crimes.35 9
Thus, no court has ever precisely addressed the question whether mili-
tary commissions, constituted in the absence of legislative authority, are le-
gitimate tribunals for considering violations of the laws of war. Congress
certainly could have specified that such offenses be punished: the Constitu-
tion gives Congress the power to "define and punish... Offences against the
Law of Nations, ' 360 which includes the laws of war. Moreover, if Congress,
by statute, made criminal certain actions violating the laws of war, Congress
could also have authorized the military to conduct trials for offenses arising
under the statute. Indeed, in Ex parte Qurin the Supreme Court accepted
the notion that Congress could simply authorize the military to punish viola-
tions of the "laws of war" without specifying the precise contours of those
laws. The Court allowed Congress to leave the definition of offenses under
the laws of war to "the system of common law applied by military tribunals
so far as it should be recognized and deemed applicable by the courts. '361
The difficult question is whether the military could have operated di-
rectly under the law of nations, with no statutory authority of any kind. The
Supreme Court stated in 1855 that, even without Congressional action, the
law of nations, including the laws of war, forms a part of "the municipal
jurisprudence of every country" in its dealings with foreign countries and
their nationals.362 The Court emphasized that this was particularly true dur-
courts-martial would have the power to try "any other person [not subject to the Articles of War]
who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals." Id at 789. Article 15 specified that
the Articles of War "shall not be construed as depriving military commissions... of concurrent
jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by
such military commissions." Id at 790. Congress thus did not expressly define the jurisdiction of
military commissions but instead recognized the law of war as providing a separate source of author-
ity for military tribunals.
359. 317 U.S. at 29.
360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
361. 317 U.S. at 29-30. The Quirin Court relied upon earlier decisions that had established the
flexibility accorded Congress in defining offenses against the law of nations. See Harmony v. United
States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1826);
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-62 (1820). In 1867, perhaps in response to
protests about the military arrests and trials during the Civilar or to civil suits against the officers
who had made those arrests, Congress attempted to validate the actions of the military after the fact-
[Alli acts, proclamations, and orders of the President [from March 4, 1861 to July 1, 1866]
... respecting martial law, military trials by courts-martial or military commissions, or the
arrest, imprisonment and trial of persons charged with participation in the late rebellion
against the United States ... and all proceedings and acts done or had by courts-martial or
military commissions... are hereby approved in all respects, legalized and made valid....
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432. To the extent that this Act attempted to make punishable
acts that were not otherwise unlawful at the time, it was condemned as an ex post facto law. See In
re Murphy, 17 F. Cas. 1030, 1032 (C.C.D. Mo. 1867) (No. 9947). Under the ruling in Murphy, if the
military commission trying the Dakota went beyond its authority, the Act of Mar. 2, 1867, could not
legitimize those trials.
362. Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 112 (1855). See also cases cited in note 321
supra.
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ing a state of war.363 Moreover, throughout the early history of America,
statesmen and judges repeatedly asserted that the law of nations was part of
domestic law.364 Such statements could lead to the conclusion that the mili-
tary indeed possessed the power to act directly under the law of nations. But
the judicial pronouncements were made largely in the context of issuing
grand jury charges, not upholding prosecutions. 365 When the question
whether criminal prosecutions could be maintained directly under custom-
ary law was presented to the Supreme Court in 1812 in United States v.
Hudson,366 the Court held that federal courts had no such common law ju-
risdiction. 367 A broad reading of that case suggests that crimes not estab-
lished by statute-such as crimes against the law of nations-were not
punishable. 368
Thus substantial uncertainty exists whether, in 1862, the courts would
have recognized the military's power to exercise common law authority to
punish foreign nationals for violations of the laws of war. It is clear, how-
ever, that many of those who considered the question of the legitimacy of the
military commissions at the time of the Civil War answered it in the
negative. 369
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND WARFARE
I suggested in Part III that if the Dakota were simply individuals creat-
ing mayhem, a military commission was not a legitimate form of trial be-
cause martial law had not been declared and civilian authorities could have
tried the Dakota under the state's criminal laws. If, on the other hand, the
Dakota were foreign nationals fighting a war against the United States, there
was at least historical precedent for the trials, though doubts remained about
the validity of any military commission proceeding. In this Part, I explore
the legitimate scope of trials of foreign nationals fighting a war, concluding
that the law of nations permits such prosecutions only for offenses against
the laws of war. I then consider whether the Dakota were acting as mem-
363. Jecker, 59 U.S. at 112.
364. See generally Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAND. L. REV. 819, 825-26 (1989).
365. Id at 825-26.
366. 11 U.S. 31, 7 Cranch 32 (1812).
367. Id at 34.
368. Hudson may be a more limited decision, however. One commentator has suggested that
the case was a product of concerns about protecting the lawmaking power of the states, not a state-
ment about the applicability of the law of nations. Jay, supra note 364, at 843-44; see also Stewart
Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 1), 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1012-19 (1985). But see
Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1222-
23 (1988) (Hudson "obviously weakened the authority of those Framers who contended.. . that the
laws of the United States included the law of nations").
369. Realistically, it seems unlikely that the courts would have invalidated the trials on this
ground. While legally the state courts had no jurisdiction, see Part IV infra, and military tribunals'
claim to jurisdiction was debatable, the highly charged racial atmosphere and the nature of the
attacks made some punishment of the Dakota virtually inevitable. As a practical matter, the best
alternative may have been fairly conducted military trials for violations of the laws of war, but the
Dakota were not even afforded that.
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bers of a sovereign nation at war with the United States, and thus entitled to
the protection of international law for actions committed in wartime.
A. The Laws of War in 1862
It was well accepted in 1862, as it is today, that when two sovereign
nations wage war against one another, the soldiers on both sides are entitled
to different treatment than individuals who engage in similar acts of assault,
murder, and destruction not authorized by a nation at war. In a declared
war between two sovereign powers, the law of nations permitted the use of
force as a proper means of obtaining a nation's objectives.370 Captured en-
emy soldiers were therefore not to be punished for the killing and destruc-
tion carried out in the war effort, but were to be treated as lawful belligerents
and held as prisoners of war.
This protection of enemy soldiers extended only to certain actions, how-
ever. Although the standards were not well developed, the law of nations in
1862 considered some acts of violence too odious to be permitted in modern
warfare. These acts included assassination, poisoning, killing an enemy who
had surrendered, and killing unarmed civilians.371 Such actions were consid-
ered punishable violations of the laws of war. Moreover, foreign citizens
who killed or plundered without a formal or informal commission from their
sovereign were considered bandits or marauders, subject to punishment for
their depredations.372
This practice of treating enemy soldiers as justified in fighting a war, but
limiting by custom those acts considered lawful in warfare, developed as a
means to control the extent of killing and destruction caused by war.373
Treating the enemy's soldiers as prisoners of war rather than as criminals
helped to ensure reciprocal leniency from the enemy; requiring authorization
370. See H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 425-26; DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. 3,
§§ 1-5, 136 (J. Chitty ed. 1852); Gen. Order No. 100, supra note 334 (Instructions for the Govern-
ment of Armies of the United States in the Field, also known as the Lieber Code, see text accompa-
nying notes 377-380 infra). See generally PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN
BELLIGERENTS (1908); THE LAW OF WAR (EL Miller ed. 1975); HuGo GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF
WAR AND PEACE (A. Campbell trans. 1901); RESTRAINTS ON WAR (M. Howard ed. 1979); Roda
Mushkat, Who May Wage War? An Examination of an Old/New Question, 2 AM. U. INT'L L. &
PoL'" 97 (1987). The modern law of nations now grants belligerent status to groups other than
nation states. Organized groups subject to some form of military discipline, but not owing allegiance
to a nation state, are now also accorded the rights of a lawful belligerent. INGRED DETrER DE
Lupis, THE LAW OF WAR 23-24 (1987); Mushkat, supra, at 104-37. Even in 1862 an entity that was
not a fully sovereign state might, in practice, become a lawful belligerent if it actually went to war,
though the theory recognized only sovereign states as having the legal right to wage war. Mushkat,
supra, at 100. In determining the proper treatment of the Dakota, I have relied upon the terminology
and concepts generally in use in 1862.
371. H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 398-404, 426-28; DE VATrEL, supra note 370, bk. 3,
§§ 140-147, 173. However, some of these otherwise forbidden acts might be justified under certain
circumstances. See H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 428-29, 439-40, 444-45; DE VATrEL, supra note
370, bk. 3, §§ 141-142, 145, 151.
372. H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 386-87; DE VATrEL, supra note 370, bk. 3, §§ 66-68,
226.
373. I.D. DE LuPis, supra note 370, at 124-25.
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from a sovereign prevented individuals from taking advantage of wartime
instability to kill or plunder for private purposes.
Most articulations of the rules regarding treatment of belligerents ap-
peared in treatises by acknowledged experts in international law, 374 not in
domestic case law. As early as 1609, however, English law recognized that
an alien enemy taken in war was not subject to the common law of the
realm.375 Few cases arose to test that concept in the American courts, but in
1878 the United States Supreme Court confirmed in Coleman v. Tennessee
that soldiers were not amenable to the ordinary criminal law of the
enemy.376
Perhaps the most significant expression of United States concurrence in
the international rules of warfare was the adoption of "Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," also known as the
Lieber Code, by United States Army General Order in April 1863.377 Called
one of the "three great landmarks of our modem Law of War," it was the
first attempt anywhere to codify the customary law of war and establish legal
standards under domestic law for the operation of national armies.3 78 The
Lieber Code recognized each of the principles already outlined regarding the
legitimacy of violence in wartime. 37 9
Although the Lieber Code was not adopted until several months after the
United States-Dakota War, the code reflected an understanding of the na-
ture of warfare widely shared in the United States and other Western coun-
tries.380 Thus, to determine whether the United States complied with its own
as well as international standards of wartime behavior, the treatment of the
Dakota in 1862 should be judged in accordance with these norms. If the
Dakota were a sovereign people and fought as a nation at war, the Dakota
prisoners should have been punished only if they violated the laws of war.3 81
In the remainder of this Part, I discuss whether the Dakota were sovereign
and acted in a sovereign capacity, which would entitle them to such limited
374. See sources cited in note 370 supra.
375. Calvin's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 (1609).
376. 97 U.S. 509, 515-16, 519 (1878). When the death sentence imposed on a Union soldier by
a court-martial during the Civil War had not been carried out nine years later, the State of Tennessee
tried and convicted him on the same charge. The Court reversed the state conviction, holding that,
as a soldier in the Army of the United States, the defendant could not be tried under the ordinary
criminal laws of the enemy (Tennessee).
The only contrary ruling appeared in the case of Government v. M'Gregory, 14 Mass. 498
(1780). In M'Gregory nine individuals were indicted for murder, they challenged the jurisdiction of
the court on the grounds that they were prisoners of war and subjects of the King of Great Britain
and therefore triable only under the law of nations in courts-martial, not under "municipal law."
The court upheld the Massachusetts Attorney General's contention that the prisoners could be tried
by the state for offenses malum in se and overruled the jurisdictional challenge. Id at 499.
377. Gen. Order No. 100, supra note 334, at 45. Francis Lieber, a scholar in international law
and a close friend of General Halleck, was instrumental in developing General Order 100.
378. Geoffrey Best, Restraints on War By Land Before 1945, in RnsrRAns ON WAR, supra
note 370, at 20.
379. See Gen. Order No. 100, supra note 334, at 45-51.
380. See R. HARTIGAN, supra note 334, at 14-15; notes 370-376 supra and accompanying text.
381. See note 370 supra and accompanying text.
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immunity. In Part V, I consider whether the acts of particular Dakota were
nonetheless punishable as violations of the laws of war.
B. Sovereignty of the Dakota
The first question is whether the Dakota were a sovereign people capable
of declaring war on the United States. The Dakota had no doubt about their
own sovereign status and their consequent right to declare and fight a war:
The Dakota community lived separate from the Americans, maintained its
traditional governing structure, and dealt with the United States as a foreign
government through the tribe's own designated leaders. What I explore in
detail here is whether the United States was compelled to recognize Dakota
sovereignty by the history of its relations with the Indian nations and by
international and domestic law.
1. Indian warfare and sovereignty in United States history.
The treatment of Indian tribes in wartime over the course of United
States history demonstrates a consistent recognition of the sovereignty of
Indian nations and their right to wage war.382 When groups of Indians
fought in what the Americans perceived as a unified force-when the fight-
ing was widespread and appeared to be motivated by a group decision-
neither the military nor the civilian authorities of the United States formally
held enemy individuals responsible for ordinary acts of destruction commit-
ted as part of the fighting. 383 When prisoners were taken by the Americans,
those captured were usually held until peace was restored and then were
released, imprisoned, or moved to reservations according to the peace terms
agreed upon or imposed.3 84 Occasionally military commanders took it upon
themselves to punish the Indian war leaders summarily-frequently by
hanging them without further ceremony-but these incidents seem to repre-
sent individual action more than governmental policy.385 Thus, although the
fighting men from Indian nations sometimes suffered retaliation for their ac-
382. Throughout this discussion I refer to historical incidents both before and after 1862.
While the latter are not "precedent" for the events of 1862, they shed light on the attitudes and
actions of the earlier period, particularly because of the consistency of treatment demonstrated, with
the notable exception of the trials and executions that are the focus here.
383. Indeed, in only one instance did the Americans formally hold individuals responsible for
the killing of civilians or other acts of destruction that violated the laws of war. This exception was
the 1873 trial of Kintpuash (Captain Jack) for violating a flag of truce. See text accompanying notes
387-388 in fra.
384. See, eg., ROBERT M. UTLEY & WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
HIsToRY OF THE INDIAN WARS 145-46 (1977) (General Sidney Jessup seized Osceola, leader of the
Seminole resistance, and imprisoned him until his death); ia at 150 (Black Hawk jailed for a year);
id at 237-39 (72 Cheyenne, Kiowa, Arapaho, and Comanche war leaders deported and imprisoned
for three years at Fort Marion, an old Spanish fortress at St. Augustin, Florida); id. at 298 (after
Chief Joseph and the Nez Perc6 surrendered, they were moved to a new reservation); id. at 270
(those captured in Bannock-Paiute War sent to reservations); id. at 329 (Goyahkla (Geronimo) and
his fighting men sent to prison forts in Florida and Alabama following surrender).
385. For example, in 1858, Colonel George Wright summarily hanged 15 members of various
tribes involved in a successful attack on the troops commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Edward
Steptoe. R. UTLEY & W. WASHBURN, supra note 384, at 204-05. And in early 1863, as reported by a
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tions in war, never before or after the United States-Dakota War were they
condemned by any form of legal process for violence associated with
warfare.
Indeed, in one instance in 1879, this limited immunity was made explicit.
In that incident, seven bands of Utes residing on a reservation in western
Colorado and eastern Utah fought a week-long battle with a detachment of
United States soldiers at Milk Creek, on the reservation. When peace was
restored, a civilian commission of inquiry was formed to determine whether
to punish individual Utes. The commission cleared those who fought at Milk
Creek because they were warriors engaged in a fair fight.386 Similarly, in
California in 1873, a group of Modocs engaged in battles with U.S. soldiers
and killed some civilians living in the vicinity of the fighting. Apparently no
attempt was made to punish individually the majority of those who fought,
including those who attacked civilians. Three of the Modocs, however, had
killed two American soldiers sent to negotiate under a flag of truce. The
Attorney General ruled that these three individuals could be tried for violat-
ing the laws of war.387 He noted that the Indian tribes had been recognized
as independent communities for treaty-making purposes and that they fre-
quently carried on "organized and protracted wars"; he concluded that the
Modocs, therefore, were subject to the rules of warfare and could be pun-
ished for transgressing them.388 Presumably, as recognized in a Judge Ad-
vocate General's opinion several years later, the members of an Indian tribe
could not be held responsible if they did not violate the rules of war.3 89
2. The law of Indian sovereignty in 1862.
While the extensive historical record reflects a consistent de facto recog-
nition that the members of an Indian tribe should be treated as legitimate
belligerents in wartime, the legal record on this issue is sparse. Only one case
has ever directly addressed the question whether an American Indian group
had sufficient sovereignty to afford its captured soldiers prisoner-of-war sta-
tus.390 As the unexplained and unsupported decision of a territorial trial
court, however, the case is singularly unenlightening.3 9 1 The only other judi-
prospector who witnessed the incident, soldiers guarding Mangas Coloradas, chief of the Warm
Springs tribe, tortured him with heated bayonets and then shot him when he protested. Id. at 226.
386. DEE BRowN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 388 (1970). The Commission
named 12 Utes to stand trial for killing Nathan Meeker, the much-resented Indian agent, and nine
other employees at the Agency. R. UTLEY & W. WASHBURN, supra note 384, at 310. The Commis-
sion thus seemed to be drawing a distinction between those who fought "fairly" and those who
violated the laws of war.
387. 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249, 253 (1873).
388. lit
389. See Letter from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Adj. Gen. (Jan. 29, 1875), in Letters Sent-
JAG, NARG 153 (Entry 1); text accompanying note 434 infra.
390. United States v. Cha-to-kah-na-pe-sha, 25 F. Cas. 414 (Super. Ct. Ark. Terr. 1824) (No.
14,789a).
391. Id In this 1824 case, the Superior Court of the Territory of Arkansas tried an Osage for
murder. The defendant claimed that the Osage were sovereign and had the right to declare war and
that, consequently, his actions-not described in the opinion-were acts of war. Abruptly and with-
out reference to any authority, the court noted that "[e]ven if this position was sound, which is not
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cial references to the status of Indian nations at war with the United States
appear as dicta in general discussions of the nature of Indian sovereignty,
primarily in nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions that still serve as
the foundation for present-day concepts of Indian sovereignty.
The first such direct reference was in 1831 in Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia,3 9 2 in which Chief Justice Marshall first described Indian tribes as "do-
mestic dependent nations. ' 393 Although he determined that the Cherokees
were not a "foreign state" for purposes of article III jurisdiction, Marshall
described the Cherokees as "a distinct political society, separated from
others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself."394 By its
treaties with the Cherokees, Marshall said, the United States had recognized
them "as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of
being responsible in their political character.., for any aggression commit-
ted on the citizens of the United States, by any individual of their commu-
nity.,, 395 Marshall's notion of "domestic dependent" status meant that the
Indian nations had placed themselves under the protection of the United
States and could no longer carry on foreign relations directly with any other
nation. A majority of the Court recognized that the Indian nations nonethe-
less retained control over "the relations of peace and war," at least with
respect to the United States.396
The next year, in Worcester v. Georgia,397 Marshall again recognized that
the fact," the Osage were not at war with the United States and had disavowed the defendant's
actions and surrendered him to the authorities for prosecution. The court thus held that the Osage
nation could not claim belligerent status based on sovereignty and that, in any event, this Osage
certainly could not because his nation was not at war. Even if the facts had warranted a more
extended consideration of the question whether the Osage had a right to wage war, this alternative
holding by a territorial trial court could hardly be considered strong precedent on the issue.
392. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
393. Id. at 17.
394. Id. at 16, 19. Article III of the United States Constitution grants the federal courts juris-
diction over "Controversies... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In Cherokee Nation, the Cherokees sought an injunction to
prevent the state of Georgia from enforcing the laws of Georgia within Cherokee territory; these
laws had the alleged purpose of annihilating the Cherokees as a political society and seizing the
Cherokee lands. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
395. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
396. Justice McLean joined Chief Justice Marshall. Justices Thompson and Story, in dissent,
agreed that the Cherokees were sovereign and suggested further that they were a foreign state under
the Constitution. Id. at 52-62 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Although it did not expressly refer to the
power to wage war, the dissent's view of Cherokee sovereignty necessarily encompassed that power.
Justices Johnson and Baldwin, while concurring with the Court's result, denied that the Cherokee
were sovereign. Id. at 21-27 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 33-39 (Baldwin, J., concurring). Justice
Duvall apparently did not participate. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law,
Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. Rnv. 500, 517-18 (1969). Thus, four of the seven justices agreed
that the Cherokees had the right to wage war. Marshall indirectly recognized the same point earlier
in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). By recognizing that a land cession in a peace
treaty between the United States and the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations could effectively annul an
earlier grant of the land to an individual, Marshall implicitly recognized the Illinois and Piankeshaw
as nations capable of making war and settling terms of peace.
397. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). The State of Georgia had convicted Samuel Worcester of
residing in Cherokee territory without a license required under Georgia statutes. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that the Cherokee nation was a "distinct community" in which the
laws of Georgia had no force. Id. at 561-63.
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the English, and by implication the Americans, had regarded the Indian na-
tions "as nations capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war. 398
Justice McLean, concurring, made the point more explicit:
We have recognized in them the right to make war. No one has ever sup-
posed that the Indians could commit treason against the United States. We
have punished them for their violation of treaties; but we have inflicted the
punishment on them as a nation, and not on individual offenders among
them as traitors. 399
Both of these cases echoed an 1828 opinion of the Attorney General about
the status of the Creeks: "Like all other independent nations, they have the
absolute power of war and peace."
Because the Supreme Court never had to decide directly whether an In-
dian nation was legitimately at war with the United States for purposes of
the law of nations, all of these statements are dicta, not holdings. Nonethe-
less, when one considers the nature of sovereignty that Chief Justice Mar-
shall acknowledged for the Cherokees, it follows that they did have the
power to wage war and the right to have their soldiers treated as belligerents
under the laws of war. Marshall most fully expressed his idea of Indian sov-
ereignty in Worcester.401 There he wrote that the Indian tribes had always
been treated as independent by the European nations and subsequently by
the United States, and that the lands received from the Indians had been
purchased as from another sovereign.4° 2 When the Cherokees placed them-
selves under the protection of the British or the Americans, it was not an
abandonment of their sovereignty, but instead an alliance.4o3 The Cherokees
may have been a dependent ally, weaker than the United States and seeking
support and protection, but the relation "was that of a nation claiming and
receiving the protection of one more powerful; not that of individuals aban-
doning their national character, and submitting, as subjects, to the laws of a
master."4°4 The settled doctrine of the law of nations, Marshall noted, is that
the "weaker power does not surrender its independence.., by associating
398. Id at 548.
399. Id at 583 (McLean, J., concurring).
400. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 110, 133 (1828). The same point was made sixty years later, after many
more wars with the Indian nations, by the United States Court of Claims:
The principles of international law have been applied to hostilities with the Indian tribes so
far as to accord to them the rights of a belligerent. It is too well-settled to need citations
that an Indian warrior in a war waged within the boundaries of a State can not be tried for
murder or robbery in its courts .... When war comes, it becomes lawful to kill, capture,
and destroy; and if by the peculiar circumstances of a case such acts are deemed offenses, it
is because they are offenses against the laws of war.
Love v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 332, 346 (1894); accord Leighton v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 288,
304, 325 (1894); Ke-tuc-e-mun-guah v. McClure, 122 Ind. 541, 23 N.E. 1080 (1889).
401. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515.
402. Id at 546-47; see also Steven Paul McSloy, American Indians and the Constitution: An
Argument for Nationhood, 14 AM. INDIAN L. Rv. 139, 139-40 (1989) (Marshall articulated the
view, accepted by European monarchs and legal scholars throughout the colonial period, that the
Indian nations of North America were independent sovereign powers.).
403. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 555.
404. Id
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with a stronger, and taking its protection.'' 4° The law of nations recognizes
that even a tributary state, so long as it retains the right to govern its own
body, retains its sovereign status.4° 6 Moreover, once considered sovereign, a
nation acquires and retains the power, under the law of nations, to declare
and fight wars, 4° 7 with no distinction made for wars against a protector state
or for those fought after recitation of treaty obligations to maintain perpet-
ual peace and friendship.
Marshall's belief that the Cherokees maintained their existence as a na-
tion, though perhaps not "foreign" for purposes of article III, was based on
his review of the history of Cherokee relations with Europeans and Ameri-
cans. Beginning with the assumption that the Cherokees were sovereign
before Europeans arrived on the North American continent, Marshall con-
sidered the treaties between the Cherokees and other nations and determined
that the treaty language continued to recognize the sovereignty, if not the
separateness, of the Cherokees.4° 8
A review of the treaties between the Dakota and the United States sug-
gests that these treaties similarly recognized the sovereign status of the Da-
kota. For example, in the Treaty of 1805 the "Sioux Nation" granted land to
the United States and expressly granted "full sovereignty and power over
said districts forever," a recognition that the "Sioux" were a "nation" that
had the power to grant sovereignty along with territory.4° 9 Subsequent trea-
ties proclaimed "perpetual peace and friendship" between the United States
and the tribes or bands signing the treaty,4 10 an earmark of international
agreements. 4 11 Felix Cohen, an authoritative scholar of Indian law,4 12 sug-
gested that treaty provisions related to war and peace, national boundaries,
and extradition show the international status of the Indian tribes.4 13 Each of
these kinds of clauses appears in the treaties with the Dakota. For example,
the 1825 treaty was an effort "to promote peace among [the Sioux and other
tribes] and to establish boundaries among them"; 414 it spoke of drawing lines
405. Id at 561.
406. See DE VATTEL, supra note 370, bk. 1, § 7.
407. See id. at bk. 2, §§ 49-52, bk. 3, §§ 1-5.
408. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552-57 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
409. Treaty with the Sioux, Sept. 23, 1805, art. 1, reprinted in 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 1031 (19C4). The Treaty of 1805 was confirmed by the Senate on
April 16, 1808, 2 J. EXEC. PROC. S. 80 (1808), but was apparently never proclaimed by the President
or published in the United States Statutes at Large. 2 C. KAPPLER, supra, at 1031 n.*.
410. Treaty with the Sioux of the Lakes, July 19, 1815, art. 2, 7 Stat. 126, 126 (1846); Treaty
with the Sioux-See-see-toan and Wah-pe-toan Bands, July 23, 1851, art. 1, 10 Stat. 949, 949 (1855);
Treaty with the Sioux-Med-ay-wa-kan-toan and Wah-pay-koo-tay Bands, Aug. 5, 1851, art. 1, 10
Stat. 954, 954 (1855).
411. See Love v. United States, 29 Ct. CI. 332, 340-41 (1894); FELIx S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 39 (1942) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
412. The courts have viewed Cohen's work as authoritative. See, eg., Squire v. Capoeman, 351
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1956); Felix Frankfurter, Foreword to FELIX S. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE:
SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN at xiii (1960); Stephen M. Feldman, Felix S. Cohen and His
Jurisprudence: Reflections on Federal Indian Law, 35 BuFFALo L. REv. 479, 514-17 (1986).
413. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 411, at 39.
414. Treaty with the Sioux and Chippewa, Sacs and Fox, Menominie, Ioway, Sioux, Winne-
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"dividing [the] respective countries" of the tribes.415 The 1858 treaties con-
tained pledges "not to engage in hostilities with the Indians of any other
tribe unless in self-defence" and to deliver to the United States any member
of their bands who became an offender against the laws of the United States
or of Minnesota. 416
The Dakota treaties departed significantly from those reviewed by Mar-
shall in Worcester417 only in their handling of the land reserved to the Da-
kota. It appears in Worcester that the Cherokees never ceded to the United
States the land recognized as Cherokee territory by the treaties but simply
retained it as their own.418 The 1851 treaty with the Dakota, on the other
hand, seemed to cede land to the United States, which then returned some of
it to the Dakota.419 Since a sovereign state can acquire its domain by grant
or cession, as well as by long occupancy, discovery, or conquest,420 the Da-
kota would have been no less sovereign had they received their land by
treaty from the United States rather than by retaining it. Certainly the Da-
kota had no cause to believe that the treaty terms changed their sovereign
status; indeed, they probably were unaware of the technical provisions for
transferring the land reserved to them. Nor is there any indication that the
Americans thought the 1851 treaties affected the status of the Dakota. In
fact, seven years later the Americans concluded another set of treaties with
the Dakota, indicating a continuing understanding that the Dakota re-
mained sovereign.421
Although Chief Justice Marshall's concept of Indian sovereignty thus
bago, and a portion of the Ottowa, Chippewa, and Potawattomie Tribes, Aug. 19, 1825, preamble, 7
Stat. 272, 272 (1846).
415. Id. arts. 2 & 5, 7 Stat. 272-73.
416. Treaty with the Sioux-Mendawakanton and Wahpakoota Bands, June 19, 1858, art. 6,
12 Stat. 1031, 1033-34 (1863); Treaty with the Sioux-Sisseeton and Wahpaton Bands, June 19,
1858, art. 6, 12 Stat. 1037, 1039 (1863).
417. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
418. Id. at 552-57.
419. The 1851 treaties negotiated with the Mdewakanton, Wahpekute, Sisseton, and Wahpe-
ton bands appear to provide for a total cession of all Dakota lands in the Territories of Minnesota
and Iowa. In return, the United States agreed to set apart specified land on the Minnesota River "for
the future occupancy and home of the Dakota Indians. ... to be held by them, as Indian lands are
held." Treaty with the Sioux-Sisseeton and Wahpaton Bands, July 23, 1851, art. 3, 10 Stat. 949,
949; Treaty with the Sioux-Med-ay-wa-kan-toan and Wah-pay-koo-tay Bands, art. 3, 10 Stat. 954.
The Dakota, however, understood the treaty to reserve for them the land on the Minnesota River
without cession. In negotiating both treaties, Dakota leaders expressed concern that the terms might
be changed in Washington. Minnesota Territorial Governor Alexander Ramsey and Commissioner
of Indian Affairs Luke Lea assured them that no changes would be made. Ten months after the
signing of the treaty, the Senate rejected its provisions and proposed instead that the president be
permitted to set aside for the Dakota unspecified land outside the ceded territory. S. Res., 10 Stat.
957 (1852). Some chiefs refused to sign the amended treaties. One who refused to sign-Mazasha
(Red Iron)-was arrested and the American negotiators replaced him with a chief more willing to
comply. See I. HEARD, supra note 6, at 34-40; R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 86. Having little choice,
the Dakota finally acquiesced to the amendments. See 10 Stat. 958 (1852). The President ultimately
chose the precise tract of land specified in the original treaty terms. See generally IL MEYER, supra
note 6, at 85-87 (discussing the above sequence of events).
420. H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 126; DE VATrEL, supra note 370, bk. 2, § 80.
421. Treaty with the Sioux-Mendawakanton and Wahpakoota Bands, 12 Stat. 1301; Treaty
with the Sioux-Sisseeton and Wahpaton Bands, 12 Stat. 1037.
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encompassed the right to wage war, his was not the only theory offered by
the Supreme Court before 1862. In 1846 in United States v. Rogers,422 Chief
Justice Taney provided his own interpretation of the history of relations with
the Indian nations, one totally at odds with the opinions of Chief Justice
Marshall. Rogers raised the question whether a white American could re-
nounce his citizenship, be adopted into the Cherokee nation, and thereafter
be governed solely by Cherokee law rather than by American criminal law.
In his opinion for the Court, Taney stated that the Europeans never treated
or acknowledged the native tribes as independent nations but rather treated
them as subject to the dominion and control of whichever European nation
claimed, on the basis of discovery, the territory in which the Indian nation
resided. Without citation to authority of any kind and without mention of
the contrasting vision of history described in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and
Worcester, Taney wrote: "[W]e think it too firmly and clearly established to
admit of dispute, that the Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits
of the United States are subject to its authority .... -"423 If Taney meant, as it
appears, that the Cherokees retained no aspects of sovereignty, then presum-
ably they also had no right to wage war.
Subsequent commentators have severely criticized the Rogers opinion as
a misreading of history and a misinterpretation of prior doctrine.424 In 1856,
only ten years after Rogers, Taney contradicted his own earlier view when he
stated, in Dred Scott v. Sandford:425
[Tihe Indian[s] ... were yet a free and independent people, associated to-
gether in nations or tribes, and governed by their own laws .... These
Indian Governments were regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as
much so as if an ocean had separated the red man from the white... and
the people who compose these Indian political communities have always
been treated as foreigners not living under our Government.
426
The Court reconfirmed this position in 1884 in Elk v. Wilkins, 427 holding
that a person born as a member of and owing allegiance to an Indian tribe
was no more the subject of the United States government than were children
of subjects of any foreign government born within the United States.428
Whatever force Rogers might have had was dissipated by Taney's apparent
abuse of the historical record, his own equivocation, and the Court's subse-
quent rejection of the view expressed in that case.
422. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
423. Id at 572.
424. See, eg., Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 1,
40-42 (1987); Robert T. Coulter, A History of Indian Jurisdiction, in RETHINKNG INDIAN LAWs 9
(1982); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U.
PA. L. REv. 195, 210 (1984); Daniel L. Rotenburg, American Indian Tribal Death-A Centennial
Remembrance, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 409, 420 (1986); Rachel San Kronowitz, Joanne Lichtman,
Steven Paul McSloy & Matthew G. Olsen, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Polit-
ical Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Ruv. 507, 524 (1987) (student authors).
425. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
426. Id at 403-04.
427. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
428. Id at 102.
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The prevailing and most persuasive Supreme Court theory of Indian sov-
ereignty thus offers a conceptual affirmation of the manner in which the
American Indian was ordinarily treated in wartime. Certainly, the United
States throughout its history often trampled upon or ignored Indian sover-
eignty-for example, with respect to land claims and treaty rights.429 None-
theless, the United States seemed to recognize, both in its actions and in its
words, that the Indians were sufficiently separate and independent to retain
the right, under the law of nations, to fight as sovereign nations and to have
their members accorded the rights of lawful belligerents.
C. Fighting as a Nation
As noted earlier, the law of nations in 1862 recognized a distinction be-
tween violence committed as part of a public war and violent acts committed
without such authorization or sanction.430 In a public war, those who fought
were considered justified when they killed or destroyed within the bounds of
"proper" warfare. In contrast, individuals who acted for their own private
gain or who acted without authorization from their government, even if their
government was at war, were considered marauders, robbers, and murderers
and could be punished as such. The history of warfare between the United
States and the Indian nations also reflects this distinction: While Indians
who fought in wars were not punished as criminals for their acts, individual
Indians were sometimes tried and punished-in criminal proceedings in
state courts-if their actions seemed more like isolated attacks on individu-
als than part of official hostilities.431
In 1847, for example, Chief Tilokaikt, Tomahas, and several other
Cayuses entered the Christian mission at Waiilatpu in Oregon Territory and
killed fourteen people, including missionaries Marcus and Narcissa Whit-
man. The Cayuses apparently did not participate in any further fighting but
simply faded into the countryside. Later, five of the "ringleaders" of the
attack were tried and convicted for murder after they gave themselves up in
1850.432 Similarly, in 1871, Kiowa chiefs Satanta and Big Tree were tried for
killing individuals during an attack on a wagon train that was part of a pat-
tern of raids conducted from their base on the Kiowa reservation in
Texas. 433
In most of these instances, the distinction between individual acts and
group warfare was not articulated. On some occasions, however, the differ-
ence was made explicit. In early 1875, for example, the Judge Advocate
429. See generally D. BROWN, supra note 386; HELEN HUNT JACKSON, A CENTURY OF Dis-
HONOR (1881 and photo. reprint 1965); VINE DELoRIA, JR. & CLiFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN
INDIANS, AMERICAN JusTIcE (1983).
430. See text accompanying notes 370-372 supra.
431. The courts, as well, have occasionally noted this distinction between individual acts and
group warfare. See Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901); People v. McLeod, 25
Wend. 483, 578 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
432. R. UTLEY & W. WASHBURN, supra note 384, at 179-81.
433. The two were condemned to death, but their sentences were commuted to imprisonment
and, in 1873, they were freed to return to their people. Ia at 261-62.
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General ruled that a group of Indians accused of murder, robbery, and theft
could be tried in state court because the alleged acts had occurred when
there was no state of war. In doing so, the Judge Advocate General distin-
guished an earlier case in which "an entire Indian clan, having a tribal or-
ganization, engaged in hostilities, as such, against the United States." 43
The United States, then, recognized the difference between acts of war-
fare and acts of individuals. The next step is to determine whether the Da-
kota acted as individuals or as a nation at war. Under the law of nations in
1862, the manner in which a nation could declare war and thereby transform
acts of individuals into acts of warfare was controlled by that nation's own
fundamental law allocating decisionmaking responsibility. 435 The Dakota
nation, like many other Indian nations, was governed by consensus operat-
ing at levels ranging from a single band to the whole nation.4 36 Important
decisions affecting the band as a whole were made at Council, a meeting of
the men and sometimes also the women of the band. Generally, all who
came to Council had an opportunity to speak, and the band took action only
when there was sufficient agreement. Each band had the independence to
reach its own governing decisions, including whether to go to war.
A decision as important, and with such ramifications, as a declaration of
war, however, was often made at a Council attended by representatives of
more than one band. A decision would still be made by consensus, but par-
ticipation would not be so general; the chiefs would speak and act on behalf
of their bands. Once a Council representing multiple bands reached a deci-
sion, each band was bound by the collective decision, unless the band chose
to withdraw from the larger group. If the community decided in Council to
go to war, a soldiers' lodge-a collection of men experienced in warfare-
would form, with complete authority over the community for the duration
of the war.4 37
The events of 1862 followed this general pattern. After the killings at
Acton, when some of the young men began to urge war, Shakopee's band
held a Council, followed by a multi-band Council in Taoyateduta's village
and subsequent Councils among the Sissetons at the Yellow Medicine (Up-
per) Agency.4 38 It was at these Councils that the Dakota made the decision
434. Letter from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Adj. Gen. (Jan. 29, 1875), in Letters Sent-JAG,
NARG 153 (Entry 1). The Judge Advocate General was distinguishing the case of the Modoc lead-
ers tried by military commission in 1873. See text accompanying notes 387-388 supra. But see Letter
from J. Adv. Gen. Joseph Holt to Sec'y of War William Belknap (July 3, 1869), in Letters Sent-JAG,
NARG 153 (Entry 1) (denying payment of claim to Cherokees for cattle taken by United States
forces during Civil War; Cherokees could not be considered to be at war with the United States
because they were in state of pupilage and dependence and were not independent communities).
435. DE VATrEL, supra note 370, bk. 3, § 4; H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 351.
436. S. POND, supra note 216, at 66-69. The following description is gleaned from discussions
with present-day members of the Dakota nation.
437. The authority of the soldiers' lodge is similar to the authority of the military after a
declaration of martial law. Sometimes a soldiers' lodge formed before the formal decision was made
to go to war in part to attempt to influence the decision. The soldiers' lodge had no formal author-
ity, however, until the Council decided on war. See note 436 supra.
438. See texts accompanying notes 22-25 & 40 supra.
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to go to war. With many Dakota having become "farmer-Indians" and as-
similating American ways in the years preceding the war, however, the com-
munity itself was split. The farmer-Indians had formed their own band and
were no longer part of Shakopee's or Taoyateduta's bands. When the deci-
sion to go to war was made, the farmer-Indians, who were assumed to be
more sympathetic to the Americans, were not included at the Council meet-
ings. Many of them were thus as surprised, angry, and frightened by the
outbreak of the war as were the Americans. 439
The Dakota made the momentous decision to go to war rapidly, under
the press of circumstances and despite the opposition of some of the leaders.
Some Dakota may have felt that the decision to go to war was made without
sufficient deliberation and consultation, contributing to a sense among some
of the Dakota that the war was not a tribal decision, but rather a series of
actions by a group of angry young men and those who chose to follow them.
Despite the resulting opposition to the war by some of the Dakota, however,
the forms of typical Dakota decisionmaking had been followed. Though the
Dakota might ordinarily have taken more time to make such a decision and
might have consulted more bands, Councils were held and group decisions
were made, both to begin and to continue the fighting. These procedures
were sufficient to gain recognition for the Dakota as legitimate
belligerents. 44°
Even if the violence were considered to be the actions of a breakaway
group, the men who fought may have been entitled to be treated as legiti-
mate belligerents. Although the courts never decided what form of hostilities
between the United States and an Indian nation would constitute an official
war under the law of nations, the courts frequently considered a related
question that sheds considerable light on this issue. In 1891, Congress
passed the Indian Depredations Act,441 which provided for payment to indi-
viduals who proved that their property was taken or destroyed by "Indians
belonging to any band, tribe, or nation, in amity with the United States."442
The United States would pay the claims from annuities or other funds owed
to the tribe.443 When claims were made, the question necessarily arose
whether the group of Indians that had taken or destroyed the property be-
longed to a "band, tribe or nation" that was "in amity" with the United
States.
Almost invariably, the group in conflict was not a whole tribe or even a
band, but a group that had broken from the rest and had independently
decided to fight the Americans. In case after case, the Claims Court and then
439. See Cecilia Campbell Stay'sAccount, in THROUGH DAKOTA EYms, supra note 6, at 47-52;
Good Star Woman's Recollections, supra note 21, at 52-53; Esther Wakeman's Reminiscences, in
THROUGH DAKOTA EyEs, supra note 6, at 53-55; Joseph Coursolle's Story, supra note 19, at 57-58;
Taopi's Statement in THROUGH DAKOTA EYEs, supra note 6, at 63-65.
440. See text accompanying note 435 supra.
441. Ch. 538, § 1, 26 Stat. 851 (1891).
442. id at 851-52.
443. Id § 6, at 853. If no such funds were available, the United States would pay the claimant
from the Treasury, but the amount would then be deducted from future payments to the tribe. Id
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the Supreme Court determined that these groups had to be treated as dis-
tinct from their tribe.444 The courts invariably concluded that, although the
tribe or nation remained at peace with the United States, the breakaway
group had made an independent decision to go to war. Since the group that
caused the injury was not "in amity with the United States," the property
damage constituted an act of war and the claimant was not entitled to any
recovery. 445
Of course, in these cases the courts were construing a statute, not apply-
ing international law. Moreover, the courts may have been motivated in part
by a desire to protect the United States Treasury: If they found the warring
group to be politically separate from the tribe, neither the tribe nor the
United States would have to pay.446 Nonetheless, the conclusions the courts
reached about the political status of the warring groups seem to reflect the
general understanding of Indian warfare shared by Congress, the military,
and the general public. Thus, even if Taoyateduta and the Dakota who
fought in 1862 did not act for the entire tribe, they should have been recog-
nized as a politically separate band of belligerents entitled to favorable treat-
ment under the laws of war.
D. The Views of the Participants
Although the historical and legal precedents consistently reflect that the
Dakota were entitled to be treated as a sovereign nation fighting a war, the
officials who controlled the events in 1862 did not treat them as such. For
some purposes, at least, these individuals seemed to view the Dakota as sov-
ereign,447 but in the aftermath of the war, the Americans involved in the
444. See Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901); Scott v. United States, 33 Ct. CL 486,
493-94 (1898); Salois v. United States, 33 Ct. CI. 326, 332-33 (1898); Conners v. United States, 33 Ct.
Cl. 317, 320 (1898); Dobbs v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 308, 314-16 (1898).
445. In the most telling of these decisions, the Court of Claims reviewed the acts of what it
called an "insurgent" group of Chiricahua Apaches led by Goyahkla (Geronimo), consisting of 22
men, 13 women, and 2 children. The group had no existence as a band prior to the outbreak of
hostilities; had a military leader, not a hereditary chief, as their commander;, and had no separate
territory. The court nonetheless concluded that Goyahkla's small group was at war with the United
States, independent of the much larger body of the Chiricahuas, who remained at peace. Scott, 33 Ct.
CI. at 494. The court accorded similar treatment to Tahmelapashme (Dull Knife) and Little Wolf,
and to their followers, 320 members of two bands who had broken away from the rest of the North-
ern Cheyenne. Conners, 33 Ct. Cl. at 321. In considering (and rejecting) a reparations claim for
injury caused by this group, the Court of Claims noted that these bands were not individuals wan-
dering from the main body, murdering and destroying while the main body remained in amity, but
"an entire body waging armed resistance, with all its might and with all the ferocity of Indian
warfare, against whatever power the United States could bring to bear upon them." Id.
446. See Steven A. Knecht, Tribal Status and the Indian Nonintercourse AcL An Alternative to
the Montoya Definition of Tribe, 29 CATH. U.L. REv. 625, 629 (1980) (student author). The tribe
remained primarily liable, but the United States Treasury was charged if no money was available
from payments due or becoming due to the tribe from annuities or land sales, or from appropriations
other than for "current and necessary support, subsistence and education." Indian Depredations
Act, ch. 538, § 6, 26 Stat. 851, 853 (1891).
447. See, eg., Governor's Messag Pioneer Democrat, Sept. 10, 1862, at 4, ol. I (Governor
Ramsey's message to the state legislature referring to the "Dakota nation" and the "Sioux nation");
The Question of Rerponsibility, St. Paul Daily Press, Sept. 12, 1862, at 1, col. 2 (editorial noting that
"[tihe Sioux Indians are not within the jurisdiction of the State of Minnesota, nor subject to its laws.
[Vol. 43:13
US.-DAKOTA WAR TRIALS
events made clear that they believed the Dakota should be considered ordi-
nary murderers and thieves. Sibley himself indicated that he regarded the
Dakota "not... as entitled to be considered in the light of prisoners of war,
but rather as outlaws and villains. . . ."448 Senator Henry Rice agreed, say-
ing that it would be an error to call the Dakota prisoners of war; in his
opinion they were "murderers of the deepest dye." 449 Although Governor
Ramsey recognized the Indians "as independent nations, competent to de-
clare war, to make laws for their own guidance, and to hold and dispose of
property, ' 450 he also suggested that the Dakota should be treated as "visit-
ing bands of murderers" and punished by the State of Minnesota.451 Senator
Wilkinson and Representatives Aldrich and Windom wrote to President
Lincoln expressing similar sentiments: "These Indians are called by some
prisoners of war. There was no war about it. It was wholesale robbery, rape,
murder. These Indians were not at war with their murdered victims. '452
Even Bishop Whipple, who was inclined to a more benevolent attitude, de-
clined to consider the Dakota as sovereign and therefore entitled to carry on
a war.
4 5 3
The State authorities are excluded from any control over them or any responsibility for their con-
duct," but also stating that the Dakota were wards of the United States government); Letter from
Right Reverend Bishop Whipple, St. Paul Daily Press, Dec. 4, 1862, at 4, col. 3 ("In all of our
relations [with the Dakota] we have persistently carried out the idea that they were a sovereign
people."); St. Paul Pioneer, Jan. 8, 1863, at 1, col. 1 (reporting another of Governor Ramsey's
messages to the state legislature, in which he complained about "[t]he recognition of [the Dakota] as
independent nations, competent to declare war, to make laws for their own guidance, and to hold
and dispose of property").
448. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Acting Ass't Adj. Gen. R. Selfridge (Dec. 22,
1862), in Letters and Telegrams Sent, NARG 393 (Entry 343). One month earlier, Sibley had writ-
ten to Selfridge requesting his guidance regarding whether the Dakota were to be considered prison-
ers of war and thus entitled to complete rations. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Ass't Adj.
Gen. R. Selfridge (Nov. 29, 1862), in id Sibley seems never to have questioned the treatment of the
Dakota as simple murderers for the purpose of the Commission trials. In a letter to Judge Advocate
General Holt following the disapproval of the trial of Wowinape in 1863, Sibley challenged the
application of a particular statute to trials, such as the Commission proceedings, involving "enlisted
men or prisoners of war," see notes 184-185 supra, thus implicitly suggesting that the Dakota were
prisoners of war. In view of his other actions and remarks, however, it is unlikely that Sibley fully
considered this statement or meant to recognize in the Dakota any sovereign status entitling them to
formal treatment as prisoners of war.
449. Letter from Sen. Henry Rice to Bishop Henry Whipple (Nov. 19, 1862), in Whipple Pa-
pers, MHS.
450. Annual Message of Governor Ramsey to the Legislature of Minnesota (Jan. 7, 1863), at
27 (on file with Stanford Law Review).
451. Id. at 29. In suggesting that the State might punish the Dakota, however, Ramsey contin-
ued to recognize the unusual status of the Dakota. The authority to try the Dakota that he claimed
for the State emanated, he thought, from the state's power to engage in war independently of the
United States when its own boundaries were invaded. Ramsey still saw the Dakota as a warring
nation, not as a group of simple murderers acting individually and subject to the normal criminal
jurisdiction of the State.
452. Letter from Sen. Morton Wilkinson and Reps. Cyrus Aldrich and William Windom to
Pres. Abraham Lincoln, reprinted in S. EXEc. Doc. No. 7, supra note 116, at 4 (emphasis in
original).
453. Letter from Bishop Henry Whipple to Sen. Henry Rice (Nov. 29, 1862), in Whipple Pa-
pers, MHS ("I said what I did simply to show how false a system was whose policy if carried out to
its just conclusions left these savages as an independent nation and as such would have the right to
engage in war, a doctrine I do not believe."). At least one person not directly involved with the
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These statements confirm what is evident from reading the transcripts of
the trials: the Dakota were tried as common criminals, not as legitimate bel-
ligerents of a sovereign nation. The only proper charge against a belligerent
is violation of the laws and customs of war. The Commission, instead, tried
the Dakota on charges of murder, robbery, rape, and participation in the
"outrages" on the frontier. Most of the Dakota brought before the Commis-
sion were charged with and convicted of murder solely for participating in
battles, which is not an offense for legitimate belligerents captured in war-
fare. Although some individual Dakota might have committed acts in viola-
tion of the laws of war,454 the Commission made no attempt to identify those
actions. The transcripts show that the Commission acted without recogni-
tion of the fact that most of the Dakota were guilty of nothing more than
fighting in a war and that they were therefore guilty of no punishable offense.
V. VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR
As members of a sovereign nation, the Dakota should not have been con-
demned for fighting in a war with the United States. Under the law of na-
tions, however, they-as well as the American soldiers-would have been
liable for acts that overstepped the bounds of proper warfare. We must
therefore ask a final question: Do the trials reveal that any of the Dakota
were guilty of violating the laws of war? Clearly, if the Dakota were sover-
eign and fighting a war, killing soldiers in battle would not be a violation.
Similarly, once civilians took up arms and established themselves as de facto
military units, as did the defenders at New Ulm, they should be considered
combatants and fair targets in the war.455
The killing of noncombatants is more problematic. Certainly it was the
killing-and alleged mutilation-of civilians that provoked cries for revenge
from the Minnesotans. It was also the killing of civilians that apparently
persuaded President Lincoln to order execution of those who participated in
"massacres" rather than in battles.
Although the proposition that noncombatants should be protected in
wartime seems unobjectionable, it is far from clear what standard should
have been used to judge the actions of the Dakota, because no precise stan-
dard existed in 1862. General Order 100,456 issued in early 1863 to guide the
United States Army in its fight against the Confederacy, stated that the citi-
zen of a hostile country is an enemy and is subject to the hardships of war,
but that "[t]he principle [is] more and more acknowledged that the unarmed
events in Minnesota disagreed with these views and suggested a distinction of the sort I have pro-
posed in this article. V.D. Lowther, an attorney in Chicago, wrote to Whipple: "[R]ecognizing as we
mistakenly do by Treaties the Indians as independent nations, not amenable to our laws, all of them
that we have captured are entitled to be treated as Prisoners of War, entitled to their immunities
.... Letter from V. Lowther to Bishop Henry Whipple (Dec. 13, 1862), in Whipple Papers, 1AIHS
(emphasis in original).
454. See Part V infira.
455. H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 426, 428; Dn VATrML, supra note 370, bk. 3, §§ 145,
147, 149.
456. Gen. Order No. 100, supra note 334.
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citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigen-
cies of war will admit. '457 Similar sentiments were expressed by the major
treatise writers of the time.458 But General Order No. 100 left ambiguous
just what "the exigencies of war will admit": "Military necessity admits of
all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the
war."' 45 9 It consists "of those measures which are indispensable for securing
the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modem law and
usages of war."460 The contemporary treatises were equally ambiguous: A
belligerent nation has "the right to use such force as may be necessary, in
order to obtain the object for which the war was undertaken .... [The
subjects of the belligerent states], therefore, have no right to take the lives of
non-combatants... unless the same should be necessary for the object of the
war."461
The general rule in 1862, then, was that noncombatants should be pro-
tected but they might legitimately be injured or killed if the war required it
and modem "law and usages of war" permitted it-a kind of common law
standard to be gleaned from custom.462 But in 1862-indeed, until much
later than 1862463-there were no clear customs about when military neces-
sity would justify killing civilians; perhaps the only certainty was that vio-
lence was directed at civilians, and was seldom punished.464 This proved
457. Id. § 1, 22.
458. See, eg, DE VATrEL, supra note 370, bk. 3, §§ 136-139, 145; H. GROTIUS, supra note
370, at 323-31; H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 412. Halleck, it should be noted, was not only a
scholar in the area of international law, publishing several editions of his treatise; he was also at
various times the commanding general of the Union Army for the western theater, General-in-Chief
of the Union armies, and chief of staff under General Grant. David Herbert Donald, Uniting The
Republi, 1860-1877, in THE GREAT REPUBLIC 452, 460, 462 (1985). He was instrumental in pro-
moting the promulgation of General Order 100.
459. Gen. Order No. 100, supra note 334, § 1, 15.
460. Id, § 1, 14.
461. H. HALLECK, supra note 320, at 412.
462. General Order 100 may have tried to move towards increased protection of civilians by
limiting harm to them to situations in which it was "incidentally unavoidable," suggesting that di-
rect attacks on civilians would be considered unacceptable even if "indispensible for securing the
ends of the war." Gen. Order No. 100, supra note 334, § 1, 14. Without further contemporary
explanation or application of these newly expressed terms, however, the precise standard by which to
judge the Dakota remains unclear. See notes 463-467 infra and accompanying text.
463. The international community did not reach any formal agreement on the protection of
noncombatants until 1949. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Earlier interna-
tional agreements primarily concerned the treatment of combatants and prisoners of war. See I.
DELuris, supra note 370, at 332-37. Even today, there remains significant controversy about the
extent to which "military necessity" may justify behavior that would otherwise violate express provi-
sions of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of civilians.
464. See, ag., DONALD A. WELLS, WAR CRIMES AND LAWS OF WAR 3-4 (1984); Best, supra
note 378, at 29-31; Michael Howard, Temperamenta Belli: Can War Be Controlled, in RESTRAINTS
ON WAR, supra note 370, at 1, 9-11; Donald Cameron Watt, Restraints on War in the Air Before
1945, in id, at 57, 57-58. Indeed, it was the absence of such international standards that raised
questions about the legality of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes trials following World War
II. See generally D. WELLS, supra, at 1-3, 71-72; WILLIAM J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG:
AMERICAN ATrrruDES TOWARD THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR-CRIME TRIALS 40-66 (1970);
CHARLES E. WYZANsKI, JR., WHEREAS--A JUDGE'S PREMISES 164-90 (1965).
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especially-although not uniquely-true in fighting between the United
States and the Indian nations.4 5 The participants in the events of 1862
might therefore have had some difficulty articulating custom-based rules by
which to judge the behavior of the Dakota.
Moreover, the Dakota, like other Indians, traditionally fought with
methods substantially different from those of the Americans and Europeans.
In particular, in intertribal Indian wars almost all members of the enemy
nation-including women and children-were legitimate targets of attack,
and captives were rarely taken.466 These practices were largely dictated by
circumstances: the Indians had no prison camps in which to confine cap-
tives; women and older children, if taken, were likely to escape and bring
vital information back to their own tribes; the fighting men could not effec-
tively transport the younger children, and infants would likely die on the
way.467 In arriving at its decisions, the Commission should have at least
considered these differences in culture and military methods in any attempt
to determine whether "military necessity" permitted killing noncombatants
in the war.
Had the Commission tried to articulate rules of war by which to judge
the Dakota, we could now evaluate whether the standards imposed were fair
and reasonable, as articulated and applied. Unfortunately, the manner in
which the trials were conducted does not permit such an inquiry. Even if
now, more than a century later, we could somehow craft a nonanachronistic
set of rules about treatment of noncombatants, the record compiled by the
Commission would not be sufficient for application of those rules. The Com-
mission allowed each defendant to speak and asked witnesses to identify the
defendant and explain what they knew of his participation in the fighting,
but the members did not inquire further once they had evidence of participa-
tion in the fighting. To the Commission, evidence that a defendant had shot
a gun in battle with soldiers was just as damning as testimony that he had
killed a family of settlers fleeing in a wagon. Because the Commission was
determined to punish any Dakota who fought in any manner, it asked no
questions about military necessity and made no effort to explore the circum-
stances of any of the killings.
President Lincoln stated that he made his decision to hang only thirty-
eight of the 303 condemned Dakota in order to execute those involved in
465. See generally R. UTLEY & W. WASHBURN, supra note 384; ROBERT WOOSTER, THE
MILITARY AND UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 1865-1903, at 137-38, 141-42, 208-09 (1988) (U.S.
army often violated traditional rules of warfare in fighting with Indians; Indian women and children
were frequent targets); Don Higginbotham, The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and
Appraisal, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 230, 230-234 (1987) (reviewing work concluding that American wars
were fought with a "strategy of annihilation," particularly in conflicts with Indians); Robert M.
Utley, The Frontier Army: John Ford or Arthur Penn?, in INDIAN-WHrrE RELATIONS: A PERsts-
TENT PARADOX 133, 133-34, 141 (J. Smith & R. Kvasnicka eds. 1976) (U.S. army practiced total
war against bands or tribes that resisted, killing many noncombatants).
466. See WILLIAM W. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE OJIBWAY PEOPLE 102-07, 183-87, 224-27,
327-29, 352-53, 367 (1885 & photo. reprint 1984); S. POND, supra note 216, at 135.
467. S. POND, supra note 216, at 135.
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"massacres" rather than "battles.' 468 Lincoln made these judgments, it
seems, without recognizing the sovereignty of the Dakota, based solely on
his desire to treat the Dakota more humanely and avoid the wholesale
slaughter recommended by Sibley and Pope. Yet by distinguishing between
"massacres" and "battles," Lincoln in effect attempted to draw the kind of
line that would have been legitimate had the Dakota been acknowledged as
sovereign and tried for violations of the laws of war. To some degree he was
successful. The testimony-flawed though it may have been469-tended to
show that many of those who were hanged had killed men, women, and
children in what appeared to be attacks on individuals in their homes or
wagons, not as part of larger battles,470 or to have shot at individuals under
such circumstances. 471 Others were shown to have been in a group of Da-
kota, some of whom killed individuals in this manner472-although the lia-
bility of those accompanying the killers is questionable, as I have already
suggested.473 Two were convicted of raping captive women.474
In other cases, however, Lincoln's choices are harder to understand. The
Commission found Hdainyanka guilty of nothing more than leading the Da-
kota into battle and opposing the return of the hostages.475 Shoonkaska
(White Dog) was found guilty only of using a stratagem at the battle at
Redwood Ferry: he held Captain Marsh in conversation, allowing the Da-
kota to surround and fire upon the captain and his soldiers.476 Wahehud was
convicted of killing a soldier, under circumstances not explained in the testi-
mony.477 Several others may have been convicted for killings that occurred
during the Battle of New Ulm, 4 78 an attack on a strategically placed settle-
468. See notes 116-120 supra and accompanying text.
469. See notes 210-246 supra and accompanying text.
470. See Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 6, 14, 15, 22, 67, 68, 69, 96, 115, 170,210,225, 264, 318,
333, 342, 373, 377, 382.
471. See Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 5, 138, 175.
472. See Trial Transcripts, Case No. 2 (defendant acted pleased when others said they killed
two men; also convicted of rape), Case No. 4 (with group when settler killed; also convicted of rape),
Case No. 24 (in party that killed settler, but defendant was chasing a girl who ran away when killing
occurred), Case No. 155 (in group that killed settler), Case No. 254 (in group that shot at settlers on
way to New Ulm), Case No. 279 (in group that fired on settlers at Beaver Creek), Case No. 327
(defendant seen in house where old man and two girls were killed), Case No. 359 (present when
settler killed; saved white woman from death).
473. See text accompanying notes 219-221 supra.
474. See Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 2, 4.
475. See Trial Transcripts, Case No. 19.
476. See Trial Transcript, Case No. 35; K. CARLEY, supra note 6, at 16; I. HEARD, supra note
6, at 72-73. With no guarantees of safe passage having been given and no truce flag violated, it does
not appear that these actions would violate the laws of war. Instead, they would be considered the
ordinary kind of deception practiced to obtain advantage on the battlefield.
477. See Trial Transcripts, Case No. 12. Wahehud was also charged with and convicted of
"making war upon the citizens of the United States," but the specifications listed only general partic-
ipation in the war, and the testimony related only to the killing of the soldier. Id. It is against the law
of war to kill a soldier who has surrendered, unless taking prisoners is impossible. H. HALLECK,
supra note 320, at 429-31, 439-40. The transcript gives no clues whether this is the kind of charge
alleged.
478. See Trial Transcripts, Case Nos. 10, 178, 383. It is unclear from the evidence given
whether these were isolated attacks not part of a general battle or actually part of the unified attack
on New Ulm.
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ment defended by a group of citizen-soldiers. At least one Dakota was omit-
ted from the list of those to be hanged although his "crimes" were
indistinguishable from some of those executed.479
Lincoln tried to distinguish rationally between the Dakota who deserved
retribution for their actions and those who did not. But because neither he
nor the Military Commission recognized the sovereignty of the Dakota or
attempted to define the proper bounds of warfare on the frontier, he con-
structed an imperfect line. Furthermore, the record he drew upon was insub-
stantial, the evidence was of questionable reliability, and the standards by
which the Dakota were judged were unexpressed. Only the two convictions
for rape present undeniable cases of violation of the laws of war. With re-
spect to all the other cases, we cannot adequately judge the defendants. Be-
cause the participants did not ask the right questions, we cannot reconstruct
the events sufficiently to determine whether the Dakota committed acts for
which they might legitimately have been punished.
VI. UNDERSTANDING THE HI TORY
We have seen that the trials of the Dakota were conducted unfairly in a
variety of ,ways. The evidence was sparse, the tribunal was biased, the de-
fendants were unrepresented in unfamiliar proceedings conducted in a for-
eign language, and authority for convening the tribunal was lacking. More
fundamentally, neither the Military Commission nor the reviewing authori-
ties recognized that they were dealing with the aftermath of a war fought
with a sovereign nation and that the men who surrendered were entitled to
treatment in accordance with that status.
A final question remains, however. The historical record shows that in
no other instance in American history did the military respond to a war in
this manner, though there were many opportunities. Why did it happen
here?
First, the fact that the Dakota lived on a small strip of land, entirely
surrounded by United States territory, must have led the Americans, con-
sciously or unconsciously, to view the Dakota as less independent and less
sovereign than Indian tribes that occupied larger tracts of land.480 The Da-
kota's growing dependence on the annuities paid annually by the United
States government reinforced that perception.481 This attitude is reflected in
the question asked over and over again in the trials of Wakanozanzan and
Shakopee: Were they annuity Indians under the protection of the United
479. See Trial Transcripts, Case No. 3 (defendant in party that killed settler). There was testi-
mony that he saved a white woman from death, and this may have saved his life, but others of those
hanged had also protected captive women and were not spared. See note 223 supra.
480. I sense today the same reluctance among the general populace to view Indian tribes as
sovereign, confined as they are to relatively small reservations surrounded by American territory.
481. These annuities were required payments for land sold pursuant to treaties and so repre-
sented, if anything, an affirmation of the sovereign status of the Dakota, since a country concludes
treaties only with other nations, not with private groups. Whatever the legal consequences of receiv-
ing annuities, however, the Minnesotans apparently viewed the annuities as creating a dependent
relationship.
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States? In effect, the Commission was asking whether the Dakota were de-
pendent upon the United States and thus guilty of rebelling against their
own government rather than warring against a foreign one.
A second likely reason for the treatment accorded the Dakota was the
Americans' perception that the Dakota were no longer as different and sepa-
rate as once they had been. When first encountering the Dakota on the fron-
tier, the settlers considered them to be "savages" who could be forgiven their
excesses because they did not know better. By 1862, however, the Americans
viewed the Dakota as having betrayed a special relationship created by a
dozen years of close contact between members of the two communities and
substantial assimilation by some of the Dakota.482 The Dakota Reservation
was an especially small geographical area, so the Dakota often traveled off
the reservation and frequently visited the American settlements. Many of
the settlers provided food, medicine, and volunteer services to the Dakota,
particularly in times of special need.483
Missionaries had been active among the Dakota since the establishment
of the first mission in 1835; although they reported few conversions before
1862, the clergy had a marked impact through their efforts to evangelize and
acculturate the Dakota to Christian and "white men's ways. ' '48 Many inter-
marriages occurred between the two communities, and family ties thus
bound them together. Substantial numbers of full-blood Dakota had adopted
some American ways--cutting their hair and donning American clothes-
events often accompanied by great pomp and ceremony by the American
officials marking the transition. The farmer-Indians served as a visible re-
minder that some of the Dakota were settling into a very American-and
very un-Dakotan-way of life. In 1856, a group of Dakota had broken en-
tirely from the Dakota community and set up the highly touted "Hazlewood
Republic," adopting an American-like constitution and laws.485 All these
things combined to obscure from the Americans the extent to which most
Dakota remained governed by their own traditions and to suggest to the
Americans that the Dakota "knew better" and should be punished for their
actions.
Some of the calls for vengeance on the Dakota reflected precisely this
482. See generally GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON, KINSMEN OF ANOTHER KIND: DAKOTA-
WHITE RELATIONS IN THE UPPER MISSMSIPPI VALLEY, 1650-1862 (1984); Reginald Horsman, In-
dian and White Perceptions of an Expanding Republic: Minnesota in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
(unpublished paper, on file with the Stanford Law Review); B. Forbes, supra note 123.
483. See Sweet, supra note 17, at 355-56, 369.
484. See generally B. Forbes, supra note 123. Forbes reports that only 52 full-bloods and 15
mixed-bloods were members of the three mission churches on the eve of the war, but that the mis-
sionaries' impact on the Dakota community was much stronger than these figures suggest. Id at 77.
He believes that the tensions caused by the missionaries' inroads on traditional Dakota culture were
themselves an important cause of the war. Id at 259-67.
485. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 102; B. Forbes, supra note 123, at 71. The Republic was
established in 1856 by 17 Wahpeton, who, "wishing to place themselves under a separate chief and
adopt all the habits of civilized 'life,"' signed a constitution and requested recognition from the
federal government as a separate band. Id (quoting the HAZLEWOOD REPUBLIC CONsT.). The Re-
public was recognized by the federal government, and by 1858 included 82 Dakota and mixed-
bloods.
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notion, which Sibley himself expressed in a letter he wrote to Bishop Whip-
ple on December 7, 1862, seeking to justify the trials and executions:
A great public crime has been committed not by wild Indians who did
not know better, but by men who have had advantages, some of religious
teachings, all more or less of acquiring light, by long and intimate inter-
course with white men, which rendered them entirely competent to judge of
the criminality of the proceedings in which they are now implicated and
who therefore do not deserve to be judged with the leniency, with which
entirely wild and ignorant savages might have a claim to be treated.486
The extent of the killing and disruption caused by the Dakota and the
nature of the Dakota attacks on a settled, permanent community further
explain the American response. Hundreds of settlers were killed and more
than ten thousand fled from their homes, in fear for their lives. The Dakota
destroyed homes and storehouses, and the settlers knew they would face the
winter without sufficient supplies. Many Minnesotans personally knew
someone who was killed in the fighting. In no other conflict with Indians, at
least since colonial times, was a settled civilian community so thoroughly
affected4 87 -and all of it caused by a group most viewed as "civilized."
Moreover, the attack came at a time when Minnesota, and the nation, felt
particularly vulnerable as a result of the Civil War.488 Add the widespread
belief, albeit unfounded, that most of the Dakota had engaged in wholesale
rape and mutilation, and it becomes easier to understand the outpouring of
rage and the disinclination to view the actions of the Dakota as justifiable
warfare. At least one historian has suggested that the settlers' response to the
486. Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Bishop Henry Whipple (Dec. 7, 1862), in Whipple
Papers, MHS. A printed memorial, sent to President Lincoln as he pondered the fate of the con-
demned Dakota, expressed similar sentiments:
Tame [the Indian], cultivate him, strive to Christianize him as you will, and the sight of
blood will in an instant call out the savage, wolfish, devilish instincts of the race. It is
notorious that among the earliest and most murderous of the Sioux, in perpetrating their
late massacre, were many of the "civilized Indians," so called, with their hair cut short,
wearing white men's clothes, and dwelling in brick houses built for them by the
government.
S. ExEC. Doc. No. 7, supra note 116, at 5; see also Pioneer Democrat, Sept. 10, 1862, at 4 (Governor
Ramsey's message to the legislature); Memorial for the Removal of the Winnebago Indians, Sept. 23,
1862, reprinted in GENERAL AND SPECIAL LAws OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, EXTRA SESSION
OF THE STATE LEGsLATuRE COMMENCING SEPT. 9, 1862, at 92-93 ("[Tlo live adjacent to those
savages.., is more than can reasonably be expected from a people who have lost all confidence in
Indian integrity or Indian professions of friendship."); Reminiscence of Marcia Doughty Pika Sun-
day Oregonian, Nov. 17, 1940, in Sioux Uprising Collections, MHS ("Had these red-skinned natives
been engaged in open war, such as the law of races or of nations tolerate, their advocates might well
have claimed for them the rights extended to prisoners of war. But these savages had declared no
open war. They had secretly conspired against the lives of men, women and children in a time of
peace when the hand of genuine friendship was extended for their relief.").
487. One historian called the United States-Dakota war "the most disastrous Indian uprising
white Americans had experienced since the attacks of Opechancanough and Philip on the Virginia
and Massachusetts frontiers two centuries before." ANGIE DEBo, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF
T UNITED STATES 157 (1970).
488. In fact, there was suspicion that the Confederacy had incited the Dakota to war. See eg.,
Daily Tribune Aug. 25, 1862, at 4, col. 4 ("The Sioux have doubtless been stimulated if not bribed
to plunder and slaughter their white neighbors by White and Red villains set among them for this
purpose by the Secessionists."); B. Forbes, supra note 123, at 255-59.
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war may also have been motivated by greed: Treating the Dakota as
criminals allowed the United States summarily to remove all the Dakota
from the state, thereby opening to settlement land that the Minnesotans had
coveted for years.48 9
All of this may explain why the American community was unwilling to
consider the Dakota as legitimate belligerents. Ultimately, however, it was
Colonel Sibley, not the community, that decided to try the Dakota. It was he
who first suggested, in his letters to General Pope, that he conduct trials and
execute the guilty. Sibley had no prior experience in the military to suggest
military commission trials as the proper avenue for punishing unfair tactics
in warfare. But Sibley was a lawyer-indeed, the first lawyer and the first
Justice of the Peace in the territory that became Minnesota. 49° His father
had been Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan.4 9 1 Sibley was
outraged at the conduct of the Dakota, personally offended by what he
viewed as the rejection of friendship and assistance offered them,492 and keen
to punish those he saw as murderers. His training as a lawyer, however,
would suggest not that he punish the Dakota by removing them to a distant
reservation, as was frequently done, but that he try them for their crimes. He
expressed precisely such thoughts a dozen years earlier when, as delegate
from the Territory of Minnesota, he introduced into Congress a bill for the
extension of the laws of the United States over the Indian tribes of Minne-
sota and Oregon. "If the Indians must be punished," he said, "let the inflic-
tions at least be regulated by law."'493 In providing trials for the Dakota in
1862, he protected them, at least in his own mind, with due process, while
ensuring that the guilty would be punished.4 94
VII. CONCLUSION
In one sense, Sibley may indeed have protected the Dakota. Without
trials to satisfy the demand for retribution, the Minnesotans might well have
489. R. MEYER, supra note 6, at 124-25; cf. R. WOSMR, supra note 465, at 51-55 (United
States military policy often shaped by settlers' desire for Indian land). The Dakota were removed
pursuant to statute rather than by treaty, as other Indian removals had been accomplished. See note
150 supra and accompanying text.
490. Robert J. Sheran & Timothy . Baland, The Law, Courts, and Lawyers in the Frontier
Days of Minnesota: An Informal Legal History of the Years 1835 to 1865, 2 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv.
1, 6 (1976).
491. Id. at 14.
492. See note 486 supra and accompanying text.
493. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1507 (1850).
494. "I shall do full justice, but no more," he wrote to his wife. "I do not propose to murder
any man, even a savage, who is shown to be innocent of the great transgression, or to permit the
massacre of women and children." Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Mrs. Henry Sibley (Oct.
20, 1862), in Sibley Papers, MHS. The role he played weighed heavily on his mind. Several days
earlier he had written to his wife:
I have to review all the proceedings, and decide the fate of each individual. This power of
life, and death, is an awful thing to exercise, and when I think of more than three hundred
human beings are subject to that power, lodged in my hands, it makes me shudder. Still,
duty must be performed, and judgment visited upon the guilty.
Letter from Brig. Gen. Henry Sibley to Mrs. Henry Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in Sibley Papers, MHS.
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carried out their threats to attack and kill the entire Dakota community.
Moreover, by holding trials, Sibley left a more substantial record of the
events of 1862, providing greater opportunity for challenging the treatment
of the Dakota. To the Dakota, however, who never doubted their own sover-
eignty, the trials were incomprehensible and an affront to their dignity. Be-
cause they gave a pretense of process with little actual fairness, with an
underlying absence of authority, and with no recognition of Dakota sover-
eignty, the trials obscured the ultimate injustice to the Dakota nation.
The events of 1862 also suggest something more general about the limits
of law in society. To fully serve its purposes, the law must do more than
simply define boundaries of behavior and punish those who overstep the
boundaries. Law must be more than the routine exercise of power.495 It
must "guide and educate" those subject to it and validate itself ethically in
the eyes of the governed as well as in the eyes of the ruling class.4 96 Groups
that form the polity must either share the norms of behavior reflected in the
law or accept that the system that produces those standards represents the
best interests of the community of which they are a part, even if some indi-
vidual rule is not consistent with their own self-interest. Law is justified-
and effective-only insofar as it reflects the community's shared values or is
the product of a process viewed as legitimate by the governed.
In a relatively homogeneous society, or one in which cultural assimila-
tion of new groups is the expectation and the reality, the law can easily fulfill
this role. But those assumptions no longer apply in American society, if they
ever did. We now recognize the very different realities that exist for cultur-
ally distinct subgroups of the governed.497 As we thus approach a more truly
pluralistic society, acknowledging and (sometimes) valuing the separateness
and individuality of the nation's constituent groups, the validity of duly en-
acted legal rules is no longer assured.498
The United States-Dakota War trials starkly illustrate the limits of law
when the governors and the governed do not share an understanding, much
less an acceptance, of the forms of law used and the norms applied. Because
of the wide cultural gulf separating the Dakota from the Americans, the
Dakota did not in 1862, and do not today, fully understand why trials were
495. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRIrICAL LEGAL STUDIES 263 (1987); EUGENE
GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 27 (1974).
496. E. GENOVESE, supra note 495; see also Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Crimi-
nal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17
(1975); M. KELMAN, supra note 495, at 262-68. But cf Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in
the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379 (discussing generally the legitimacy of laws).
497. See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CTIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1989) (discussing United States' treatment of culturally distinct subgroups
under the Constitution).
498. See, eg., People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (L.A. Super. Ct. 1985) (Japanese mother
charged only with involuntary manslaughter in death of her two children where her actions would
have only been deemed involuntary manslaughter in Japan); Nat'l L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 3, col. I
(Chinese immigrant received lightest possible sentence for the murder of his wife after successfully
asserting "cultural defense"-cultural factors lessening the defendant's responsibility for certain
crimes).
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held, why some men were convicted and some were not, or why the thirty-
eight, and later two more, were chosen to hang. If, as appears to be true, the
United States intended the trials to "guide and educate" the Dakota-to
confirm the acceptable standards of behavior and to serve as a warning about
the consequences of future violations-then the trials failed to achieve their
didactic purpose. The defendants and the rest of the Dakota community ac-
quiesced in their treatment; they had no choice.499 But with no opportunity
for the governed to understand the treatment they received, the trials and
executions became an exercise of power, not law.
499. In this they seem less like the governed described by Genovese and Hay, see text accom-
panying note 496 supra, and much more like the criminal defendant who sits quietly through his trial
and walks calmly, escorted to prolonged confinement, not because of any shared understanding of
the rules but because of the "overwhelming array of violence ranged against him." See Robert M.
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1607 (1986).
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APPENDIX
The following is a list of abbreviations I have used to refer to material con-
tained at the National Archives and the Minnesota Historical Society:
Documents at the National Archives
Court Martial Cases,
NARG 153, File NN3132
Indian Prisoners, NARG
94 (Entry 173)
Letters Rec'd, NARG 393
(Entry 346)
Letters Ree'd-Adj. Gen.,
NARG 94
Letters and Telegrams
Sent, NARG 393 (Entry
343)
Letters Sent-Indian
Expedition, NARG 393
(Entry 354)
Letters Sent-JAG, NARG
153 (Entry 1)
Military Orders, NARG
94
Court Martial Case Files; Records of the Immediate
Office of the Judge Advocate General; Records of the
Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), 1808-
1942; Record Group 153, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
Indian Prisoners, 1861-1865; Civil War, 1861-1865;
Records Relating to Wars, 1812-1943; General
Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record
Group 94 (Entry 173); National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
Letters Received, 1862-1869; District of Minnesota,
Nov. 1862-June 1873; Geographical Districts and
Subdistricts; United States Army Continental
Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (Entry
346); National Archives, Washington, D.C.
File 51-1866; Sioux Uprising in Minnesota in 1862,
1862-1916; (National Archives Microfilm Publication
M619, roll 483); Letters Received by the Office of the
Adjutant General, Main Series, 1861-1870; Records of
the Adjutant General's Office, 1780s-1917, Record
Group 94; National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Nov. 1862-Oct. 1873;
District of Minnesota, Nov. 1862-June 1873;
Geographical Districts and Subdistricts; United States
Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record
Group 393 (Entry 343); National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
Letters Sent, June-Oct. 1862; Daffy Journal of the
Indian Expedition, June-Sept. 1863; District of
Minnesota, Nov. 1862-June 1873; Geographical
Districts and Subdistricts; United States Army
Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group
393 (Entry 354); National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Letters Sent, 1842-1889; Records of the Immediate
Office of the Judge Advocate General; Records of the
Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), 1808-
1942, Record Group 153 (Entry 1); National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
Orders and Circulars, 1797-1910; Orders, 1797-1939;
General Records of the Adjutant General's Office,
Record Group 94; National Archives, Washington,
D.C.
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Military Orders-Mexican
War, NARG 94 (Entry
134)
Military Orders-Mexican
War (Puebla), NARG 94
(Entry 134)
Military Orders-Mexican
War (Volunteer Div.),
NARG 94 (Entry 134)
Military Orders-Mexican
War (Gen. Scott), NARG
94 (Entry 134)
Trial Transcripts
Orders, 1845-48; Mexican War, 1845-50; Records
Relating to Wars, 1812-1943; General Records of the
Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94 (Entry
134); National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Mexican War Department of Puebla Orders and
Special Orders, March-June 1848; Orders, 1845-48;
Mexican War, 1845-50; Records Relating to Wars,
1812-1943; General Records of the Adjutant General's
Office, Record Group 94 (Entry 134); National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
General and Special Orders, February 18-December
18, 1847, Mexican War Volunteer Division Issued and
Received; Orders, 1845-48; Mexican War, 1845-50;
Records Relating to Wars, 1812-1943; General
Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record
Group 94 (Entry 134); National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
Worth's and Scott's Command Orders, Issued and
Received, June 1846-July 1847; Orders, 1845-48;
Mexican War, 1845-50; Records Relating to Wars,
1812-1943; General Records of the Adjutant General's
Office, Record Group 94 (Entry 134); National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
Senate Records 37A-F2, Original Transcripts of the
Records of Trials of Certain Sioux Indians Charged
with Barbarities in the State of Minnesota; National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
Documents at the Minnesota Historical Society
ABCFM Papers, MHS
Riggs Letters, WPA-
Chippewa County Project,
MIIS
Riggs Papers, MHS
Sibley Papers, MHS
[microfilm]
Sioux Uprising Collection,
MHS
Sioux War Trials, MHS
P1423
Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for
Foreign Missions, 1827-1878; File BA10.A512b,
Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Letters of Stephen R. Riggs; Works Progress
Administration, Chippewa County Museum Project
1465, 1936-37; File FF612.W9C5 (vol. 13), Minnesota
Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Stephen Return Riggs and Family Papers, 1837-1958;
File P727, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul,
Minnesota.
Henry Hastings Sibley Papers, 1815-1930; File M164,
Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Sioux Uprising Collection; File P1369, Minnesota
Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota.
U.S. Army; Military Commission, Sioux War Trials,
1862; Trial Transcripts; File P1423, Minnesota
Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota.
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Whipple Papers, MHS Henry Benjamin Whipple Papers, 1833-1934; File
P823, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul,
Minnesota.
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